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We study the effect of time-varying disagreement of professional forecasters on the transmission of monetary policy in Korea, which has transitioned from an emerging to an advanced economy. We find that high levels of disagreement interfere with the transmission of monetary policy and, hence, weaken monetary policy effects. However, under low levels of disagreement, a monetary policy shock elicits textbook-like responses of inflation, expected inflation, and real activity. The findings are consistent with the view that disagreement affects the role of the signaling channel of monetary transmission relative to the conventional transmission channel. We also show that the dependance of the transmission on the level of disagreement remains intact even after controlling for time-varying monetary policy uncertainty and considering the shifts in the Bank of Korea’s inflation target type.
We examine the response of the exchange rate to monetary policy shocks using structural vector autoregression (SVAR). The SVAR approach in this study differs from previous studies by incorporating uncertainty measures and employing shock-restricted identification constraints. Using structural shocks that are in accordance with the event and external variable constraints, we demonstrate that the US exchange rate appreciates immediately in response to contractionary monetary policy shocks, with the maximum appreciation occurring within one to two months. Our finding highlights the importance of allowing contemporaneous interaction between interest rate and exchange rate, as facilitated by the shock-restricted SVAR, and accounting for uncertainties to address the puzzle of the exchange rate response.
We provide new evidence on U.S. monetary policy spillovers to Australia using an integrated time–frequency connectedness framework. Spillovers primarily transmit through the interest rate (policy rate) channel, followed by the asset price (with the consumer discretionary sector as the main conduit) channel and the exchange rate channel. Spillovers are highly time-varying, peaking at the onset of COVID-19 and again during the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Linking these spillovers to the real economy, we show that an identified U.S. tightening is followed by a tightening in Australia’s monetary policy stance and generates contractionary and disinflationary effects on Australian output and inflation, consistent with transmission via imported financial conditions and the domestic policy reaction. Finally, we show that ignoring spillovers yields a price puzzle under recursive VAR identification, while using spillover-based surprises as external instruments removes the puzzle and recovers theory-consistent responses.
This paper studies the transition to high inflation during the COVID-19 pandemic, using a behavioral version of the New Keynesian model, which replaces the conventional assumption of rational expectations with subjective and heterogeneous expectations. Different shares of agents in the economy form expectations based on alternative views regarding future economic variables: (1) a share of agents forecasts that inflation and output will rapidly revert to steady state; (2) another share forms forecasts based on a model resembling the MSV solution under rational expectations; (3) a third share of agents uses an under-specified model that captures trend-following, adaptive, or extrapolative behavior. Agents learn over time the parameters of their perceived model and they can also shift across different views based on past forecasting performance. The macroeconomic model is estimated using Bayesian methods to fit realized macroeconomic variables and data on expectations from surveys. The results document an additional channel that operates through switches in agents’ perceptions and amplifies the impact of the original inflationary shocks. In response to rising inflation after COVID, agents begin shifting from the mean reversion model to the trend-following specification (with a belief about perceived inflation persistence that is simultaneously revised upward). Consequently, the impact of inflationary shocks is magnified and the effects of monetary policy attenuated.
We analyse the monetary-fiscal policy mix in post-war Europe, focusing on France and Italy, to trace the historical dynamics of debt and inflation. Using a Markov-switching DSGE model, we identify distinct policy regimes: a Passive Monetary-Active Fiscal (PM/AF) regime before the late 1980s/early 1990s, an Active Monetary-Passive Fiscal (AM/PF) regime associated with central bank independence and EMU convergence, and a third regime marked by the ELB and active fiscal measures aimed at recovery. Simulations reveal that the PM/AF regime in France led to price volatility but stabilised debt, while AM/PF curbed inflation at the cost of rising debt. In contrast, Italy’s procyclical fiscal policy in downturns exacerbated imbalances, aggregate volatility, and low growth. We further assess the implications of policy credibility and uncertainty.
The pandemic crisis introduced an unprecedented supply-side shock that was global in scope. Despite historically high levels of prior sovereign debt and low bond yields, macroeconomic policy responses included monetised fiscal expansions of extraordinary magnitude. Conventional theory suggests that the combination of supply contractions with such expansions is inflationary, yet central bank discourse during the pandemic expressed little concern about inflation. Our theoretical analysis suggests the presence of strong inflation forces at the time, likely offset by continuing pessimism shocks, consumption constraints and expectations management. In prominent advanced countries over more than a century, monetised fiscal expansions are shown to have preceded inflation surges, most strongly following signature episodes like WWII.
