Financial stability is essential for sustainable economic growth, and prudential policies have been reinforced since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to safeguard this stability. The Basel III framework introduced stringent capital, liquidity, and risk management requirements for banks, strengthening their resilience. In the face of growing climate-related risks, central banks and supervisory authorities must ensure that financial systems remain stable. Extreme weather events and abrupt transitions to a low-carbon economy can lead to significant financial losses, including asset stranding and increased defaults, threatening overall financial stability. Central banks and supervisory authorities must integrate climate risks into their financial supervision frameworks, adapting existing tools to manage these complex, systemic risks. Prudential responses must encompass both individual institutions and broader financial systems to mitigate the impact of climate change on financial stability. Ensuring a resilient financial system is crucial for maintaining economic stability in the transition to a low-carbon future.

The proponents of the ‘convenient solution’ discussed in Chapter 3 see the cost of climate action as one of government investment in new infrastructure. However, as there is not time for this to scale sufficiently, we must think differently about cost. Voluntarily restraining ourselves from emitting activities may save us money, but in most cases at present, purchasing equipment compatible with zero emissions costs more than the emitting alternative. Eventually, governments will legislate to ban emissions, by which time we will only compare the costs of different emissions-free alternatives. On the journey to that point, governments can aim to help us change by subsidising zero-emissions projects or taxing emitting activities. Carbon pricing has proved to be politically impossible, due to competition in trade and the high costs it would place on householders. Instead, we can all re-think the timescale of our purchasing decisions and recognise that paying for the higher costs of emissions-free options today is in reality an investment in the future, like a pension or savings account, aiming to avoid the far worse costs of a global war over food.

From agents and bearers of human rights, the volume turns to domains which some have seen as impervious to claimants of rights, but which have been refashioned thanks to their mobilization. Sara Silverstein explains how it was from the periphery – first small European states before World War II and later from the Global South after – that most work was done to elaborate entitlements to healthcare, whether at the local, national, or international level. Some of these impulses sprang from mechanisms of colonial rule, others from the biopolitical transformation of citizenship (including in the rise of mandatory insurance); and there is no doubt that the international standard-setting of the World Health Organization and other agencies played an important role.

Provisions in consumer contracts that deprive consumers of recourse in the event of a product failure effectively cancel the insurance that the law would otherwise provide to consumers who are injured by sellers of consumer products. This redistributes wealth from the poorest consumers to richer consumers because richer consumers can afford to self-insure against the risk of product failure whereas poorer consumers cannot. It follows that consumer sovereigntist arguments that consumer indifference to consumer-unfriendly contract terms suggests that consumers prefer the lower prices that come with such terms are misleading here. The interests of rich and poor consumers diverge with respect to these contract terms and the fact that rich consumers may carry the day in the market does not imply the consumers as a group prefer these terms. Accordingly, the European approach to consumer law, which treats democratically elected governments regulating consumer contract terms as a more authentic reflection of popular will than the purchase decisions of consumers in markets, may be more appropriate when it comes to the regulation of consumer contracts.

This chapter discusses insurance as a central player in the purchasing of health goods and services. It points out the flaws and quirks in the insurance market that lead to an absence of perfect competition and the potential for skewed bargaining power between providers and insurers. Managed care is then outlined as an attempt by insurance companies to curtail health spending through utilization controls and narrow networks. Additional tools such as paying for wellness programs, bundling payments for episodes of care, and cost-effectiveness measures are also discussed as possibilities to improve the efficiency of payouts by insurers. The chapter concludes by reminding us that insurance companies make more money the less they pay out and that making it more difficult for beneficiaries to access care will allow them to accomplish that.

This chapter deals with the economics of prescription drugs and of insurance coverage for them. Sellers of drugs have temporary market power because of patents. Drugs are supplied under a cost structure with high fixed costs of research, discovery, and approval followed by low marginal cost of producing additional units; this structure does not permit competitive markets to exist during the period of patient protection. Health systems buy drugs for inpatients in the usual way, but outpatient and pharmacy sold drugs are priced above marginal cost with prices often distorted by insurance coverage. The result can be high prices (though not necessarily increasing ones). A potential solution to the inefficiencies in this market is an agreement between insurers and drug sellers to buy a predetermined volume with the marginal price of additional units low or zero – the so called “Netflix” model. The intent of above-cost pricing for drugs is to encourage the supply of innovative products, but evidence on whether the current patient system in the US achieves an ideal outcome is lacking.

