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Many political science theories posit empirical relationships that are conditioned by some moderating variable, which scholars model using a multiplicative interaction term in a regression. In recent years, scholars have begun using such terms in dynamic regression models with time series data. However, the lack of guidance on adding multiplicative interactions to these workhorse models exposes problems with the consistency of the estimator, model restrictions, and interpretation. This paper provides theoretical and practical guidance to address these problems. First, we define the conditions under which scholars can ensure consistent estimates when estimating relationships conditioned by a moderating variable in dynamic models. Second, we introduce a general model that makes no theoretical assumptions about precisely how conditional relationships unfold over time. Third, we develop a flexible approach for interpreting such models. We demonstrate the advantages of this framework with simulation evidence and an empirical application.
What explains the contested conditions for migrant worker citizenship under socialism? Migration scholarship often elides socialist contexts, tracing migrant deservingness to the neoliberal rise of labor-based conditionality for legal status across Western states in the late twentieth century. However, a broader historiography suggests that socialist states, despite their institutional differences, conditioned migrant inclusion on labor performance throughout the twentieth century. To explain how this form of civic conditionality operated under socialism, this paper draws on the case of migrant “limit” worker management in Moscow from the early 1960s to 1987. Using archival materials, I show that state-owned enterprises operated as migration intermediaries, establishing and enforcing a labor-based conditionality for local citizenship even as the state pursued additional civic aims. I find that civic campaigns initiated in the early 1960s provided an ideological framework and material base for enterprises to govern migrant workers at their dormitories. Managers and officials at the dormitory redirected resources intended for social activism and cultural tutelage toward ensuring baseline productivity and compliance. Enterprise managers and union officials additionally substituted the material conditions at the dormitory for the assessments of individual migrants’ moral and productive status. This paper extends the literature on migrant deservingness to a socialist context, showing how conditionality for civic inclusion develops beyond the neoliberal shifts in contemporary citizenship.
Between 2010 and 2019, five Eurozone governments in economic difficulty received assistance from international lenders on condition that certain policies specified in the Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) were implemented. To what extent were those conditions implemented? After conditionality, to what extent have governments rolled back changes pursued under external constraint? Do we find variation across governments regarding implementation and reversals, and if so, why?. This paper presents a database allowing the answers to those questions, the Data Base on EcoNomic Adjustment Policies (ENAP) database. We codified all policies and reforms included in the MoU’s, and whether those were subsequently fully or partially implemented. We also codified all decisions taken by bailed out countries since the beginning of the financial crisis and verified whether those had been kept or fully or partially reversed until December 2019. For each condition or policy, a series of explanatory variables were coded: policy sector, type of reform, timing and type of reversal, origin of reversal and number of veto players. The ENAP shows that in all countries, MoU’s were largely implemented and are resilient.
The external dimension of the EU migration policy relies to a large extent on its development policy to foster ‘mutually beneficial partnerships’ between the EU and non-EU states. While political conditionality remains a fundamental axis of the EU’s external relations, a curious ‘twist’ of events has led to the emergence of ‘migration-based’ conditionality, especially in the aftermath of the 2015–2016 ‘migration crisis’. Conditionality can be broadly defined as the EU’s leverage of different instruments to lead non-EU states to comply with certain norms. In the context of the EU development policy, conditionality traditionally relates to human rights, democracy, and good governance. In the context of migration, however, these norms are mostly connected with the readmission of nationals. While migration-based conditionality might appear as a deviation from a more ‘righteous’ form of conditionality, this contribution argues that this is incorrect. Through a critical review of the EU development policy going back to its colonial roots, this chapter intends to show that migration-based conditionality stems from political conditionality and not that it strays from it. In doing so, it seeks to highlight how migration-based conditionality reflects a hierarchical access to mobility still rooted in colonial racism.
