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International investment law faces a paradigm shift with the rise of the digital economy. Emerging technologies such as blockchain, artificial intelligence, and the platform economy redefine investment dynamics while challenging traditional regulatory frameworks. Digitalisation expands cross-border investment opportunities in areas like AI, genomics, and smart infrastructure, while also complicating traditional jurisdictional and territorial considerations. The shift from physical to digital assets necessitates a re-evaluation of the classic definitions of an ‘investor’ and ‘investment’. Meanwhile, states increasingly regulate strategic digital assets under national security concerns, introducing measures ranging from data localization mandates to investment screening mechanisms. These changes raise geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions and highlight disparities in digital governance models between major powers. Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) may have to adapt to address disputes over digital assets and data, as well as leverage AI and other digital technologies for efficiency while safeguarding due process. This chapter, along with the broader volume, examines these themes, emphasising balanced frameworks that promote innovation while safeguarding public interests in the evolving digital economy.
As business transactions and the global economy become increasingly digitalized, international investment disputes will deal with novel assets in new boundary-defiant contexts. Indeed, jurisdictional arguments and objections will likely require arbitral tribunals to confront with the uneasy task of delineating the ‘localization’ of investments in digital economy assets such as cryptocurrency, non-fungible tokens, and data-related investments. However, given that even more traditional assets have raised a variety of problems relating to territorial nexus and localization, the authors believe that the digital economy emphasizes what are essentially differences in degree rather than in kind. This chapter discusses the complexities that arise in considering the idiosyncrasies of investments in digital economy assets within a traditional territorially defined jurisdictional framework. First, the authors present some of those new digital economy assets and canvass several typical cross-border challenges inherent in international investment arbitration. Second, they question how traditional objections to jurisdiction ratione personae and jurisdiction ratione materiae might be employed when the investments in question relate to those digital developments. Third, the chapter raises questions about states’ jurisdiction to prescribe, and ponders the potential effects for purposes of jurisdiction of states asserting their authority to prescribe over investments or investors outside their territory.
The rise of public regulation of private law relationships has resulted in a thorny legal landscape across regulated markets shaped by the complex interplay between multiple actors, including legislators, regulatory agencies, and courts, and fraught with tensions between public and private interests. This chapter sets out the book’s purpose, namely, to offer a new theoretical perspective on the relationship between market regulation and private law that is built on the claim that these two forms of legal discourse are two sides of the same coin that can be reconciled with each other. The chapter explains the background to this study and the research design, focusing on the interaction between EU private law as a subset of market regulation and traditional national private law. It begins with a brief account of the growing role of market regulation in the private law domain and then proceeds to identify the core questions that the collision between market regulation and private law gives rise to, which underlie the book. The chapter further explains the novelty of this work in relation to existing literature on private law and regulation, as well as its approach to the subject.
Coordinated urban and rural development is crucial for reducing inequality and achieving common prosperity. Using panel data from 57 counties in Zhejiang Province from 2015 to 2019, this study examines the impact of digital economy development on the urban–rural income gap, with particular attention to its role in digital poverty alleviation and the underlying transmission mechanisms. The results show that while digital economy development contributes to poverty alleviation by significantly increasing household income in both urban and rural areas, it simultaneously widens the urban–rural income gap. The analysis of mechanisms reveals that nonagricultural employment (NAE), innovation, and entrepreneurship mediate this relationship, disproportionately benefiting urban areas. The heterogeneity analysis further indicates that human capital (HC) and business environment (BE) disparities amplify the widening effect of digital economy development on the urban–rural income gap, while improved infrastructure reduces barriers to resource flow, mitigating the gap. These findings highlight the dual effects of digital economy development, offering critical policy insights for promoting digital poverty reduction while addressing regional disparities to achieve common prosperity.
A state’s entitlement to tax a person is said to rest on either source, which is a connection between the state and the income, or residence, which is a connection between the state and the owner of the income. The source state can tax income sourced in the state, whereas the residence state can tax all of the resident’s income. Historically, these bases for tax were uncontroversial because most people earned all or almost all their income in a single state. Digitalization and globalization have changed how people live their lives, however, and have provoked questions about whether states can assert an unlimited entitlement to tax all of a person’s worldwide income, even if that person does not reside in its territory. This chapter demonstrates that income taxation of individuals in the twenty-first century does not require a personal link of the ’residence’ kind. It details policy options that would preserve the personal income tax on individuals without a singular reliance on a person having a sole residence. Ending the reliance on residence would alleviate many of the most pressing challenges facing the international tax regime, including the taxation of remote workers, digital services, and digital nomads.
