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On May 14, 1946, ten days after the opening of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (popularly known as the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal), Captain George Furness, a member of the defense counsel, cast serious doubt on the fairness of the Tribunal conducted by the victorious nations in World War II:
‘We say that regardless of the known integrity of the individual Members of this Tribunal they cannot, under the circumstances of their appointment, be impartial; that under such circumstances this trial, both in the present day and history, will never be free from substantial doubt as to its legality, fairness, and impartiality.‘
After a decade of combat, casualties, massive displacement, persisting violence, enhanced sectarian tension and violence between Shi’ias and Sunnis, periodic suicide bombings, and autocratic governance, a negative assessment of the Iraq War as a strategic move by the United States, United Kingdom, and a few of their secondary allies, including Japan, seems unavoidable. Not only the regionally destabilizing outcome, including the blowback effect of perversely adding weight to Iran's overall diplomatic influence, but the reputational costs in the Middle East associated with an imprudent, destructive, and failed military intervention make the Iraq War the worst American foreign policy disaster since its defeat in Vietnam in the 1970s. Such geopolitical accounting does not even consider the damage to the United Nations and international law arising from an aggressive use of force in flagrant violation of the UN Charter, embarked upon without any legitimating authorization as to the use of force by the Security Council. The UN hurt its image when it failed to reinforce its refusal to grant authorization to the United States and its coalition. This was compounded by the fact that the UN lent support to the unlawful American-led occupation that followed. In other words, not only was the Iraq War a disaster from the perspective of American and British foreign policy and the peace and stability of the Middle East region, but it was also a serious setback for international law, the UN, and world order.
Ōishi Matashichi, a fisherman aboard The Lucky Dragon #5, in a new book, tells the story of the 1954 Bikini Hydrogen bomb Bravo test that transformed his life and touched off the world anti-nuclear movement. The Asia-Pacific Journal is pleased to offer excerpts from Richard Falk's foreword and Ōishi's riveting account of the bomb which exploded with a force 1,000 times that of the Hiroshima Bomb and left its imprint on the lives of the surviving members of the crew and our understanding of nuclear weapons and US atomic diplomacy.
Ever since German and Japanese leaders were prosecuted, convicted, and punished after World War II at Nuremberg and Tokyo, there has been a wide split at the core of the global effort to impose criminal accountability on those who commit crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and war crimes on behalf of a sovereign state. The law is always expected to push toward consistency of application as a condition of its legitimacy. In the setting of international criminality the greatest danger to widely shared values is posed by those with the greatest power and wealth, and it is precisely these leaders that are least likely to be held responsible or to feel threatened by the prospect of being charged with international crimes. The global pattern of enforcement to date has been one in which the comparatively petty criminals are increasingly held to account while the Mafia bosses escape almost altogether from existing mechanisms of international accountability. Such double standards are too rarely acknowledged in discussions of international criminal law nor are their corrosive effects considered, but once understood, it becomes clear that this pattern seriously compromises the claim that international criminal law is capable of achieving global justice.
Ever since German and Japanese leaders were prosecuted, convicted, and punished after World War II at Nuremberg and Tokyo, there has been a wide split at the core of the global effort to impose criminal accountability on those who commit crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and war crimes on behalf of a sovereign state. The law is always expected to push toward consistency of application as a condition of its legitimacy. In the setting of international criminality the greatest danger to widely shared values is posed by those with the greatest power and wealth, and it is precisely these leaders that are least likely to be held responsible or to feel threatened by the prospect of being charged with international crimes. The global pattern of enforcement to date has been one in which the comparatively petty criminals are increasingly held to account while the Mafia bosses escape almost altogether from existing mechanisms of international accountability. Such double standards are too rarely acknowledged in discussions of international criminal law nor are their corrosive effects considered, but once understood, it becomes clear that this pattern seriously compromises the claim that international criminal law is capable of achieving global justice.
There are mounting hopes that Barack Obama will use the occasion of the Group of 7 meeting in Japan in May to visit Hiroshima, and become the first American president to do so. It is remarkable that it required a wait of over 60 years until John Kerry became the first high American official to make such a visit, which he termed ‘gut-wrenching,‘ while at the same time purposely refraining from offering any kind of apology to the Japanese people for one of the worse acts of state terror against a defenseless population in all of human history. Let's hope that Obama goes, and displays more remorse than Kerry who at least deserves some credit for paving the way. The contrast between the many pilgrimages of homage by Western leaders, including those of Germany, to Auschwitz and other notorious death camps, and the absence of comparable pilgrimages to Hiroshima and Nagasaki underscores the difference between winning and losing a major war. This contrast cannot be properly accounted for by insisting on a hierarchy of evils that the Holocaust dominates.
