The American public is increasingly affectively polarized. A growing body of research has associated affective polarization with two key phenomena: ideological polarization and social group sorting. Although there is ample evidence that social group sorting, particularly along racial and ethnic lines, is driving Republicans’ affect toward the Democratic Party, it is not clear how it shapes Democrats’, particularly White Democrats’, feelings toward the predominantly White Republican Party. We propose a third model that bridges these two theoretical approaches, a racial ideology model that helps explain Democrats’ feelings toward the Republican Party. Specifically, we argue that Democrats increasingly dislike Republicans because Republicans are seen as standing in opposition to racially progressive policies. Using a preregistered conjoint experiment, we find that Americans across party lines see Republicans as opposing efforts to reduce racial inequality and that this perception is associated with negative affect toward the Republican Party among both White and non-White Democrats.

The boom in survey experiments in international relations has allowed researchers to make causal inferences on longstanding foreign policy debates such as democratic peace, and audience costs. However, most of these experiments rely on mass samples, whereas foreign policy is arguably more technocratically driven. We probe the validity of generalizing from mass to elite preferences by exploring preferences of ordinary U.S. citizens and foreign policy experts (employees of the U.S. Department of State) in two identical conjoint experiments on democratic peace. We find that experts are not only more opposed to military actions against other democracies than members of the public—but also that overall preferences about the matters of war and peace are stronger among foreign policy professionals.

The literature in political science considers (sometimes inaccurate) perceptions of immigrants as a factor in anti-immigration attitudes among natives, but much less is known about perceptions regarding immigrants from specific regions. In this paper, I explore Americans’ perceptions about immigrants from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. To measure these perceptions, I apply a conjoint experiment with a multinomial outcome, in which respondents are asked to categorize hypothetical immigrants as coming from one of the five regions. Results from a nationally diverse sample demonstrate that immigrants from all regions other than Europe are associated with speaking poor English. Immigrants from Latin America are also associated with welfare dependency and rule-breaking behavior, while the opposite is true for immigrants from Asia. These negative perceptions may at least partly explain opposition to non-European, and specifically Latin American, immigration in the United States.

Social construction theory postulates that policy outcomes depend on whether target groups are imagined by the public as deserving or undeserving. However, recent evidence demonstrates that the constructions in question are contentious rather than uniformly shared. This article applies the conjoint-experimental method to measure the social construction of immigrant (il)legality and to assess its political implications. We demonstrate that it is multidimensional because the absence of legal status is associated with receipt of government benefits, Hispanic origin, police record, poor English fluency, and less education. We also show that whereas the receipt of government benefits is not associated with the absence of legal status among most respondents, individuals who hold this association support stricter immigration-enforcement policies. Our findings corroborate the social construction approach but also indicate that researchers may want to measure multiple dimensions of target-group constructions in addition to deservingness.

Businesspeople are expected to invest in political connections when the institutions are weak. Using an original dataset from Russia in 2003–2010, we document changes in political connections of the richest businesspeople and show that within the institutional environment of a fledgling autocracy political engagement stops paying off, and the businesspeople retreat from politics. The businesspeople’s political disengagement reveals their insider assessment of the quality of Russian political institutions, indicating that as autocracy consolidated in Russia, its political institutional structure was in decay. This finding contributes to our understanding of authoritarian institutions, suggesting that even though autocracies nowadays might be institutionalized to a much higher degree, in the short-run autocracy is still detrimental to institutionalization.

What are the relative contributions of stereotypes about the race and deservingness of welfare recipients to Americans’ opinions on welfare? A recent study employing a conjoint-experimental method finds that Americans’ stereotypes of welfare recipients as undeserving drive negative attitudes toward welfare, while stereotypes of welfare recipients as Black have little effect. However, this finding may be produced by the measure of welfare attitudes that includes questions implicating deservingness. We implement a conceptual replication of that study using different measures of welfare policy opinions that directly ask respondents about spending, both on welfare generally and on specific welfare programs. We show that when support for welfare is measured using the spending questions, stereotypes about race are significantly associated with opposition to welfare. These results have important implications for the debate on Americans’ opposition to welfare programs, as well as for the measurement of policy opinions in surveys.

Two parallel processes structure American politics in the current moment: partisan polarization and the increasing linkage between racial attitudes and issue preferences of all sorts. We develop a novel theory that roots these two trends in historical changes in party coalitions. Changing racial compositions of the two major parties led to the formation of racialized images about Democrats and Republicans in people’s minds—and these images now structure Americans’ partisan loyalties and policy preferences. We test this theory in three empirical studies. First, using the American National Election Studies we trace the growing racial gap in party coalitions as well as the increasing overlap between racial and partisan affect. Then, in two original survey studies we directly measure race–party schemas and explore their political consequences. We demonstrate that race–party schemas are linked to partisan affect and issue preferences—with clear implications for the recent developments in U.S. politics.

Conjoint experiments are quickly gaining popularity as a vehicle for studying multidimensional political preferences. A common way to explore heterogeneity of preferences estimated with conjoint experiments is by estimating average marginal component effects across subgroups. However, this method does not give the researcher the full access to the variation of preferences in the studied populations, as that would require estimating effects on the individual level. Currently, there is no accepted technique to obtain estimates of individual-level preferences from conjoint experiments. The present paper addresses this gap by proposing a procedure to estimate individual preferences as respondent-specific marginal component effects. The proposed strategy does not require any additional assumptions compared to the standard conjoint analysis, although some changes to the task design are recommended. Methods to account for uncertainty in resulting estimates are also discussed. Using the proposed procedure, I partially replicate a conjoint experiment on immigrant admission with recommended design adjustments. Then, I demonstrate how individual marginal component effects can be used to explore distributions of preferences, intercorrelations between different preference dimensions, and relationships of preferences to other variables of interest.