The health benefits of the long-chain omega-3 polyunsaturated fatty acids (PUFA), eicosapentaenoic acid (EPA) and docosahexaenoic acid (DHA) have been known for over 50 years and underpin the UK population recommendation to consume >450 mg EPA + DHA per day. These recommendations, last revised in 2004, are based mainly on epidemiological evidence. Much research has been conducted in the interim. Most randomised controlled trials (RCT) use doses of EPA + DHA of 840 mg/d or more. For anti-inflammatory, triacylglycerol-lowering and anti-hypertensive effects, >1.5 g EPA + DHA per day is needed. Cognitive benefits are also likely to require these higher intakes. Farmed salmon now contains considerably less EPA + DHA relative to farmed fish of 20 years ago, meaning one portion per week will no longer provide the equivalent of 450 mg EPA + DHA per day. Oily fish alone can only provide a fraction of the EPA + DHA required to meet global needs. Furthermore, there is low global oily fish consumption, with typical intakes of <200 mg EPA + DHA per day, and limited intakes in vegans and vegetarians. Therefore, there is an urgent need for affordable, acceptable, alternative EPA + DHA sources, including vegan/vegetarian friendly options, such as bio-enriched poultry, red meat and milk products; fortified foods; enriched oilseeds (for example, genetically modified Camelina sativa); algae and algal oils; and approaches which enhance endogenous EPA/DHA synthesis. In this narrative review, we suggest that current EPA + DHA intake recommendations are too low, consider EPA/DHA from a holistic health-sustainability perspective and identify research, policy and knowledge mobilisation areas which need attention.

Electoral boundaries are an integral part of election administration. District boundaries delineate which legislative election voters are eligible to participate in, and precinct boundaries identify, in many localities, where voters cast in-person ballots on Election Day. Election officials are tasked with resolving a tremendously large number of intersections of registered voters with overlapping electoral boundaries. Any large-scale data project is susceptible to errors, and this task is no exception. In two recent close elections, these errors were consequential to the outcome. To address this problem, we describe a method to audit the assignment of registered voters to districts. We apply the methodology to Florida’s voter registration file to identify thousands of registered voters assigned to the wrong state House district, many of which local election officials have verified and rectified. We discuss how election officials can best use this technique to detect registered voters assigned to the wrong electoral boundary.

Numerical issues matter in statistical analysis. Small errors occur when numbers are translated from paper and pencil into the binary world of computers. Surprisingly, these errors may be propagated and magnified through binary calculations, eventually producing statistical estimates far from the truth. In this replication and extension article, we look at one method of verifying the accuracy of statistical estimates by running these same data and models on multiple statistical packages. We find that for two published articles, Nagler (1994, American Journal of Political Science 38:230-255) and Alvarez and Brehm (1995, American Journal of Political Science 39:1055-1089), results are dependent on the statistical package used. In the course of our replications, we uncover other pitfalls that may prevent accurate replication, and make recommendations to ensure the ability for future researchers to replicate results.

Consumers of the National Election Study (NES) should be concerned if the survey has a bias that is increasing with time. A recent article by Barry Burden claims that for presidential elections, there is an increasing overreport bias, or turnout gap, between the NES turnout rate and the observed turnout rate caused by declining NES response rates. I show that the increasing turnout gap is an artifact of the universes these two turnout rates are based on. Reconciling the two universes shows no systematic increase of the reconciled turnout gap in presidential elections from 1948 to 2000, and furthermore demonstrates that the post-1976 rise in NES response rates (until 2000) is rewarded in a lower turnout gap. In addition, I offer another theory to explain the turnout gap. If respondents have an equal propensity to misreport that they voted when they did not, as turnout declines, the number of nonvoter respondents increases and so does the turnout gap. I show that in multivariate analysis this theory outperforms Burden's response rate driven theory, though neither theory reaches statistical significance.

Presidential vote shares in legislative districts are widely available for congressional districts and are often used by scholars in their research. Here, I describe the general methodology to construct statewide vote shares within districts and apply these methods to a new database of presidential vote shares within 36 states' legislative districts.

The 2010 midterm elections are consequential not only in terms of the candidates who were elected to office, but also in terms of the government policies that they will enact. High on the list of important policies is the decennial practice of drawing new redistricting plans for legislative offices. A new census reveals population shifts that will result in a reallocation of congressional seats among the states through apportionment and—following U.S. Supreme Court rulings in the 1960s—a re-balancing of congressional and state legislative district populations within states that aims to give fast-growing areas more representation and slow-growing areas less. Of course, much more than an innocuous administrative adjustment occurs during the process of redistricting. The individuals who draw districts are keenly aware that district lines may affect the fortunes of incumbents, political parties, and minority voters' candidates of choice.

