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A truly unique all-embracing narrative of the American war in Afghanistan from the own words of its architects. Choosing Defeat takes an unparalleled inside look at America's longest war, pulling back the curtain on the inner deliberations behind the scenes. The author combines his own extensive experience in the Army, the CIA, and the White House, with interviews from policymakers within the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations, to produce a groundbreaking study of how American leaders make wartime decisions. Transporting you inside the White House Situation Room, every key strategic debate over twenty years – from the immediate aftermath of 9/11, to Obama's surge and withdrawal, to Trump's negotiations with the Taliban, and Biden's final pullout is carefully reconstructed. Paul D. Miller identifies issues in US leadership, governance, military strategy, and policymaking that extend beyond the war in Afghanistan and highlight the existence of deeper problems in American foreign policy.
Multicenter clinical trials are essential for evaluating interventions but often face significant challenges in study design, site coordination, participant recruitment, and regulatory compliance. To address these issues, the National Institutes of Health’s National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences established the Trial Innovation Network (TIN). The TIN offers a scientific consultation process, providing access to clinical trial and disease experts who provide input and recommendations throughout the trial’s duration, at no cost to investigators. This approach aims to improve trial design, accelerate implementation, foster interdisciplinary teamwork, and spur innovations that enhance multicenter trial quality and efficiency. The TIN leverages resources of the Clinical and Translational Science Awards (CTSA) program, complementing local capabilities at the investigator’s institution. The Initial Consultation process focuses on the study’s scientific premise, design, site development, recruitment and retention strategies, funding feasibility, and other support areas. As of 6/1/2024, the TIN has provided 431 Initial Consultations to increase efficiency and accelerate trial implementation by delivering customized support and tailored recommendations. Across a range of clinical trials, the TIN has developed standardized, streamlined, and adaptable processes. We describe these processes, provide operational metrics, and include a set of lessons learned for consideration by other trial support and innovation networks.
Background: Antibiotics are frequently prescribed in patients with COVID-19 infections to treat secondary bacterial pneumonia. The pneumonia panel (PNP) is a molecular diagnostic tool that rapidly detects 33 bacterial and viral targets. The utility of this panel in COVID-19 patients and how it may direct antibiotic use is unknown. We sought to understand the utilization of PNP in patients with COVID-19 pneumonia over time by comparing clinical parameters, microbiologic results, and antibiotic use between May–December 2020 and January–July 2022. Methods: We implemented the PNP in May 2020 with antimicrobial stewardship guidance, provider education, and order restriction to critical care and infectious disease clinicians. From February–July 2021 prescribers received regular structured antimicrobial stewardship feedback regarding PNP results; from August 2021 to January 2022, no antimicrobial stewardship feedback was provided; from February to July 2022, intermittent feedback was provided. We compared PNP and culture results from sputum or bronchoalveolar lavage samples and antibiotic use and modification within 24 hours of PNP result from patients with confirmed COVID-19 pneumonia between May–December 2020 and January–July 2022. Clinical data and antibiotic use were abstracted through chart review. We excluded patients who died within 72 hours of PNP, those who had concurrent nonpulmonary infections, and those whose COVID-19 test was >30 days prior. Results: We included 114 patients in 2020 and 71 patients in 2022. The overall median age was 61 years, 71% were male, and 66% were mechanically ventilated without statistical differences between the cohorts, including their comorbidities. Acute or worsening hypoxia remained the predominant indication for PNP (77% in 2020 vs 75% in 2022, NS). The median number of days between admission and PNP was 4 (IQR, 1–8) in 2020 versus 3 (IQR, 1–7), and the difference was not significant. PNP and culture results in Table 1 show that Staphylococcus aureus and Hemophilus influenzae were the pathogens most commonly identified. Table 2 describes empiric prescribing and modifications for commonly prescribed antibiotics. Prescribers used empiric cefepime and ceftriaxone more in 2020 and vancomycin more in the 2022 group; however, these were not statistically significant. Cefepime de-escalation was more common in 2022 (53% vs 28%; P = .03). Antibiotic modifications within 24 hours of PNP remained similar in 2020 vs 2022. Although vancomycin cessation was more common in 2020 (78%) versus 2022 (57%), the difference was not statistically significant. Conclusions: With ASP guidance, PNP may be a useful tool to stop or target antibiotics for secondary bacterial pneumonia in COVID-19 pneumonia. Early vancomycin cessation (prior to culture results) may be an enduring consequence of PNP implementation.
Several hypotheses may explain the association between substance use, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and depression. However, few studies have utilized a large multisite dataset to understand this complex relationship. Our study assessed the relationship between alcohol and cannabis use trajectories and PTSD and depression symptoms across 3 months in recently trauma-exposed civilians.
Methods
In total, 1618 (1037 female) participants provided self-report data on past 30-day alcohol and cannabis use and PTSD and depression symptoms during their emergency department (baseline) visit. We reassessed participant's substance use and clinical symptoms 2, 8, and 12 weeks posttrauma. Latent class mixture modeling determined alcohol and cannabis use trajectories in the sample. Changes in PTSD and depression symptoms were assessed across alcohol and cannabis use trajectories via a mixed-model repeated-measures analysis of variance.