The venture capital ecosystem in Africa is thriving. With multiple large investor rounds and exits in the 2020s, the continent transitioned from having not a single unicorn in 2016 to seven start-ups worth over US$1 billion in less than a decade, while five unicorns were born in 2021 alone. Even though many start-ups on the continent gain traction organically, the current paradigm is no substitute for finding a competitive regional strategy that offers a sustainable flow of successful scale ups that then obtain unicorn status. There is a vast difference in institutional structure, resources and capabilities between African countries and what is found elsewhere. Africa faces different sets of challenges that require a unique approach to venture creation. Reforms capable of strengthening existing policy frameworks, skills development initiatives and a financing architecture that supports entrepreneurship along the entire value chain will be critical in the African context. This chapter situates policy innovation in the context of Africa’s bubbling venture capital ecosystem as a key contributor to unicorn emergence.
This chapter examines the factors which influence the entrepreneurial ecosystems in member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). We present four stylised case studies of successful entrepreneurship featuring Asian unicorns: Bitkub, PrimaKu, Bolttech and Maya. The entrepreneurial ecosystem in Singapore is vibrant, with a growing number of start-ups and venture capital funding sources. Indonesia is seen as the home of somewhat surprisingly successful ventures, whereas the entrepreneurial ecosystems of Thailand and the Philippines are still at an earlier stage of development. The region’s entrepreneurial climate has been continuously improving, facilitating the emergence of more start-ups and a more supportive ecosystem. ASEAN economies embrace digital technologies and leverage them for economic and social advancement. E-commerce businesses in ASEAN have significant growth potential.
Unlike existing studies on labour and income in the digital era, this paper argues not only that the impact of the digital economy’s intervention in the labour process is fragmented rather than comprehensive, but also that the transformation of job demand and labour supply behaviours is simultaneous and related to the attributes of the industries in which they operate. Drawing on the conventional biased technological progress hypothesis and labour process theory, we argue that the digital economy has generally increased the labour income inequality for migrant workers in China. Using geospatially matched China Labour Dynamics Survey 2018 microdata and provincial digitalisation indices, we uncover a digital ‘upgrading trap’: the development of the digital economy hides the process of inequality formation in the hedging relationship between objective labour demand ‘upgrading’ and subjective labour supply ‘expanding’. The former can be summarised as the risk of ‘no job’ and the latter as the risk of ‘no way back’. Counterintuitively, consumer Internet development demonstrates a greater role in both reducing workers’ inequality in secondary labour markets and promoting a fair primary distribution. These findings reconceptualise digital inequality as coevolutionary outcomes, and offer a tripartite governance way for inclusive growth through portable skill certification, algorithmic accountability mechanisms, and interoperable social security systems.
States are reshaping the global digital economy to assert control over the artificial intelligence (AI) value chain. Operating outside multilateral institutions, they pursue measures such as export controls on advanced semiconductors, infrastructure partnerships, and bans on foreign digital platforms. This digital disintegration reflects an elite-centered response to the infrastructural power that private firms wield over critical AI inputs. A handful of companies operate beyond the reach of domestic regulation and multilateral oversight, controlling access to technologies that create vulnerabilities existing institutions struggle to contain. As a result, states have asserted strategic digital sovereignty: the exercise of authority over core digital infrastructure, often through selective alliances with firms and other governments. The outcome is an emergent form of AI governance in techno-blocs: coalitions that coordinate control over key inputs while excluding others. These arrangements challenge the liberal international order by replacing multilateral cooperation with strategic—and often illiberal—alignment within competing blocs.
The chapter discusses the evolution of justice and dispute resolution in the era of LawTech (LT). Traditional taxonomies of justice are mirrored in new forms of digital dispute settlement (DDS), where the idealized Justice Hercules is compared to the prospect of robo-judges. Currently, LT primarily supports traditional courts as they transition to e-courts. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is evolving into online dispute resolution (ODR), with blockchain-based crowdsourcing emerging as a potential alternative to traditional justice. Hybrid models of dispute resolution are also taking shape. The chapter outlines assessment criteria for adopting LT in digital systems, focusing on ensuring that DS in the digital economy remains independent, impartial, and enforceable. Human centricity is core construct for the co-development of LT and DS. This overarching principle requires human oversight, transparency, data privacy, and fairness in both access and outcomes.