The future of Ukraine depends on its relations with the EU. What is the law governing accessions? What are the main challenges facing Ukraine on the path towards EU membership? Going through the pre-accession scrutiny in times of war, Ukraine sets a unique precedent, where more experimentation could be possible to mitigate a huge risk that the EU repeats and amplifies the same mistakes it made in the Western Balkan countries – making the region a hostage of its contradictory and lethargic politics for too long. The evolution of EU enlargement law and the legal-political framework surrounding accessions across the different rounds of EU enlargement demonstrates that EU law is flexible while the practice of its application is volatile and deeply political. Enlargement practice shows that applying pre-accession conditionality may cause significant delays, while not delivering the results expected of it. A new approach to regulating accessions to the EU needs to be tested out before it is too late. This approach should build on Article 49 TEU and seek at least some depoliticisation of the enlargement process to guarantee the rule of law without dubious pre-accession techniques. Such an approach would speed-up accessions while making EU enlargement more predictable, serving the interests of Ukraine and other partners.
Many studies argue that the World Bank grants favorable loan conditions to allies of its powerful principals. These studies typically use the count of conditions as a proxy for how demanding loans are on borrowers, even though some conditions are more difficult to comply with than others. We propose a new operationalization: a measure of conditionality stringency in Bank loans constructed using Latent Semantic Scaling. Using this new measure, we find little evidence of a generalizable influence of powerful principals. Instead, the stringency of loan conditions is associated with bureaucratic assessments of risk. To facilitate future research, we provide a new dataset of World Bank loan condition texts and our measure of text stringency for all loans in the dataset.
Recent changes to EU fiscal policy, such as the landmark economic governance reform package passed in early 2024, have established a dense ‘coordination space’ that steers crucial social and economic choices at the EU and national levels. This coordination space, however, departs significantly from its historical predecessors. It largely operates within a hard law framework using finance rather than either rules or soft persuasion and peer review as its main tool of influence. In this coordination space, EU law is less a system of uniform rules underlain with sanctions than a negotiation framework where discretion abounds, and rules are never broken but rather ‘adjusted’. As this paper argues, the significance of the coordination space lies not only in its unique governance model and unclear boundaries but rather its increasing centrality to the governance of the EU. As the paper will explore using the rule of law example, even areas of EU law commonly conceived as necessarily insulated from political bargaining are increasingly drawn into the negotiation logic and instruments of coordination, rendering even more crucial a clear understanding of the trade-offs policy coordination implies. By unpacking 8 core features of policy coordination in the 2020s, the paper is therefore devoted to illuminating an expanding battleground within which EU law is being re-defined.
The Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies is designed to promote fisheries sustainability by curbing harmful subsidies that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity. However, the current approach to applying unconditional and non-negotiable special and differential treatment provisions in the Agreement is based on a North–South binary division and essentially fails to achieve the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goal 14.6. This article explores the linkage between sustainable development and a conditional right to special and differential treatment, and further presents a conditionality approach to applying appropriate and effective special and differential treatment that necessarily takes into account the diverse needs of different developing countries and better reconciles with economic, environmental, and societal sustainability. A conditionality approach shifts the basis of special and differential treatment from self-claimed ‘developing country’ status to multi-dimensions conditions embedded in the Agreement that can be objectively identified and assessed to achieve fisheries sustainability.
This chapter empirically analyzes how portfolios of external finance impact aid agreements. The chapter integrates data on external debt and foreign aid to establish a comprehensive picture of developing countries' portfolios of external finance, demonstrating that these have become less reliant on traditional donors over time. The analysis tests if a greater share of finance from Chinese or private sources is associated with favorable terms from traditional donors, using measures of aid volume, infrastructure project share, and conditions attached to World Bank projects. The findings indicate that as countries draw a greater share of their external finance from nontraditional sources, they are more likely to receive aid on preferred terms. The relationship is stronger for countries of strategic significance to donors and, especially, those with higher donor trust.
