Chapter 6 tests and illustrates the argument that protest broker availability helps to shape where protests occur by affecting the ability of elites to mobilize collective action. Drawing on a unique combination of original protest data from South Africa, over two years of fieldwork, and a new survey with local elites, the chapter demonstrates that both elites and citizens recognize the pivotal role of protest brokers in enabling protest. The evidence shows that broker presence is a critical factor in explaining geographic variation in protest activity. Through three detailed case studies, the chapter further unpacks the mechanisms behind this relationship. First, it examines repeated failures to mobilize protest in a broker-absent community. Second, it shows how the loss of a broker reduces protest activity in a previously mobilized area. And finally, it analyzes regional protest efforts, revealing that communities with brokers are more likely to participate. These findings confirm that broker availability not only affects local mobilization capacity but also helps to explain larger patterns of protest distribution. The chapter underscores the broader importance of brokerage in collective action, particularly under conditions of elite-led mobilization.

Building on the previous chapter’s focus on protest occurrence, Chapter 7 explores how protest brokers influence the types of protest that emerge. Drawing on extensive qualitative and quantitative data, the chapter shows that brokers shape not just whether protest happens, but also how it unfolds. It offers four key findings. First, it demonstrates that mobilization tactics vary by broker type: brokers embedded in their communities are less likely to rely on financial incentives to mobilize protest than those with weaker local ties. Second, it shows that communities with nonembedded or nonexclusive brokers are more likely to protest over a broader range of issues. Third, because nonembedded brokers depend more on material incentives, this chapter shows that their protests tend to be shorter in duration. Finally, the data shows that protests are less likely to turn violent when organized by brokers who are either embedded in the community or exclusive in their elite affiliations. Together, these findings highlight the significant impact of broker characteristics on protest dynamics, and help explain variation in protest forms, duration, and intensity across communities.

Chapter 2 lays the foundation for the book’s theoretical framework by introducing the collective action problem and examining how protest mobilization unfolds in practice. Drawing on global literature and empirical examples, it demonstrates that elite-driven protest is a widespread and influential form of collective action. It shows, however, that successful elite mobilization requires deep local knowledge, strong community networks, and trust – resources that many elites lack. To overcome this gap, the chapter introduces the concept of the protest broker: an intermediary who facilitates connections between elites and potential protesters. It explores who protest brokers are, what they do, and why their role is central to protest mobilization. It argues further, that existing theories of elite mobilization implicitly assume the presence of such intermediaries, yet rarely acknowledge them explicitly. By making protest brokers visible, this chapter reframes key assumptions in the protest literature and connects them to broader research on political and vote brokers. It also situates protest brokers among other grassroots actors – such as shop floor stewards and activists – clarifying their unique but overlapping functions in enabling protest and shaping its location and form.

Chapter 5 transitions from theory to practice, offering in-depth empirical evidence of protest brokers in action within South Africa. Drawing on over 26 months of ethnographic fieldwork, interviews, and surveys, this chapter shows that protest brokers are not only real but central to the organization of protest at the local level. It introduces the 37 brokers at the heart of this study, detailing who they are, why they act as intermediaries, and how they use their local knowledge, trust, and networks to mobilize communities on behalf of socially distant elites. The chapter also illustrates significant variation among brokers – reflecting the typology developed in Chapter 3 – and shows how these differences influence the brokers’ roles, scope of influence, and strategies. It also explores the dual relationships brokers maintain: with elites and with the specific communities they mobilize. Brokers emerge as highly skilled actors who manage reputations carefully, possess intimate knowledge of their communities, and selectively mobilize based on tightly defined social boundaries. By grounding the theoretical framework in rich qualitative and quantitative data, this chapter establishes protest brokers as indispensable actors in collective action processes.

Chapter 9 concludes the book by revisiting its core motivations, summarizing key findings, and outlining the broader theoretical and empirical contributions. It reflects on the central argument – that protest brokers are critical intermediaries in the mobilization of collective action – and highlights the book’s contribution to our understanding of why, where, and how protests occur. The chapter reiterates the importance of protest brokers in shaping both the occurrence and nature of protest, and underscores how overlooking these actors has led to significant gaps in theories of protest and elite mobilization. The discussion then expands to consider the implications of these findings for broader debates in the academic literature, including around the roles of civil society, grassroots organizing, and political intermediation. It positions protest brokers as a vital piece of the puzzle in understanding collective action, both in South Africa and globally. The chapter concludes by proposing avenues for future research, calling for further exploration of protest brokerage across different political contexts and time periods, and encouraging scholars to pay greater attention to the actors who bridge these gaps between elites and communities.