Amid China’s goals to reach peak carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060, along with its ecological civilization agenda, the synergy between the digital economy (DE) and environmental quality (EQ) in Chinese cities has become increasingly vital. Using panel data from 285 cities between 2016 and 2021, this study constructs an integrated framework to examine the level of coordinated development between the DE and EQ, measured through the coupling coordination degree (CCD) that captures the strength and harmony of their interaction. It further analyses spatial–temporal heterogeneity and influencing factors. The results reveal: (1) both the DE and EQ have improved steadily, with the CCD rising to a moderate level and showing clear spatial clustering; and (2) economic development, educational investment and industrial upgrading boost the CCD, whereas average years of education and government intervention may hinder it. Additionally, economic development and industrial upgrading have positive spatial spillovers, and a threshold effect of government intervention is observed.
The global transformation of the economy towards a digital one has fundamentally restructured business operations, economic models, and tax practices. With digital technologies and electronic communications embedded within industries, the digital economy has fostered innovative business models, transformed user behaviors, and increased operational efficiency. However, such a revolution has come at the price of exposing the limitations of traditional international tax models based on physical presence and tangible properties. The entry of borderless, intangible, and platform-based economic activities necessitates urgent tax redesign, especially amid digital businesses, which increasingly interact across borders yet leave no traditional physical presence.
This research describes the revolutionary influence of the digital economy on cross-border taxation, deconstructs the traditional conceptualization of the permanent establishment (PE), and evaluates the emergent principle of “tax where value is generated” based on recent literature as well as emerging global reform approaches.
Geopolitical forces are fundamentally altering the landscape of e-commerce and digital trade. Cross-border e-commerce is increasingly fragmented along geopolitical lines, as e-commerce companies are forced to reckon with the security implications of their operations. This includes governments’ concerns about data security and sovereignty. When foreign firms collect extensive data on the behavior of the country’s customers, there is potential for those data to be exploited in shaping consumer behavior or spreading information in the country. Additionally, when a foreign firm plays an important role in the domestic economy, local governments have limited means to encourage those firms to act in the “national interest” or broader societal and economic goals beyond maximizing profits. Because of these concerns, governments have adopted policies to shape the behavior of e-commerce companies. This includes shaping market access, level playing field, investment security, and institutional alignment. E-commerce companies have adopted various strategies to manage corporate nationality and geopolitical tensions, including masking country of origin, diversifying supply chains, relocating control rights, focusing on alternate markets, and corporate diplomacy.
This Element develops a theory of institutional acceleration to explain the transformation to a digital economy through a cluster of frontier technologies: artificial intelligence, blockchain, quantum computing, cryptography, and low-earth orbit infrastructure. Unlike previous technological revolutions, these technologies transform not how we organise things, but how we coordinate economic activity. The authors' supertransition thesis explains why these digital technologies shouldn't be understood in isolation, but rather should be understood in how they combine to create new institutional possibilities, leading to more open, complex, and global economic systems. Drawing on evolutionary economics and institutional theory, this Element shows how this evolutionary process is reshaping our institutional economic architecture. Ultimately, institutional acceleration drives greater computation and knowledge into our economic systems.
The chapter offers an insight into the highly fluid field of digital trade rulemaking as a direct reaction to digital transformations. Against the backdrop of the evolution of the trade policy discourse beyond online trade in goods and services and the emergence of new digital protectionism, the chapter explores the dynamics of digital trade regulation in the past decade in a complex geopolitical setting by looking at some broader trends, as well as distinct regulatory models (exemplified by the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), the European Union–United Kingdom Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)) and the new templates of the digital economy agreements (DEAs) that also signal room for regulatory innovation in trade law. The chapter’s enquiry seeks to identify new design elements found in preferential trade agreements (PTAs), to trace how these have diffused over time, and to ask what their implications for domestic regulatory space may be. Finally and linking to the multilateral discussions on electronic commerce, the chapter tests to what extent PTAs have worked as regulatory laboratories and whether some of the newly emerged digital trade rules can be multilateralised.