Results
Three trajectory classes (low, high, increasing use) provided the best model fit for alcohol and cannabis use. The low alcohol use class exhibited lower PTSD symptoms at baseline than the high use class; the low cannabis use class exhibited lower PTSD and depression symptoms at baseline than the high and increasing use classes; these symptoms greatly increased at week 8 and declined at week 12. Participants who already use alcohol and cannabis exhibited greater PTSD and depression symptoms at baseline that increased at week 8 with a decrease in symptoms at week 12.
Conclusions
Our findings suggest that alcohol and cannabis use trajectories are associated with the intensity of posttrauma psychopathology. These findings could potentially inform the timing of therapeutic strategies.
People often use tools for tasks, and sometimes there is uncertainty about whether a given task can be completed with a given tool. This project explored whether, when, and how people’s optimism about successfully completing a task with a given tool is affected by the contextual salience of a better or worse tool. In six studies, participants were faced with novel tasks. For each task, they were assigned a tool but also exposed to a comparison tool that was better or worse in utility (or sometimes similar in utility). In some studies, the tool comparisons were essentially social comparisons, because the tool was assigned to another person. In other studies, the tool comparisons were merely counterfactual rather than social. The studies revealed contrast effects on optimism, and the effect worked in both directions. That is, worse comparison tools boosted optimism and better tools depressed optimism. The contrast effects were observed regardless of the general type of comparison (e.g., social, counterfactual). The comparisons also influenced discrete decisions about which task to attempt (for a prize), which is an important finding for ruling out superficial scaling explanations for the contrast effects. It appears that people fail to exclude irrelevant tool-comparison information from consideration when assessing their likelihood of success on a task, resulting in biased optimism and decisions.
Neurobiological and social-contextual influences shape children’s adjustment, yet limited biopsychosocial studies have integrated temporal features when modeling physiological regulation of emotion. This study explored whether a common underlying pattern of non-linear change in respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) across emotional scenarios characterized 4–6 year-old children’s parasympathetic reactivity (N = 180). Additionally, we tested whether dynamic RSA reactivity was an index of neurobiological susceptibility or a diathesis in the association between socioeconomic status, authoritarian parenting, and the development of externalizing problems (EP) and internalizing problems over two years. There was a shared RSA pattern across all emotions, characterized by more initial RSA suppression and a subsequent return toward baseline, which we call vagal flexibility (VF). VF interacted with parenting to predict EP. More authoritarian parenting predicted increased EP two years later only when VF was low; conversely, when VF was very high, authoritarian mothers reported that their children had fewer EP. Altogether, children’s patterns of dynamic RSA change to negative emotions can be characterized by a higher order factor, and the nature by which VF contributes to EP depends on maternal socialization practices, with low VF augmenting and high VF buffering children against the effects of authoritarian parenting.
The expansion of the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates (seventh to ninth centuries AD) brought diverse regions from the Indus Valley to the Eurasian Steppe under hegemonic control. An overlooked aspect of this political process is the subsequent translocation of species across ecological zones. This article explores species introduction in the early Islamic world, presenting the first archaeological evidence for domestic water buffalo in the Caucasus—identified using zooarchaeological and ZooMS methods on material from the historical site of Bardhaʿa in Azerbaijan. We contextualise these finds with historical accounts to demonstrate the exploitation of medieval marginal zones and the effects of centralised social reorganisation upon species dispersal.
Although no drugs are licensed for the treatment of personality disorder, pharmacological treatment in clinical practice remains common.
Aims
This study aimed to estimate the prevalence of psychotropic drug use and associations with psychological service use among people with personality disorder.
Method
Using data from a large, anonymised mental healthcare database, we identified all adult patients with a diagnosis of personality disorder and ascertained psychotropic medication use between 1 August 2015 and 1 February 2016. Multivariable logistic regression models were constructed, adjusting for sociodemographic, clinical and service use factors, to examine the association between psychological services use and psychotropic medication prescribing.
Results
Of 3366 identified patients, 2029 (60.3%) were prescribed some form of psychotropic medication. Patients using psychological services were significantly less likely to be prescribed psychotropic medication (adjusted odds ratio 0.48, 95% CI 0.39–0.59, P<0.001) such as antipsychotics, benzodiazepines and antidepressants. This effect was maintained following several sensitivity analyses. We found no difference in the risk for mood stabiliser (adjusted odds ratio 0.79, 95% CI 0.57–1.10, P = 0.169) and multi-class psychotropic use (adjusted odds ratio 0.80, 95% CI 0.60–1.07, P = 0.133) between patients who did and did not use psychological services.
Conclusions
Psychotropic medication prescribing is common in patients with personality disorder, but significantly less likely in those who have used psychological services. This does not appear to be explained by differences in demographic, clinical and service use characteristics. There is a need to develop clear prescribing guidelines and conduct research in clinical settings to examine medication effectiveness for this population.