This paper investigates the stability of the demand for money in the United States and provides a comparison among the simple-sum monetary aggregates, the original (non-credit-card-augmented) Divisia monetary aggregates, and the credit-augmented Divisia and credit-augmented Divisia inside aggregates. We use quarterly data from the Center for Financial Stability and the Pesaran et al. (2001) bounds test procedure to investigate the long-run relation between the monetary aggregates and their respective user costs. In doing so, we use three classic money demand functions—the log–log, the semi-log, and the Selden and Latané specifications. With quarterly data over the 1967:q1 through 2025:q1 period, for which the original Divisia monetary aggregates are available, we find evidence of a stable money demand function only with the Sum M4 aggregate under all money demand specifications, but not with any of the Divisia aggregates. With quarterly data over the post-2006 period, for which the credit-augmented Divisia monetary aggregates are also available, our findings show that the demand for money is stable across all money demand specifications with all of the original Divisia aggregates and the credit-augmented Divisia aggregates (but not with all of the credit-augmented Divisia inside aggregates). We also find evidence of cointegration with the Sum M3 and Sum M4 aggregates under all three money demand specifications, but not with the Fed’s Sum M2 aggregate.
We propose a novel approach to classifying inflation-targeting (IT) economies using fractionally integrated processes. Motivated by the rising prevalence and diversity of IT, we leverage variation in the persistence of inflation rates to identify four de facto strategies, or “shades” of IT. Moving from negative orders of fractional integration, indicating anti-persistent behaviour, to more persistent long-memory processes, often associated with less credible policy frameworks, we classify countries into average, strict, flexible, and uncommitted IT. This framework sheds light on differences between declarative and actual strategies across 36 advanced and emerging economies. Most countries fall into the flexible IT category, though extreme cases, including uncommitted IT, occur quite frequently. Furthermore, we link our classification to institutional features of national frameworks using ordinal probit models. The results suggest differences across categories are related to variations in the maturity and stability of IT frameworks, with weaker connections to central bank independence and transparency.
This paper examines the effects of average inflation targeting (AIT) on social welfare and fiscal multipliers under varying averaging windows using a nonlinear New Keynesian model. While the existing literature highlights AIT’s advantages over Inflation Targeting(IT) and longer-window AIT over shorter-window AIT in terms of social welfare, these conclusions often rely on linearized models that fail to capture expectation effects arising from window lengths. By solving the model nonlinearly, we find that social welfare increases with AIT windows up to six years but declines for longer windows. The key driver is the differing expectation effects, where longer windows reduce the likelihood of the zero lower bound (ZLB) binding but may overshoot inflation targets, leading to lower output and welfare. Our results reveal that the optimal averaging window for AIT depends critically on the ZLB probability: higher ZLB risks favor longer windows, while lower risks make shorter windows sufficient. Moreover, we investigate the fiscal multiplier under AIT and show that it differs significantly from IT. In addition, the welfare-maximizing AIT window does not align with the window that maximizes fiscal multipliers, highlighting trade-offs between welfare and fiscal policy effectiveness. This study underscores the importance of nonlinear methods in evaluating AIT and provides practical insights into its calibration for modern monetary policy frameworks.
The endogenous money approach has a long history and development, but the proponents of Modern Monetary Theory point out that it can be extended by Chartalism and the leading role it gives to money created by the State. In this paper, we test this assertion by making a critical analysis of their contributions and reviewing the opposing positions. We conclude that, indeed, the integration of the endogenous money and state money views in a same theorical framework seems to offer a coherent explanation of monetary phenomena.
The green transition to reduce greenhouse gas emissions requires substantial investments in a narrow time window to avoid climate-related disruptions, adding two new dimensions for monetary policy and exacerbating the trade-offs that central banks face. First, climate-related physical disruptions lead to higher inflation (i.e., Climateflation). Second, the rush to green technology may result in inflation due to supply bottlenecks (i.e., Greenflation). As a consequence, central banks implement restrictive monetary policy that have a detrimental effect on the high up-front costs of renewable energy projects. This slows down the dynamics of green technologies adoption. We build a dynamic non-linear model to study these interactions under reasonable parameterizations. Both Climateflation and Greenflation are quantitatively significant, creating a dilemma for central banks between raising interest rates to counteract inflation and easing them to facilitate renewable investment. We further show that, under specific stochastic scenarios, the trade-off between inflation control and green transition can improve when structural costs for green technologies decrease or when supply-side constraints relax.
The rise of U.S. inflation in 2021 and 2022 and its partial subsiding have sparked debates about the relative role of supply and demand factors. The initial surge surprised many macroeconomists despite the unprecedented jump in money growth in 2020–21. We find that the relationship between consumption and the theoretically based Divisia M3 measure of money (velocity) can be well modeled both in the short- and long-runs. We use the estimated long-run relationship to calculate the deviation of actual velocity from its long-run equilibrium and incorporate it into a P-Star framework. Our model of velocity significantly improves the performance of the P-Star model relative to using a one-sided HP filter to calculate trend velocity as used by other researchers. We also include a global supply pressures index in the model and find that recent movements in U.S. inflation largely owed to aggregate demand driven macroeconomic factors that are tracked by Divisia money with a smaller role played by supply factors.
