One relatively recent pivot in the discussion concerning the possibility of interpersonal utility comparisons (IUCs) centers on evolutionary biological considerations. In particular, it has been suggested that, since all human beings are part of the same species, we should expect our utility functions to be structured similarly and thus be comparable. However, a closer look at this argument shows that it is not compelling as it stands: since cultural learning plays a crucial role in our cognitive evolution, the conclusion that we evolved to be psychologically similar to each other needs to be revised. This, though, does not mean that evolutionary theory has nothing to say about the possibility of IUCs. In fact, as this paper makes clear, by expanding the evolutionary argument with work in gene–culture–technological coevolutionary theory, it becomes possible to support the contention that IUCs may well be sometimes possible. This has important implications for the analysis and design of social institutions.

Normative reasoning within the mainstream economic framework has been largely shaped by utilitarian ethics. The growing popularity of effective altruism indicates that the utilitarian spirit has also permeated the sphere of social sentiment, evaluating our pro-social behaviour and charitable giving in terms of efficiency. The present study assesses the appropriateness of judging social outcomes through the prism of allocative efficiency by questioning to what extent the society of effective altruists is robust, sustainable, and resilient. Using computer simulations based on the dictator game, we demonstrate that a society of welfare-maximising effective altruists can achieve an optimal outcome alongside equality under extremely restrictive assumptions, such as the uniformity of giving strategies (i.e. interacting with other effective altruists exclusively) and initial equality of wealth distribution. Yet, in the world of unequal opportunities, utilitarian giving tends to increase wealth disparity. In addition, in polymorphic societies, effective altruists underperform compared to deontological (or unconditional) altruists. Consequently, we demonstrate that striving for allocative efficiency might undermine the equality and resilience objectives and question whether the former should remain the dominant economic normative principle.

Modern corporations have increasingly been adopting a decentred, layered, and multi-jurisdictional form as a strategy of boundary manipulation known amongst tax lawyers and accountants as ‘regulatory arbitrage’. The argument we put forward in this article is that the scholarly work that treats these strategies as mere tax avoidance practices has contributed to an underestimation and misrecognition of the way contemporary multinationals operate in markets. These strategies, which we explain in terms of arbitrage power, exploit the difference between exchanges in an imaginary ‘smooth’ market of the economic textbook and a global market that is divided among legal authorities, each imposing their own rules, regulations, and taxations. Arbitrage power exploits differences between the location of market exchange and the location of the registration of property title transfers, combining this with a manipulation of formal systems for recognizing business enterprises in order to escape some or all of the rules and regulations of society. The result is a marked difference between the ‘brochure multinational’, the way multinationals are seen and presented in their glossy brochures, and the way multinationals are legally and practically organized nowadays.

Much theoretical and empirical work by economists and psychologists has shown that the neo-classical approach is defective, and economists are now looking for an alternative. Evolutionary economics is the answer. It starts from the realistic premise that society and the economy are shaped by competition, but unlike neo-classical economics, it proceeds empirically by observing and analysing what has been happening to the economy and society. It does so on the premise that a process of social selection is taking place, analogous but not identical to that of biological selection. This dynamic approach requires a revival of economic history. By reporting on, and inviting debate over, what is happening and its implications, the adoption of an evolutionary approach should help restore the moral content of economics and the surrounding social sciences. Such a change in approach would be a paradigm shift, and will take time. That it will happen is likely: in the end facts kick.

Governments’ economic policies need to be based on a coherent view of the role of innovation and productivity in sustaining growth. This article analyses advice on fostering innovation from Australia’s main statutory economics adviser, the Productivity Commission. It argues that the Productivity Commission’s comprehensive 2007 report, Public Support for Science and Innovation, contributed to a policy vacuum hampering government support for innovation for nearly a decade. First, within the Productivity Commission’s understanding of innovation was a contradiction between its required policy targeting criteria and the impossibility of meeting these criteria. Second, the resulting stance on innovation policy was at odds with research and theory on the drivers of innovation and hence growth – particularly innovation systems theories and those based on evolutionary economics. The ensuing innovation policy vacuum suggests that the Productivity Commission placed the abstract ideological ‘purity’ of neoclassical economic theory above empirical exploration of how government can best support Australia’s future economic development. Since late 2015, moves to fill this policy vacuum have included a Senate inquiry, a government department restructure, and the creation of a new Innovation and Science statutory advisory board. Whether these initiatives foster sustained innovation will depend on the extent to which they adopt approaches based on innovation systems or evolutionary economics, and transcend the static neoclassical mindset espoused by the Productivity Commission.

This paper proposes a new conceptualization of business model (BM) that rigorously exploits the important insights this notion offers and links them to related views developed in economics and business studies. We develop the foundations of a BM concept consistent with the principles of generalized Darwinism (GD) and with contributions already developed within this framework. Thus, we demonstrate the relevance of GD as a unifying framework for developing the evolutionary theory of firm and industry. We suggest analysing BM as a generative replicator hosted by the firm, which structures interactions between the members of this organization and the social entities of its industrial environment. We argue that GD allows us to clarify the nature and boundaries of the BM concept and to specify its relationships to other key evolutionary concepts, such as organizational routines.

We present the theory of the collaborative innovation bloc (CIB), an evolving system of innovation within which activity takes place over time. We show how the application of the CIB perspective can help make institutional and evolutionary economics more concrete, relevant, and persuasive, especially regarding policy prescriptions. Such policy actions should strive to improve the antifragility of CIBs and the economic system as a whole, thus enabling individual CIBs and the broader economic system to thrive when faced with adversity. With this in mind, we develop heuristics to evaluate CIB antifragility before using Sweden's economic and institutional evolution since the 1970s as a backdrop for identifying a set of institutional areas where reform can be undertaken to move in this direction.

This paper combines the property rights approach of Barzel with models from renewable resource and evolutionary economics to examine the domestication of wild animals. Wild animals are governed by weak property rights to stocks and individuals while domesticated animals are governed by private ownership of stocks and individuals. The complex evolutionary process of domestication can be viewed as a conversion of wild populations into private property, as well as a transition from natural selection to economic selection controlled by owners of populations and individuals. In our framework domestication is not the explicit goal of any economic agent, but it emerges as a long-run outcome of an innovation in hunting strategies in a hunter–gatherer society. Our formal model also suggests that the domestication process moves slowly at first but then proceeds rapidly, and is aligned with the archeological evidence on domestication events.