Following the Uniformitarian Principle, the Performance–Grammar Correspondence Hypothesis (PGCH; Hawkins 2004) predicts a directionality in language change: if the same content can be expressed by two competing structures and one of these is easier to process (see Hawkins 1999, 2004), then the simpler structure will be preferred in performance. Consequently, it will be used more often with a greater range of different lexical items, which increases its type frequency and ultimately leads to it being more cognitively entrenched than its alternative (see Hawkins 2004: 6). As an analysis of the diachronic evolution of the family of English comparative correlative constructions (the more iconic cause–before–effect C1C2 construction the more you eat, the fatter you get vs the less iconic effect–before–cause C2C1 construction you get the fatter, the more you eat) shows, however, the PGCH only played a secondary role in the genesis of this set of constructions. In this article, I will present a usage-based constructionist approach that allows researchers to reinterpret the classical Structuralist notion of gaps in the system as gaps in the mental constructional network. This type of Cognitive Structuralist analysis accounts for the presence of the less iconic C2C1 structure (and the absence of the more iconic C1C2 structure) in OE, the genesis of C1C2 structures at the end of the OE period as well as the processing effects predicted by the PGCH once both the C1C2 and the C2C1 constructions were in competition during the ME period.

Historical linguistics is a field that, perhaps more than other branches of linguistics, can be said to exhibit a certain conservatism. To be clear, this term is not meant in any traditional political sense. Rather it is meant to capture the notion that, as a discipline, diachronic studies seem to accept and build on previous theories and empirical findings to a greater extent than do most synchronic subdisciplines. This may be because data are comparatively rare and hard to come by. One result of this scarcity is that, once analyzed, there are fewer opportunities for reanalysis predicated on new data. There are, of course, occasions when more or less radical proposals are brought forward subsequently, which result in debates of the kind which are much more common in synchronic syntax, say, or phonology. The reconstruction of the Indo-European consonant system (Beekes 1995: 132–4 provides a summary), for example, continues to be debated almost two hundred years after it was first proposed.

Assuming that the Uniformitarian Principle refers to processes of production and perception, I argue that it remains invaluable for work on language in the last five thousand years or so, the period of linguistic historical record. In this article I show that some proposals about the development of ‘insubordination’ (Evans 2007), particularly those that link it to degrammaticalization (e.g. Higashiizumi 2006 on because-monoclauses; Brinton 2014 on as if clauses), are artifacts of theory (Kaiser & Struckmeier 2015), and do not conform to processes that can be projected from a Uniformitarian Process Principle that pays attention to interactional practices. I investigate evidence in the history of English for the development of finite independent monoclauses that are introduced by subordinators, for example, Because you don't understand, If we could see that picture again, As if you are not gorgeous. I conclude that, at least in English, such monoclauses are chunks that are used incrementally in on-line interaction, just like independent NPs and prepositional and adverbial phrases (Ford et al. 2002; Couper-Kuhlen 2011; see also Lindström & Londen 2008 on Swedish monoclauses with subordinators; Gras & Sansineña 2015 on Spanish monoclausal que-constructions). In such cases degrammaticalization is not relevant. The Uniformitarian Processes Principle can serve as an important corrective on artifacts of theory.

In one way or another, historical linguists have always been aware of the limitations inherent to working with linguistic data from bygone ages. One of the most substantial limitations, as Petré points out, is that all speakers of a historical variant of a language are unavailable for psycholinguistic study, essentially leaving researchers with their written records as the sole data source. As such, historical linguists often find themselves taking the role of corpus linguists, trying to understand the workings of a language ‘by studying aggregate data that pools the productions of many speakers and writers – often across different media, genres, registers, and even across different time periods’ (Arppe et al.2010: 3). As Petré points out, the practice of studying language on this aggregate level has dominated the methodologies in historical linguistic studies, and very little attention is paid to the individual level.

Thomas Hoffmann's article proposes a cognitively viable theoretical framework for explaining how constructions can emerge in the history of a language. The case which Hoffmann discusses is the coming into being of the comparative correlative construction of the type The smaller a car is, the easier it is to park in late Old English and early Middle English. While car sizes and parking spaces were perhaps not a matter for discussion among speakers of that time, it was for them as important as it is for us to be able to say that if any two things differ in one respect, then they also differ in another (for details on the construction's semantics, see Beck 1997; Cappelle 2011). In this particular comparative correlative construction, the first part (C1, for ‘clause 1’) is interpreted as standing in a sort of protasis relation to the apodosis-like second part (C2, for ‘clause 2’). That is, this C1C2 construction reflects, in an iconically appropriate way, the order of a hypothetical statement followed by its consequence.

Research in our time offers a welcome flood tide of investigation into how cognitively modern human beings use their basic mental operations to think and act. With luck, it will not ebb. It could become standard, in the way that calculus, once it arose, abided. This tide offers special emphasis, crucial for this issue, on the cognitive origins and operations of language and literature, and in particular on the ways in which systems of multimodal forms can be deployed to prompt for mental operation.

Building on previous studies that have discussed pronominal referencing in Old English (Traugott 1992; van Gelderen 2013; van Kemenade & Los 2017), the present study analyses the pronominal anaphoric strategies of the West Saxon dialect of Old English based on a quantitative and qualitative study of personal and demonstrative pronoun usage across a selection of late (post c. AD 900) Old English prose text types. The historical data discussed in the present study provide important additional support for modern cognitive and psycholinguistic theory. In line with the cognitive/psycholinguistic literature on the distribution of pronouns in Modern German (Bosch & Umbach 2007), the information-structural properties of referents rather than the grammatical role of the pronoun's antecedent most accurately explain the personal pronoun vs demonstrative pronoun contrast in the West Saxon dialect of Old English. The findings also highlight how issues pertaining to style, such as the author–writer relationship, text type, subject matter and the conventionalism propagated by text tradition, influence anaphoric strategies in Old English.