Within a new Keynesian model of monetary policy with both backward- and forward-looking variables, we investigate the impact of risk aversion by assuming that the central bank is endowed with recursive preferences à la Hansen and Sargent (Hansen and Sargent, 1995). We establish that, since in this model inflation and output are forward-looking, under discretion the optimal policy is found by solving two distinct fixed-point problems: the former pertains to the central bank’s optimization exercise, the latter to the identification of the equilibrium expectations of the forward-looking variables. We show that, in the presence of forward-looking variables, the optimal policy differs from the robust policy chosen by a central bank endowed with quadratic preferences and subject to Knightian uncertainty, confuting the equivalence established by Hansen and Sargent (2008) when only backward-looking variables enter into the laws of motion regulating the dynamics of the economic system. Through our analysis we show: i) how a risk-averse central bank selects a more aggressive policy than one furnished with the standard preferences of a canonical DSGE model; ii) that the “divine coincidence” established within traditional linear-quadratic formulations between inflation and output stabilization no longer holds.
This paper commemorates the 50th anniversary of the 1973 recession during Salvador Allende’s government by offering a comprehensive analysis of macroeconomic populism. Focusing on the lessons from this historical episode, it is argued that the lax economic policies in 1970 and 1971 triggered the boom of 1971, culminating in a financial crisis in 1972 and an economic recession in 1973. The examination encompasses an evaluation of Chilean macroeconomic populism, delving into the impact of these lax policies on the business cycle. Furthermore, it addresses prevalent misinterpretations of the 1973 recession in the context of recent Latin American events. The paper concludes by extrapolating broader insights from the Chilean experience, offering valuable lessons for shaping effective economic policies in Latin America.
We explore the international transmission of monetary policy and central bank information shocks originating from the United States and the euro area. Employing a panel vector autoregression, we use macroeconomic and financial variables across several major economies to address both static and dynamic spillovers. To identify structural shocks, we introduce a novel approach that combines external instruments with heteroskedasticity-based identification and sign restrictions. Our results suggest significant spillovers from European Central Bank and Federal Reserve policies to each other’s economies, global aggregates, and other countries. These effects are more pronounced for central bank information shocks than for pure monetary policy shocks, and the dominance of the US in the global economy is reflected in our findings.
This paper sets up a small open economy two-agent model and addresses the size of output multiplier of government spending associated with taxation either on constrained households or on unconstrained households. The paper shows that the tax financing rule matters to real resource allocations in the small open economy with flexible prices and equal tax burden at the steady state, contrasting to the finding of Monacelli and Perotti (2011) in closed economies. The output multiplier in open economies is larger than the multiplier in closed economies when taxes are levied on constrained households, while the reverse holds under taxations on unconstrained households.
Using US quarterly data (1967–2023), including inflation’s post-pandemic surge and decline alongside monetary policies characterized by quantitative easing before refocusing on the 2% target, we utilize traditional and novel econometric tools to assess the stability of key macroeconomic variables’ responses to monetary shocks. Our findings confirm the relevance of a broad Divisia aggregate in understanding monetary policy transmission and highlight its empirical importance in explaining output and price dynamics across decades. Time-varying impulse response functions (IRFs) reveal consistent and puzzle-free price responses to Divisia-based monetary shocks throughout the sample, aligning with theory. Time-varying IRFs indicate that pandemic-related outliers in GDP (2020Q2) do not disrupt results. In contrast, Fed Funds rate or shadow policy interest rate shocks often yield puzzling outcomes across earlier and extended periods.
This study develops a two-country New Keynesian model incorporating deep habits in consumption to analyze macroeconomic dynamics under the optimal coordinated monetary policy. The central bank adjusts interest rates more aggressively in response to structural shocks in an open economy than in a closed economy. Deep habits strengthen the central bank’s incentive to adjust terms of trade through interest rates due to habit formation and counter-cyclical markup behavior, creating price inelasticity in demand. Deep habits also lead to deviations from the law of one price, reflected in goods-specific real exchange rates, which the degree of home bias influences. Finally, this study compares international policy coordination to noncoordination to analyze welfare gains, showing that they depend on key structural factors like price rigidity, deep habits, and home bias. Policy coordination stabilizes domestic output and inflation by internalizing externalities in terms of trade and consumption.
Differences in labour market institutions and regulations between countries of the monetary union can cause divergent responses even to a common shock. We augment a multi-country model of the euro area with search and matching framework that differs across Ricardian and hand-to-mouth households. In this setting, we investigate the implications of cross-country heterogeneity in labour market institutions for the conduct of monetary policy in a monetary union. We compute responses to demand and supply shocks under the Taylor rule, asymmetric unemployment targeting, and average inflation targeting. For each rule we distinguish between cases with lower or higher weight on the unemployment gap. Across all rules, responding to unemployment leads to lower losses of employment. Responding to unemployment reduces cross-country differences within the monetary union and consumption inequality between rich and poor households within each country.
I investigate the welfare maximizing steady-state inflation rate in a heterogeneous-agent New Keynesian model with Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity (DNWR). After matching the annual wage change distribution in the U.S., I demonstrate that DNWR has a significant impact on the economy, particularly when the inflation target is set low. The optimal inflation rate is estimated to be as high as 8.8%, and increasing the inflation target to the optimal level yields a welfare gain of nearly 3.50%. While the results exhibit sensitivity to parameterization, a broad range of calibrations indicates that the optimal inflation rate is consistently above 3%.