Ever since the advent of recombinant DNA technology in the early 1970s concerns have been expressed about the misuse potential of this and subsequent biotechnology breakthroughs. This article focuses on the securitization of gain-of-function (GOF) virology research in the United States, utilizing an updated theoretical framework that distinguishes between “riskification” and “threatification.” The paper examines three distinct cases, two historical, one ongoing. It argues that early attempts to govern GOF research primarily employed a riskification approach, characterized by self-governance by the scientific community. However, the controversy over the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic led to a shift toward threatification, bringing in high-level political actors like the U.S. President and Congress, resulting in the adoption of more restrictive, legally-enforced oversight measures. The article concludes that the application of this theoretical distinction provides a better understanding of how the governance of dual-use research has evolved in the United States.

Persistently rising atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations challenge dominant Liberal hopes that science and multilateralism might deliver rational, global climate outcomes. Emerging Realist climate approaches that take geopolitics and national interests more seriously have yet to explore Morgenthau’s concern that ‘scientism’ – exaggerated faith in scientific rationality to solve political problems – would lead to disastrous underestimations of power and irrationality. Recently, Realists have mooted ‘solar geoengineering’ designs as a ‘lesser evil’ option to deliberately cool the Earth independently of emissions reductions. However, assessments of solar geoengineering prospects barely factor in Realist concerns, focusing instead on idealised scientific modelling of bio-physical effects and Liberal governance scenarios. To explore how geoengineering techno-science would be ‘translated’ into security assessments, geopolitical logics were elicited through interviews and group discussions with (mainly Arctic-oriented) national security professionals. Security experts reframe solar geoengineering in three significant ways: (a) from a climate ‘global public good’ to a source of geopolitical leverage and disruption; (b) from a risk-reduction tool to a potential source of distrust and escalation; and (c) from a knowledge-deficit problem solvable by more research, to a potential disinformation vector. This expands Realist scholarship on climate change and identifies serious risks to ongoing scientific and commercial pursuit of such technologies.

The development of technologies for the biopreservation of infectious organisms requires careful analysis of benefits and risks. This article reviews the regulatory landscape and oversight responsibilities in the United States in respect to pathogen biopreservation. Focused on two globally significant pathogens, Cryptosporidium and Plasmodium, the article explores advantages and potential risks of biopreservation concerning biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment.

Almost all technology is dual use to some degree: it has both civilian and military applications. This feature creates a dilemma for cooperation. States can design arms control institutions to curtail costly competition over some military technology. But they also do not want to limit valuable civilian uses. How does the dual use nature of technology shape the prospects for cooperation? We argue that the duality of technology presents a challenge not by its very existence but rather through the ways it alters information constraints on the design of arms control institutions. We characterize variation in technology along two dual use dimensions: (1) the ease of distinguishing military from civilian uses; and (2) the degree of integration within military enterprises and the civilian economy. Distinguishability drives the level of monitoring needed to detect violations. When a weapon is indistinguishable from its civilian counterpart, states must improve detection though intelligence collection or intrusive inspections. Integration sharpens the costs of disclosing information to another state. For highly integrated technology, demonstrating compliance could expose information about other capabilities, increasing the security risks from espionage. Together, these dimensions generate expectations about the specific information problems states face as they try to devise agreements over various technologies. We introduce a new qualitative data set to assess both variables and their impact on cooperation across all modern armament technologies. The findings lend strong support for the theory. Efforts to control emerging technologies should consider how variation in the dual use attributes shapes this tension between detection and disclosure.