On 7 July 2017 122 countries at the UN voted to approve the text of a proposed international treaty entitled ‘Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.‘ This article assesses the significance of broad international support for the draft treaty, the opposition to it on the part of all nine nuclear powers, and its possible contribution to nuclear disarmament.
This article provides a critical discussion of Okinawa's role in serving American and Japanese strategic interests. Since the end of World War II Okinawa has been a mostly unhappy host of American military bases, and the issue has been prominent at times on the agenda of the Japanese peace movement. The interplay of overseas bases and U.S. foreign policy is a crucial and often hidden dimension of the global projection of American power, which gives rise to friction with and opposition from the peoples living in the vicinity of the bases. This has certainly been the case in relation to Okinawa. This essay offers reflections on thisunderlying reality, as well as the linkage between the network of foreign military bases and the emergence of the first global state in history, a new political phenomenon that distinguishes it from ‘empires’ of the past.
In this essay, Iaddress some preliminary considerations surrounding different notions of “peace” and peacebuilding and the appropriate methodologies to study the same.I place emphasis on the adoption of a moral epistemology that is overtly value-oriented and normatively ambitious without being oblivious to the structural characteristics of collective political behavior that tend to privilege the self at the expense of the other, such as that used by the World Order Models Project (WOMP). Rather than relying on one standard definition of “cosmopolitanism,” I advocate for a pluralistic conception that acknowledges different cosmopolitanisms. I provide a framework for peacebuilding assessment that frames inquiry around different “horizons” of aspirations (feasibility, necessity, desperation, desire), and I lay out my version of cosmopolitanism, which centers on the importance of peacebuilding objectives that are necessary and desirable. In so doing, I compare my perspective toother paradigmatic perspectives, concluding that cosmopolitanismis concerned with reconciling unity with difference, through mutual understanding of otherness.
We are living in an anguishing historical period. From one direction come dire warnings about humans’ future if the challenges posed by climate change and ecological instability are not addressed within a rather tiny window of less than twelve years. From another direction come depressing indications that peoples around the world are choosing by their own free will, extremist autocrats, even demagogues, who are extinguishing fires of freedom, building walls to keep the unwanted out and stigmatizing the stranger. In such an atmosphere, human rights are in retreat, empathy for the suffering of others is repudiated, international law is all but forgotten in the annals of diplomacy and the United Nations is often reduced to the bickering of irresponsible governments seeking nothing grander than maximum national advantage, and in the process, let the common public good of humanity be damned. Facing such reality with eyes wide open is a challenge that few acknowledge, and even fewer have the stamina, insight, compassion, wisdom and imagination needed to discern a brighter alternative future for humanity.
Stuart Rees is such an exception. His Cruelty or Humanity has the courage to portray reality in all its degrading ugliness without taking refuge in some specious bromide. His book addresses the range of cruelties that befall those most vulnerable among us in myriad specific circumstances. With an astonishing command over the global and historical landscapes of cruelty, Rees leads us through the wilderness of the most evil happenings, which have been enacted individually and collectively. And yet, through it all he manages to guide us toward the light of hope without indulging sentimentality or embracing false optimism.
What gives this perilous journey its defining originality is the degree to which Rees brings to bear the knowledge and timeless wisdom of poets both to depict the intensities of the darkness but also to instruct readers that the disciplined and lyrical insight of a poet can better than the rest of us find shafts of light that illuminate paths leading to empowerment, transcendence and liberation.
Chapter 2 argues that given the residual power of national elites protecting the status quo and the ideological agenda of the international state-based order a ‘liberal transition’ – transition without transformation – currently constitutes the ‘outer limit of feasibility.’ To reach this conclusion highlighting world order constraints on transformative change the chapter draws on historical examples (the Marshall Plan, Iran) as well as more contemporary case studies (the Arab Spring, Palestine/Israel). The author argues that the pre-conditions for transformative justice rarely exist in contemporary transitions – these include state capture or building, external support, a strong ideological vision, and top down leadership. The chapter introduces concepts to illuminate this argument, including contrasting transformation-from-without and transformation-from-within.