When is war just? What does justice require? If we lack a commonly-accepted understanding of justice – and thus of just war – what answers can we find in the intellectual history of just war? Miller argues that just war thinking should be understood as unfolding in three traditions: the Augustinian, the Westphalian, and the Liberal, each resting on distinct understandings of natural law, justice, and sovereignty. The central ideas of the Augustinian tradition (sovereignty as responsibility for the common good) can and should be recovered and worked into the Liberal tradition, for which human rights serves the same function. In this reconstructed Augustinian Liberal vision, the violent disruption of ordered liberty is the injury in response to which force may be used and war may be justly waged. Justice requires the vindication and restoration of ordered liberty in, through, and after warfare.
Natural law, in the Augustinian and Thomist sense, reflects not merely man’s nature as it is, but as it should be, accounting for the moral aspirations and moral instincts they believed were natural to man’s being. Natural law requires us to live justly: to live well in society, with love towards one another. What does it mean to love our neighbors politically? It means to live and govern in accordance with the “tranquility of order.” Responsibility for upholding this kind of peace is what “sovereignty” meant in the Augustinian era. Peace is not merely the absence of violence, but the presence of the conditions that enable flourishing. Just war is war that accords with justice: it is authorized political violence required to uphold love-directed justice. War is an instrument for defending and sustaining the tranquility of order, understood as an act of love for our neighbors and our enemies alike. With this framework, Augustinian thinkers generally favored humanitarian and state building interventions: military operations to protect the innocent, stop war crimes or crimes against humanity, punish tyrants and war criminals, and foster conditions of lasting peace and stability.
In this chapter I apply the Augustinian Liberal just war framework to contemporary cases of war and conflict: Iraq, Afghanistan, terrorism, Syria, North Korea, and selected cases of cyberwar and autonomous weapons. I discuss Iraq because it is the largest recent war and has animated a huge amount of commentary from just war scholars. I contrast my approach with that of several other thinkers to show the original insights of my approach. Second, I discuss Afghanistan and the War on Terror because the wars illustrate some features of the moral reality of contemporary war that I hope shape our understanding of just war in the future. Third, I use Syria to discuss humanitarian crises, the use of weapons of mass destruction, and the costs of nonintervention. Fourth, I use North Korea to discuss nuclear war, nuclear deterrence, and preemptive and preventive war – issues that have been with us since the dawn of the Cold War and are still with us. Fifth, I discuss cyberwar and autonomous weapons as novel forms of conflict whose moral dimensions are still coming into focus.
The Westphalian tradition of just war thinking rooted itself in a different understanding of natural law. Instead of understanding natural law as part of the divine law and reflecting humanity’s moral aspirations, the Westphalians’ natural law was rooted in the “state of nature” and reflected what reason and custom told us about humanity’s actual conduct. Justice, in this view, did not include liberality or charity; it involved the protection of the rights of sovereigns. International justice became equated with the rights of sovereign autonomy and reciprocal non-interference associated with the Treaties of Westphalia. The just war thinkers of this era are thus more hesitant to endorse a right of rebellion, intervention to support rebels, humanitarian intervention, war as punishment, war to defend the innocent, or war against those who commit crimes against nature. War is an instrument to defend international borders, not to enforce an abstract ideal of justice. This leads to the signature contribution from the Westphalian tradition: that the preservation of the balance of power is a just cause because it preserves the independence and territorial integrity of every state.
When is war just? What does justice require? The just war framework is an attempt to answer those questions. But there is no singular tradition and no consensus on the answers. Just war inquiry is best understood as three traditions: the Augustinian, the Westphalian, and the Liberal. Augustinians understood war to be a just response and an act of love to defend the tranquility of order when that order was violently disrupted, including exceptional cases of a disruption in other states. Justice required the restoration of a just peace. Westphalians reinterpreted sovereignty so that it was no longer understood as responsibility for the common good but as defense of international borders and the sanctity of national autonomy and independence. War was just when it was waged to defend the state from external attack and, sometimes, to preserve a balance of power and prevent any one state from amassing enough power to threaten others’ independence. Justice required the maintenance of international order and stability.
In the 20th century, some thinkers, like Paul Ramsey, tried to reestablish the older, explicitly religious foundations for just war thought. Others, like Michael Walzer, did the opposite, trying to found just war on felt the moral intuition of liberalism. Both sought to amend the Westphalian order to make greater room for human rights or the sanctity of human life, which marks the beginning of the Liberal tradition of just war thinking. Ramsey approached the subject from an explicitly theological perspective but still supported key Liberal tenets, like democracy, human rights, and the “international common good.” Ramsey’s emphasis on love as the cornerstone of just war meant human life was an absolute value, more important than Westphalian sovereignty. Walzer was more explicit about his liberalism, but he built it on weaker foundations. He sought to amend the Westphalian tradition to allow for intervention for humanitarian purposes, a position he strengthened in later work, but he also maintained a preference for national self-determination without concern for ideology or regime type that was in tension with his commitment to human rights.