Chapter 3 deepens the theoretical framework by examining variation among protest brokers and exploring how different types of brokers shape protest dynamics. It identifies two central relationships that define broker behavior: the broker’s connection to elites and their ties to the communities they mobilize. Building on these two dimensions, the chapter introduces four key types of protest broker – Issue, Elite, Group, and Independent – and demonstrates how each type influences patterns of protest. Specifically, the chapter explores how broker type affects the variety of issues protested, the likelihood of protests becoming violent, the duration of protests, and the mobilization tactics most likely to succeed. It also investigates the contextual and structural factors that give rise to different broker types within communities. By unpacking the causes and consequences of broker-level variation, this chapter shows that protest brokers are not a monolithic group, and that their differing motivations and positionalities significantly shape protest outcomes. This framework helps explain diverse protest patterns across geographic and political contexts, offering a more nuanced understanding of how collective action is organized and sustained.

‘Remote work’ and ‘telework’, which used to be regarded as exceptional subcategories of labor engagement, became the norm for white collar workers during the pandemic. Recent years have seen the advent of hybrid labor arrangements, where work is directly or indirectly provided through apps or similar pieces of software and other technological innovations. The overarching work digitization phenomenon is defined by increasing delocalisation and fragmentation of workplaces, and by algorithmic management. Even work typically performed on-site includes nowadays elements of delocalization. This chapter revisits our understanding of ‘teleworking’ and examines the appropriateness of existing collective labor law institutions to address the needs and particular conditions of workers engaged in digitized hybrid work. It considers that a solution may lie with the extension of the scope and focus of the rights to collective organization and action, and with a re-evaluation of their substantive content. The chapter seeks solutions in worker empowerment through the redeployment of collective labor rights and institutions. The chapter also briefly touches upon illustrative case studies that provide glimpses into possible avenues of traditional and alternative collective action tactics. The relevant current EU framework is used to contextualize the discussion.

Solidarity is a collective moral relation, and political solidarity, more specifically, is “a committed unity of peoples on a range of interpersonal to social-political levels” connecting their actions for a cause. Collective action to bring about social change in political solidarity includes a variety of potential harms for participants and for the collective whole. Although numerous accounts of solidarity describe the assumption of collective risks, I demonstrate that the solidary relation also includes a willingness to take up associated commitments meant both to mitigate social risks from the larger society within which it forms and ensure the ability for some members to contribute from their particularity. In addition, the relation of solidarity itself carries its own set of risks that participants accept with the belief that collective action offers a better prospect for social change than acting alone. Using examples to illustrate what is at stake, I discuss four facets of risk in solidarity: collective risk, personal risk, social risk, and relational risk. Assessing the potential for harm or exposure to danger in solidarity offers a way to think about expectations against domination and fostering trust within the moral relation.

Chapter 10 summarizes my findings and examines them in the context of current theory and research. It presents a new model of social and creative decline within theory groups, emphasizing the friction arising from interactions between theory groups and the fields they aim to impact as key factors in their breakdown. The chapter closes by outlining nine principles for managing scientific collaborations to help researchers, universities, and science funding agencies foster creative research groups and promote transformative science.

Water security in Latin America is at a tipping point – despite holding 30% of the world’s freshwater, millions lack access to safe drinking water. Enter the Latin American Water Funds Partnership (LAWFP), a groundbreaking model of radical collaboration that unites governments, businesses, nonprofits, and philanthropy to drive systemic change in water security.

This chapter explores how Water Funds pool financial and technical resources, implement nature-based solutions, and foster cross-sector partnerships to deliver long-term, scalable impact. With over 26 Water Funds engaging 340+ organizations, LAWFP has protected over 565,000 hectares of watersheds, improved water access, and strengthened community resilience. A compelling case study in multi-sector cooperation, this chapter demonstrates how philanthropic capital can act as a catalyst for innovation, unlocking sustainable financing to combat climate change and transform water security.

One way that citizens can become involved in public policy issues is to join interest groups that share their interests. By accumulating a large membership of voters, and by amassing resources in the form of dues, interest group leaders influence public policy. Individual members face the same incentive problems with interest groups as they do as voters. Each individual member will have negligible influence over the interest group’s activities. They can either choose to join and contribute, or not, but members are still excluded from the political marketplace. Their collective contributions convey power to the leaders of those interest groups, who are able to transact with the political elite in the political marketplace. As individuals, members of interest groups remain powerless. The leaders of those groups gain the bargaining power to enter the political elite.