Since limiting judicial independence in Hungary and Poland, the politics of the rule of law crisis have been examined by various scholars discussing conflicts within and between EU and domestic institutions. The rule of law is no longer a purely national affair – it is of high political salience both for the Member States and the EU polity. The question addressed here is: how has the rule of law crisis reshaped the EU’s modes of governance? We argue that to safeguard this common value, the EU is evolving into a regulatory polity (3.0). This development marks a shift from Majone’s EU regulatory state’s focus on regulating markets (1.0) and regulation in core state powers in times of crises (2.0) to regulation on the core values of the polity (3.0). The article shows that in a context of growing dissensus over the rule of law, EU institutional actors have sought to strengthen “rulemaking,” “rule monitoring” and “rule enforcement” through a regulatory approach anchored in a market logic. It also shows that shifting from the traditional regulatory state 1.0 to regulation in core state powers 2.0, the regulatory polity 3.0 strengthens the EU’s institutional capacity to act when the rule of law is under strain through depoliticised “rule monitoring” and politicised “rulemaking“ and “rule enforcement“ as illustrated in the cases of Hungary and Poland discussed in this article.
Work-related conditionality policy in the UK is built around the problematic assumption that people should commit to ‘full-time’ work and job search efforts as a condition of receiving benefits. This is potentially in conflict with the idea that what is required of people should be tailored to their circumstances in some way – ‘personalised conditionality’ – and implies a failure to recognise that conditionality is being applied to a diverse group of people and in a context where the paid work that is available is often temporary and insecure. Drawing on thirty-three qualitative interviews with people subject to intensive work-related conditionality whilst receiving Universal Credit or Jobseeker’s Allowance in Manchester, the paper explores the work-related time demands that people were facing and argues that these provide a lens for examining the rigidities and contradictions of conditionality policy. The findings indicate that expectations are often set in relation to an ideal of full-time hours and in a highly asymmetric context that is far from conducive to being able to negotiate a reasonable set of work-related expectations. Work search requirements affect people differently depending on their personal circumstances and demand-side factors, and can act to weaken the position of people entering, or already in, work.
The Covid-19 crisis provided an opportunity for the European Union to offer an alternative regulatory response to the crisis of values by systemically linking European funding to respect for the rule of law. A rule of law conditionality mechanism for spending was introduced in the Recovery and Resilience Facility and in Regulation 2020/2092. It is both positive – in that it encourages Member States to implement reforms and investments aimed at improving the rule of law – and negative – in that it takes the form of financial sanctions. However, the development of the rule of law conditionality is leading to an economisation of the concept of the rule of law, insofar as it mainly concerns those dimensions of the rule of law that are conducive to growth – such as justice systems and the fight against corruption. As a result, it could paradoxically exacerbate the very crisis it is designed to resolve.
This chapter provides an overview of the arguments for the stability of public opinion as well as the arguments of those who believe public opinion is unstable. We then explore conditionality, or the conditions under which public opinion appears to be more unstable. Concepts such as low information rationality, issue salience, and question wording are covered.
Why do we see large-scale labor protests and strikes under some IMF programs such as in Greece in 2010 and not in others such as in Ireland in the same year? This Element argues that extensive labor market reform conditions in an immobile labor market generate strong opposition to programs. Labor market reform conditions that decentralize and open up an immobile labor market cause workers either to lose in terms of rights and benefits, while being stuck in the same job or to fall into a less protected sector with fewer benefits. Conversely, in more mobile labor markets, wage and benefit differentials are low, and movement across sectors is easier. In such markets, labor groups do not mobilize to the same extent to block programs. The author tests this theory in a global sample and explores the causal mechanism in four case studies on Greece, Ireland, Latvia, and Portugal.
This chapter explores the role accorded to the principle of equality of Member States in the case law of the Court of Justice and national courts reviewing measures of financial assistance. At the same time, it investigates the extent to which the common interest, as the expression of the principle of solidarity, features as a consideration before those courts. The chapter opens with a brief description of financial assistance measures to gain a sense of how their versatile nature influenced judicial review. It then analyses judicial review of the European Stability Mechanism and the resulting Memoranda of Understanding at the national level in respect of access, remedies, and the interpretation of the principles of solidarity and equality. An analogous exercise is then conducted in respect of the EU courts. The chapter lastly reflects upon judicial interactions taking place between the EU and the national level and comments on the overall status of legal accountability in the EU judicial space.