Generative grammar has its beginnings in the late 1950s with the work of Noam Chomsky and emphasizes innate linguistic knowledge, or Universal Grammar. Children use their innate knowledge and, on the basis of the language they hear spoken, also known as the E(xternalized)-Language, come up with a grammar, also known as the I(nternalized)-Language (see Chomsky 1986: 19–24). Generative grammar focuses on the ability of native speakers to speak and understand grammatical sentences.

While it is undoubtedly true that historical data do not lend themselves well to the reproduction of experimental findings, the availability of increasingly extensive data sets has brought some experimenting within practical reach. This means that certain predictions based on a combination of synchronic observations and uniformitarian thinking are now testable. Synchronic evidence shows a negative correlation between analysability in morphologically complex words and various measures of frequency. It is therefore expected that when the frequency of morphologically complex items changes, their analysability will change along with this. If analysability decreases, this should in turn be reflected in decreasing sensitivity to priming by items with analogous composition. The latter prediction is in principle testable on diachronic data, offering a way of verifying the diachronic effect of frequency change on analysability. In this spirit, the present article examines the relation between changing frequency and priming sensitivity, as a proxy to analysability. This is done for a sample of 250 English ly-adverbs, such as roughly, blindly, publicly, etc. over the period 1950–2005, using data from the Hansard Corpus. Some of the expected relations between frequency and analysability can be shown to hold, albeit with great variation across lexical items. At the same time, much of the variation in our measure of analysability cannot be accounted for by frequency or frequency change alone.

In her article ‘Connecting the past and the present’, Meike Pentrel examines the order of main clause and adverbial clause introduced by before or after in Samuel Pepys's diary from the point of view of the cognitive literature on processing constraints. The thread that is shared by all contributions of this special issue is that of the hypothesis of uniformitarianism, which states that cognitive processes have remained constant in the documented history of humanity. Pentrel aims at corroborating this hypothesis by testing if the processing constraints found at work in this seventeenth-century ego-document examined by her are similar to those that have been observed in contemporary language.

This brief response to Elizabeth Closs Traugott's contribution ‘“Insubordination” in the light of the Uniformitarian Principle’ could begin with John Lennon: ‘Imagine there is no. . . sentence.’

The present article studies the linear order of main and temporal adverbial clauses in the Diary of Samuel Pepys (1660–1669). In the development of a framework that combines cognitive and historical data, processing principles identified for Present-day English (e.g. Prideaux 1989; Diessel 2008) are tested for this ego-document from the seventeenth century. The factors investigated are the iconic temporal order of both clauses, the length of the adverbial clause and the implied meaning of the clauses. Moreover, the discourse function of the respective clauses will be discussed. On the basis of the Uniformitarian Principle, the present study assumes that processing principles that are valid for Present-day English predict the position of the clause in past language stages to a similar extent.

Plainly, the effort to apply to historical language study the insights to be derived from synchronic linguistic analysis is fraught with difficulties. The problem is usually conceptualized – as it is by several of the contributors to the present collection of studies – as a difficult marriage of disciplined methods to obstreperous data, a mismatched union somehow to be mediated by the Uniformitarian Principle. To understand the issues properly, then, it would seem a prerequisite to be able to identify what, exactly, the Uniformitarian Principle is. Yet that question itself has no simple answer, in part because the question can be interpreted in at least two ways, both of them bearing directly upon the aims of this collection.

What do we know about the past? For at least some languages, we have textual (or archaeological) evidence from various periods – beyond that, there is only reconstruction. But even when we have some textual evidence, what does it tell us? The answer to this question crucially depends on the way we approach the question: we can treat texts as decontextualized, linguistic evidence, as Neogrammarian or Structuralist studies have done (see McMahon 1994: 17–32). Such an approach already allows us to discover important generalizations about the linguistic state of affairs of a particular language or historical period. Using decontextualized historical evidence, for example, we can already ascertain with a high degree of certainty that in Old English voiced and voiceless fricatives were allophones, rather than phonemes, that there was no do-periphrasis in Middle English, and that in Early Modern English there was some variability between third-person singular present tense {-s} and {-th} – just as we know that present-day Japanese and Korean use postpositions, rather than prepositions.

Marcelle Cole presents an interesting study of pronominal reference in Old English, nicely supplementing work available in the literature which shows, in brief, that in contexts with more than one possible referent, clause-initial nominative personal pronouns dominantly continue the topic (subject) of the previous clause, whereas clause-initial se-demonstratives dominantly switch the topic to a new referent of the previous clause. Cole adds to this with a study of the overall use of clause-initial pronouns in five Old English texts, which shows more variation than expected on the basis of this literature. Her conclusion is that se-forms by and large pick up discourse-new referents from the previous context. She further claims that her findings highlight how issues pertaining to style, such as the author–writer relationship, text type, subject matter and the conventionalism propagated by text tradition, influence anaphoric strategies in Old English. In this response article. I wish to counterbalance Cole's argument on two points, and make some suggestions for further research, based on recent psycholinguistic work.