Forty years after the defeat of the United States in Vietnam, the central lessons of that war remain unlearned. Even worse, the mistakes made and crimes committed in Vietnam have been repeated at great human, material, and strategic cost in a variety of subsequent national settings. The central unlearned lesson in Vietnam is that the collapse of the European colonial order fundamentally changed the effective balance of power in a variety of North/South conflict situations that reduce the agency of military superiority in a variety of ways.
What makes this change elusive is that it reflected developments that fall outside the policy parameters influential in the leadership circles of most governments for a cluster of reasons. Most fundamentally, governmental geopolitical calculations relating to world order continue to be based on attributing a decisive causal influence to relative military capabilities, an understanding at the core of “realist” thinking and behavior. Within this paradigm, military superiority is regarded as the main driver of conflict resolution, and the winners in wars are thought to reflect the advantages of hard-power differentials. The efficiency and rewards of military conquest in the colonial era vindicated this kind of realist thinking. Europe with its dominant military technology was able to control the political life and exploit the resources of populous countries throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America with a minimum of expenditure and casualties, encountering manageable resistance, while reaping the rewards of empire. The outcomes of World War I and II further vindicated the wider orbit of the realist way of thinking and acting, with military superiority based on technological innovation, quantitative measures, and doctrinal adaptation to new circumstances of conflict receiving most of the credit for achieving political victories.
The Vietnam War was a dramatic and radical challenge to the realist consensus on how the world works, continuing a pattern already evident in nationalist victories in several earlier colonial wars, which were won – against expectations – by anti-colonial forces. Despite these illuminating results of colonial wars after World War II, the American defeat in Vietnam came as a shock. The candid acknowledgment of this defeat has been twisted out of recognition to this day by the interpretive spins placed upon the Vietnam experience by the American political establishment.
Leaf surface morphology and physical characteristics of herbicide deposits on leaf surfaces can influence herbicide performance. Leaf surface topography, the degree and type of epicuticular wax formation, and the presence, type, and distribution of trichomes all influence the distribution of a given herbicide formulation sprayed onto a leaf surface. Depressions above anticlinal cell walls accumulate herbicide, thus lessening uniform distribution. As the amount of particulate wax increases, the size of individual spray drop deposits on the leaf decreases, thus resulting in reduced coverage. In many instances the presence of trichomes reduces optimal epidermal coverage by intercepting spray drops before they reach the epidermal surface. Adjuvants reduce the adverse influence of leaf topography, epicuticular wax, and trichomes on herbicide distribution, but their use usually does not yield an even coating over the entire leaf surface. Many herbicides, in pure form, are solids (i.e., crystals) rather than liquids. For most applications, herbicides are dissolved, dispersed, or emulsified in a water-based spray solution. After spraying, water and any solvents evaporate from the leaf surface and herbicides often return to their solid crystalline form. In the few cases that have been studied, less herbicide is absorbed when present on the leaf surface as a solid rather than as a liquid. In many instances, greater effectiveness of a postemergence herbicide may be obtained if attention is given to optimizing the distribution and physical form on sprayed leaf surfaces.
The leaves of tall morningglory, giant duckweed, and common purslane were treated with nine surfactants at a concentration of 0.1% and examined after 24 hr using cryo-scanning electron microscopy for phytotoxicity as evidenced by tissue damage and epicuticular wax morphology changes. In some instances, tissue damage could be discerned; however, the effects of a particular surfactant were not uniform across the three species. Morphological alteration of epicuticular waxes was not observed. Gas chromatographic analyses of the epicuticular waxes of the species used in the study reveal component differences and may, in part, explain the lack of uniform response across species for a particular surfactant.
An accurate knowledge of the thermal properties of firn and ice within a glacier is essential for any reliable mathematical model of heat transfer. This paper considers the problem of determining the thermal properties of firn at Dome C, Antarctica, for use in such a model.
First, the difficulties in accurately determining thermal properties are discussed. Then a physical experiment which can be performed under field conditions, but which will yield a well-posed mathematical problem for determining the unknown properties, is presented. Next, two different numerical techniques for solving the mathematical problem are discussed. Finally, some numerical approximations and error estimates are presented for the results of applying our numerical procedure to data from Dome C. Although insufficient data were obtained to test our methods fully, we have established a measurement procedure and a method of analysis which appear to be promising.