This Article draws upon and connects three different developments: the ‘internationalisation’ of tax law and EU tax law, specifically; the increasing digitalisation of the economy, and the European Union’s need for more revenue to deal with the financial consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and other policy priorities. It is explained why the taxation of data per se cannot be addressed at the global level at present and why the focus of research has to lie on the taxation of the different business models of the digital economy. In the absence of a global agreement as to how the digital economy should be taxed, the reaction of the European Union to such a fundamental undertaking remains uncertain and politically contingent on the outcomes of negotiation at the OECD level. Most particularly, on the so-called Pillar One agreement. A seemingly temporal solution to the taxation of the digital economy, the so-called DSTs (Digital Services Taxes) have been adopted by Member States of the EU and third countries, but their future remains uncertain. Amidst these developments, the EU has also looked for ways to increase its resources and to finance its post-Covid ambitious recovery plan. This need has led to a reconsideration of whether EU taxes could finance the EU budget (next to the Union’s own resources, which remain for the main part transfers from Member States). In this Article, I argue that beyond tax design considerations and potential constitutional impediments, the EU revenue side should be emphasised in the discussion. Therefore, I suggest that the Union should ensure that at least part of the revenue arising from digital taxation should be channeled to the supranational budget. Whether Pillar One gets adopted or not, the potential introduction of an EU digital levy, ideally by way of an EU tax, could help overcoming several shortcomings of the present tax status quo and could result in an increase of the resources at the disposal of the EU in a fashion compatible with the imperatives of democratic legitimacy.
In a world of weaponized interdependence, middle powers have policy choices that can enhance their autonomy. However, having this policy space is not enough. In order to turn the policy space into policy enactment, domestic politics has to align in a particular way. This chapter considers India and Brazil as examples of “middle powers” and analyzes their capacity to enact autonomy and safeguard their digital sovereignty. The authors argue that when independent institutions’ interests are incorporated into the policymaking process and are not usurped by the parliamentary (political) process, they observe the enactment of autonomy-enhancing policies. Brazil’s and India’s data localization policies are illustrative case studies. While Brazil and India are both open democracies with a technoeconomic landscapes characterized by a similar technoeconomic landscape with a hybrid mixture of foreign-owned and domestically owned companies, they have adopted different data localization policies. The authors argue that the divergent paths of Brazil and India are due to the nature of the policymaking process. India’s policymaking incorporated the interests of independent institutions. In contrast, Brazil’s parliamentary process usurped policymaking power from its independent institutions and has not yet granted the mandate and tools to either existing or necessary new institutions, such as regulatory agencies, to address this emerging and already pressing set of issues. Thus, for countries to enact policies to enhance their digital sovereignty, the interests of independent institutions must be incorporated, and their power must be increased.
The digital transition has become a crucial area of ideological contestation, as ongoing debates on digital surveillance and data commodification exemplify. Yet, we know too little about how political parties tap into these confrontations. This article elaborates a critical approach to map the ideological positions that 25 parties in France, Germany, Italy and Spain adopt on platform societies. The empirical analysis classifies parties' positions to uncover how their views on the digital economy and digital politics reshape their core ideologies. While parties are distributed along six ideological positions, most cases populate three types: Platform Neoliberalism, Social Liberalism 4.0 and Platform Socialism. These types represent the tripartite ideological divide on platform societies. Ultimately, this study provides an empirically informed theory of comparative digital politics and the foundation for research agendas on political parties' views on digitalization and the relations between ideologies, public policy and parties' organizational change in the digital age.
This paper reviews two important design choices for Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs). First, how CBDC intermediaries should be compensated for their services. Second, how payments from traditional banks into CBDC wallets should be cleared. Both of these design choices have important implications for the financial stability of the banking system.
A new form of digital economic circulation has emerged, wherein ideas, knowledge, labour and use rights for otherwise idle assets move between geographically distributed but connected and interactive online communities. Such circulation is apparent across a number of digital economic ecologies, including social media, online marketplaces, crowdsourcing, crowdfunding and other manifestations of the so-called ‘sharing economy’. Prevailing accounts deploy concepts such as ‘co-production’, ‘prosumption’ and ‘peer-to-peer’ to explain digital economic circulation as networked exchange relations characterised by their disintermediated, collaborative and democratising qualities. Building from the neologism of platform capitalism, we place ‘the platform’ — understood as a distinct mode of socio-technical intermediary and business arrangement that is incorporated into wider processes of capitalisation — at the centre of the critical analysis of digital economic circulation. To create multi-sided markets and coordinate network effects, platforms enrol users through a participatory economic culture and mobilise code and data analytics to compose immanent infrastructures. Platform intermediation is also nested in the ex-post construction of a replicable business model. Prioritising rapid up-scaling and extracting revenues from circulations and associated data trails, the model performs the structure of venture capital investment which capitalises on the potential of platforms to realise monopoly rents.