Political scientists serve in courtrooms as expert witnesses on many topics related to their professional training: elections, same-sex marriages, employer sanctions for hiring undocumented aliens, school desegregation, political asylum requests, property rights, and racial profiling, among many others. It is not by chance that we—the authors—have chosen to testify as experts in cases concerning elections (see also Cain 1999). Election-related cases compose a large percentage of all cases involving political scientists brought to court: a study of references to expert testimony by political scientists in published federal district court decisions from 1950 through 1989 reports that 61% involved election law issues (Leigh 1991). Our replication of this study for the period of 2000 through December 18, 2010, reveals that 74% of such cases (28 of 38) involved election law issues. These cases involved issues of minority vote dilution, redistricting, alternative election systems (cumulative and limited voting), campaign financing, voting equipment and invalid ballots, voter registration, nominating petition requirements, and a number of other issues.

College professors are evaluated for promotion and tenure on the basis of their accomplishments in three areas: teaching, research, and service. All too often, however, service is considered the poor cousin of the trio. In political science in particular, we believe that this imbalance is detrimental to the individual scholar, our students, the discipline, and the general public. The goal of this symposium is to contribute to what we see as a nascent revitalization and rehabilitation of service—especially public service—as a respectable and integral part of a political science career. We encourage our colleagues to engage the political world more often, more directly, and more reflectively, and we encourage the profession—the APSA, our departments, and our colleagues—to value such engagement institutionally and through our social norms.

In September 2006, we investigated a cluster of 9 patients who developed Enterococcus gallinarum infection after total knee arthroplasty. Isolates recovered from these patients were from the same outbreak strain. Although all 9 patients were monitored by the same healthcare personnel, were given spinal anesthesia, and had the same specific type of wound irrigation procedure performed during their hospitalization, the source or sources of these infections were not identified.

As 2010 nears, state governments are preparing for the decennialpolitical ritual of equalizing legislative district population asrevealed by the new census. If the past is a guide, legislatureswill grind to a standstill as legislators wrestle with thepolitically charged task of redistricting. But where legislators,party leaders, staff, consultants, and lawyers spend considerabletime, effort, and money on their obsession with district boundaries,political scientists come to mixed conclusions about redistricting'seffect on electoral politics. About the only consensus reached is onthe electoral effects of racial gerrymandering, where debate hasshifted to its normative implications.

We read with interest David C. Earnest's recent (July 2006) PS article about the pedagogical challenges surrounding the statistical computation of pseudo-random numbers (PRNGs). We write to clarify some issues regarding the testing and setting of PRNG seeds, and to direct readers' attention to a set of resources for configuring computationally accurate simulations and statistical analyses.

In “Don't Blame Redistricting for Uncompetitive Elections” in thisissue of PS: Political Science and Politics,Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning (2006) argue that redistrictingis not responsible for the decline in the number of competitivedistricts, defined as a district with a near balance ofpartisanship. Further, the authors claim that non-partisanredistricting institutions are not correlated with the number ofcompetitive districts. The relationship between redistrictinginstitutions and competitive districts is of importance not only toacademics who study redistricting and elections, but also to policymakers and reformers who advocate redistricting reform. If theseclaims are true, then policymakers are expending much misguidedeffort to enact redistricting reform to treat the greater problem ofthe decline of electoral competition in recent U.S. congressionalelections.

I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to Abramowitz,Alexander, and Gunning's (2006b) rejoinder to my critique of theirarticle appearing in this same issue entitled “Don't BlameRedistricting for Uncompetitive Elections” (2006a). We should havehad a scholarly debate that informed the profession and raisedinteresting questions in one of the widest read journals. Instead,Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning mischaracterize my arguments asif this was a political talk show debate, and it is telling thatthey never directly quote me in their rejoinder. The few sourcescited in support of their methodology, upon close inspection,provide no support to their measurement choice or findings. I hopethat fair-minded readers will carefully evaluate all material,including cited sources, to reach their own judgment. I concludethis article with some thoughts that I hope shed light on the lowlevels of electoral competition that Abramowitz, Alexander, andGunning and I agree characterize current congressionalelections.

Legislative redistricting is among the most intensely fought battles in American politics. Through redistricting, political parties seek to control government, incumbents seek job security, and minority groups seek representation. I explore how the various United States redistricting institutions, and the political actors who operate within them, determined the outcomes of the 2001-02 redistricting cycle. I categorize these institutions into two types: redistricting that follows the normal legislative process and that which takes place through a commission. For those states that use the legislative process, when one party controls state government, redistricting results in a partisan gerrymander. When there is divided state government, a bipartisan compromise results from the legislative process. Commission systems differ on membership and voting rules, suggesting two types of commissions: partisan and bipartisan. A partisan commission reliably produces a partisan map, while a bipartisan commission results in a bipartisan compromise.

Scholars have long been fascinated with how rearranging voters into districts affects the power of political parties, the careers of incumbents, and the representation of minorities. In this special issue, “Electoral Redistricting,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly brings together articles that touch on the three subfields of redistricting research: redistricting to advance the interests of partisans, incumbents, and racial groups. SPPQ is an excellent venue for these articles. The states are largely granted congressional redistricting authority in Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, and they have the responsibility for determining their own sub-state electoral districts. And comparative state analysis provides an excellent research design to study the general impacts of political geography, redistricting institutions, and redistricting criteria.