Chapter 1 examines what mental illness stigma is and analyzes the components of mental illness stigma to show how people with mental illness experience stigma in their daily lives. These components include labeling, stereotyping, prejudice, moral distancing, social exclusion, status loss, dehumanization, microaggressions, discrimination, and epistemic injustice. In each case, I use empirical evidence from the social psychology literature on stigma to show ways in which people with mental illness experience these forms of stigma. Next, I look at factors that affect the kind, degree, and scope of stigma associated with mental illness, including beliefs, political values, cultural values, socioeconomic status, education, and gender. Finally, I examine how many people experience compounding stigmas that come from multiple sources.

Chapter 6 examines what makes discrimination and microaggressions (as a form of discrimination) wrongful. Discrimination involves differential treatment where some people are treated in different, unequal, and worse ways compared to others, and where that differential treatment is based on possessing a socially undesirable trait that marks a person as bad and inferior. Discrimination is wrongful because it harms people in a variety of ways, impacting their circumstances, resources and opportunities, options, agency, autonomy, and well-being. It causes material disadvantage and distributive injustice that denies people access to resources and opportunities and prevents them from having the basic goods necessary to participation in society. It also demeans people and leads to unfair subordination, loss of deliberative freedom, and decreased autonomy. This chapter reviews the philosophical literature on discrimination to provide a pluralistic account of the many harms discrimination and microaggressions cause to people with mental illness, which altogether make discrimination wrongful.

The introduction motivates the book’s arguments by showing how mental illness stigma remains pervasive despite greater awareness of mental health issues and more resources directed at mental health treatment and destigmatization. The forms of mental illness stigma most commonly expressed are stigma against people with severe mental illness who are perceived as homeless, and internalized stigma that people with mental illness project onto themselves. Mental illness stigma arises as a reaction to the violation of social norms of what a human being should be in the Western world in the twenty-first century. I give an account of stigma as the devaluing and discrediting of a person based on possessing a social trait that is seen as violating social norms, constituting a relationship of power. Components of stigma include labeling, stereotyping, prejudice, moral distancing, social exclusion, status loss, dehumanization, microaggressions, discrimination, and epistemic injustice. The chapter ends with a description of the book’s scope, methodology, and chapter outline.

This chapter explores the complexities of discrimination in international trade law, a core principle that mandates equal treatment of foreign and domestic goods, services, and intellectual property. Despite its significance, the definition of discrimination remains contested, with debates focusing on intent versus impact and the comparability of products. The chapter analyses these issues, examining key legal texts like the GATT, GATS, and TRIPS agreements, and the evolving jurisprudence of GATT panels and the WTO Appellate Body. It highlights the shifts in interpreting ‘discrimination’, including the move from considering both ‘aim and effect’ to focusing primarily on the effect of trade measures. The chapter concludes by discussing the challenges in reaching a clear, agreed-upon standard for discrimination and the implications for international trade.

Methadone maintenance therapy arose as a treatment for opiate use in the mid 1960s. At the time, neither drug use nor treatment for it were considered disabilities. When Vincent Dole, the Rockefeller Institute metabolic researcher who was one of the progenitors of methadone maintenance therapy (MMT), asked, ‘What kind of disablement does a drug produce?’ (Courtwright et al., 1989, p. 334), this was a prescient question.1 Dole’s team stabilised patient-subjects on methadone, hoping to displace reliance on shorter-acting opiates, and explored dosages that would enable ‘cooperative relationships with patients’ (Courtwright, et al., 1989, p. 336). Opposing detoxification and abstinence as the sole basis for treatment, Dole saw opioid use disorder as a metabolic condition that required ongoing pharmacological stability. Contrasting the stabilising effects of one opiate (methadone) to another (heroin), Dole emphasised that drugs should be judged in terms of their social effects – did they improve or undermine capacity for stable relationships with family members, treatment providers or employers? Did they produce ‘disablement’ or did they instead ‘enable’ capacities for productive citizenship? Such questions dominated the social contexts into which methadone maintenance was inserted. Making stable, productive citizens was adopted as the goal of methadone maintenance.

The research for this chapter was undertaken on the lands of the Wurundjeri people of the Kulin Nations. As is customary in the country in which I live and work, or so-called ‘Australia’ (see Watego, 2021), I acknowledge them as the traditional owners of country, as well as elders past and present. I acknowledge that sovereignty over these lands was never ceded, and that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples remain strong in their enduring connections to land, sky, water and culture.

When it became clear that gender critical belief is protected in our anti-discrimination law, it was often said that, while such views were protected, manifesting or expressing them was not. This is simply not true. Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects both the absolute right to hold a belief and the qualified right to manifest a belief. The manifestation of protected beliefs is also protected under Article 10, which protects the right to freedom of expression. Because these are qualified rights, it may be permissible to interfere with them where proportionate. Where discrimination or harassment arises because someone holds gender critical views, this will be unlawful. However, where the treatment complained of is a genuine response to the fact or manner of manifestation of a protected belief, the legal situation becomes more complex. In assessing the extent to which is it permissible for an employer or other duty-bearer to interfere with the fact or manner of manifestation of a protected belief, the central importance of freedom of expression must be recognised as the background context of any analysis.

This use of preferred pronouns for those with trnsgender identities is extraordinarily contentious within the context of debates on sex and gender identity. This chapter begins by exploring why pronouns are so contentious, arguing that their use is an important signifier of underlying beliefs about the relationship between sex and gender identity. From here, the chapter explores whether and under what conditions an emplouyer could interfere with the expression of employees to prohibit or compell the use of particular pronouns. It concludes that this will require a fact-sensitive analysis which begins from the understanding that the right to freedom of expression is robustly protected, especially in the context of compelled speech.

The Court of Appeal in Higgs v Farmor’s School has provided a detailed analysis of the relationship between anti-discrimination and human rights standards in the workplace where employees manifest protected beliefs. Unfortunately, this analysis suffers from a central flaw by presuming that if manifestation of belief is protected under direct discrimination, it will always be unlawful for an employer to interfere. It is this presumption which prompted the Court of Appeal to defend the introduction of a justification test into what was previously a factual analysis of causation, by deeming less favourable treatment in response to ‘objectionable’ manifestations to have not been ‘because of’ the protected belief itself. This chapter argues that such an approach is unnecessary because it responds to a problem which does not exist. It is simply incorrect to presume that protection from direct discrimination necessarily implies that any interference with the manifestation of a protected belief is directly discriminatory. The ordinary application of the Equality Act is already coextensive with the protections afforded under the European Convention on Human Rights. Any interpretation needed under s.3 of the Human Rights Act is needed within the sphere of indirect discrimination, not direct discrimination.

This chapter begins with the foundations and the history of international humanitarian law before discussing the scope of its application and the law governing the conduct of hostilities, namely the means and methods of warfare. The final sections discuss the law governing the protection of persons during armed conflict and the implementation and enforcement of international humanitarian law. In introducing international humanitarian law, this chapter focuses on the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977.

The question of whether transgender girls should be permitted to participate in girls’ sports has been one of the most politically contested and socially controversial of the last decade. Neither law nor medicine provides definitive answers. This book takes on the absolutist positions staked out by both the left and the right and argues in favor of a more nuanced framework that seeks to ensure all girls and boys –both transgender and cisgender – have access to the benefits of organized sports.