Equality and equal treatment are the principal purpose of WTO law. However, that purpose is accomplished in varying conditions, which make it difficult to regularly attain the consistency and coherence that an egalitarian and obligatory conception of the law assumes. Consequently, this chapter proceeds to demonstrate how WTO law is focused secondarily on fairness and corrective justice and how this focus begets a subordinate emphasis in law on rights, which in turn gives rise to a contractual structure that is retrospectively oriented and reasoned inductively. It also demonstrates how various features of WTO law like the non-violation cause of action and implementation are consistent with such a rights-based ethos.
This chapter is an overview of central banking developments between 1919 and 1939, highlighting the establishment and operation of 28 new central banks, most in what are now called emerging markets and developing countries. Inspired by expert advice and underpinned by foreign lending, the new banks were designed to function independently from political interference, and to defend the gold standard as part an international, rules-based network of cooperating institutions. The Great Depression revealed the flaws in this setup. As capital flows dried up and international cooperation faltered, the gold standard disintegrated, and central banks were unable to head off macroeconomic and financial collapse. Designed to fight inflation, they were ill-prepared to address financial fragility. In the wake of their failure, a two-pronged reaction set in. Central bank autonomy was curtailed, while monetary policy was subordinated to new policy objectives, including the support of import substitution in Latin America and central planning in Eastern Europe. At the same time, central banks’ powers expanded, as they were transformed into agents of state-led development policy. Thus, the new central banks of the 1920s and 1930s were integrally involved not just in post-First World War reconstruction and the Great Depression, but also in the key economic developments of the mid-20th century.
The Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) was restructured repeatedly between 1926 and 1935, but these restructurings were superficial and incoherent, producing contradictory outcomes. The liberal spirit of the initial 1926-8 reforms dissolved with the onset of the Great Depression. Subsequently, the BNB was endowed with new instruments and tasked with carrying out the interventionist policies adopted in the 1930s, thus paving the way for the bank’s eventual role in the communist planned economy. This chapter focuses on the significance of BNB’s state ownership and on the tight economic conditionality attached to 1926 and 1928 loans sponsored by the League of Nations. By contrasting policies followed in Bulgaria and Greece during the Depression, it challenges Eichengreen’s hypothesis that heavy defaulters and countries leaving the gold exchange standard performed better relative to those that sought to maintain their reputations as decent debtors.
Central banks were not always as ubiquitous as they are today. Their functions were circumscribed, their mandates ambiguous, and their allegiances once divided. The inter-war period saw the establishment of twenty-eight new central banks – most in what are now called emerging markets and developing economies. The Emergence of the Modern Central Bank and Global Cooperation provides a new account of their experience, explaining how these new institutions were established and how doctrinal knowledge was transferred. Combining synthetic analysis with national case studies, this book shows how institutional design and monetary practice were shaped by international organizations and leading central banks, which attached conditions to stabilization loans and dispatched 'money doctors.' It highlights how many of these arrangements fell through when central bank independence and the gold standard collapsed.
The article looks at how “systemic” irregularities or breaches of law imputable to EU Member States are defined in key legal documents relating to the protection of the EU budget – notably with regards to Agricultural, Structural and Recovery funds, and with regards to the Conditionality Regulation. It is argued that “system deficiencies” arise where the financial interests of the European Union are damaged or put at risk because the systems meant to protect these interests in a Member State are considered deficient themselves. The scope of these systems varies with documents: some systems are defined in sectoral legislation and only have relevance for specific funding programmes; other systems have a more constitutional character and are linked to the protection of the rule of law in EU member states. Moreover, the severity of system deficiencies can be graded on a scale. This has implications regarding the extent of the financial consequences which can be imposed on Member States for the protection of the EU budget – how much EU funding should be withheld from them. It is also argued that the rationales underlying the imposition of financial consequences – putting the EU budget out of harm’s way or incentivizing change to reduce risk? – have implications pertaining to the legal and constitutional relationship established between the EU and its Member States.