This chapter begins by introducing the concept of corporate governance, and the regulatory role of directors’ duties. An appreciation of corporate governance methodologies gives context to the ‘hard law’ of directors’ duties. The chapter then considers who falls within the definition of director, the role of the director within the company, and how that role attracts legal and non-legal regulation. It also identifies who, beyond directors, can also be subject to directors’ duties. The chapter revisits the history of directors’ duties within Australian corporate law, building on the historical context provided by Chapter 1, and exploring the interrelationship between the duties applicable at common law, in equity, and according to statute. It concludes with the consequences of breach of the civil penalty provisions and options for exoneration and relief under the Corporations Act.

This chapter explores a form of anticolonial resistance that has gone relatively unnoticed by social theorists – insurrections aboard slaving ships. How might social theorists effectively represent, theorize, and contextualize these moments of anticolonial action? Drawing on the materials from the newly opened Lloyd’s archives, we discuss the importance of the insurance archive to histories of slavery and how these materials – despite their colonial ontologies – can offer novel understandings of anticolonial action. The materials permit scholars to uncover a complex set of financial logics that convey multiple different meanings about the category of the human and allow social theorists to ask different questions. Even the smallest details in the most highly localized spaces can provide insight into the nature of resistance and revolution.

This chapter introduces the major themes of the book. Insurance practices and related metaphors began expanding rapidly from a European base some 500 years ago. The simultaneous emergence of the modern state was hardly coincidental. Increasingly complex societies energized by market economies required protection from risks of various kinds. This required mobilizing and organizing private capital to achieve common goals. The deepening of markets and development of financial technologies now increases demands for protection beyond conventional borders. But where the fiscal power of the modern state underpinned national insurance and reinsurance systems, the absence of a global fiscal authority is exposed by rising cross-border, systemic, and global risks. That the background condition for necessary innovation in governance is uncertainty has also become undeniable.

This overview opens with the story of the great fire in Glarus, Switzerland, in 1861. Like those in other cities, the fire brought into clear view key elements of the insurance systems that modern societies needed to foster resilience. In its aftermath, the role of public authorities changed, reliance on new techniques for mobilizing private capital rose significantly, and the interaction of markets and states across established borders became deeper and more complex.

Exploring the economic ramifications of climate change, this chapter features insights from financial experts such as Sara Jane Ahmed, Managing Director and V20 Finance Advisor of the CVF-V20 Secretariat. It discusses the adverse effects on GDP growth, inflation, debt, and credit ratings, particularly in vulnerable economies. The chapter highlights the crucial role of financial markets, insurance, and climate finance in addressing these challenges. Innovative financing solutions such as Green Bonds and pre-arranged and trigger-based financing, including loss and damage finance, are explored as means to build economic resilience. The importance of sustainable economic policies and international cooperation is emphasised, with case studies from countries successfully integrating climate resilience into their economic planning. The chapter calls for increased investment in climate adaptation and mitigation to safeguard economic stability and promote sustainable development.

Climate activists are divided over whether to adopt strategies emphasizing stability and incremental change versus strategies promoting more extreme and immediate action. One way to promote policy stability is through private governance, that is, voluntary industry self-governance. Proponents argue this can stabilize expectations about the future, incentivize incremental reductions in emissions, and lock in policies and practices. This problem-solving approach serves to depoliticize debate but can lead to political backlash and repoliticization. I examine these dynamics through a case study of the financial sector, particularly the insurance industry. Collective attempts to ensure policy lock-in and stability include initiatives such as the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI), the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, and Net Zero Insurance Alliance. This is a case of failed depoliticization as demonstrated by the political backlash against these efforts.

In this chapter of Complex Ethics Consultations: Cases that Haunt Us, the author describes a case in which she was the community member on an ethics committee undertaking a retrospective ethics review of a case where a patient’s surrogate shifted to end-of-life care and discharge to home after being told Medicare (government insurance) would no long pay for his hospitalization. Although the consult was called on a Friday while the patient was alive, it was not reviewed by the full committee until Tuesday, by which time the patient had died.

In the period of the Renaissance, trade became a matter of legislation and policy. Municipal governments and princes aimed to facilitate trade. International trade relations became increasingly supervised by states. This came in tandem with more treaties. From the middle of the fifteenth century onwards, specialized institutions were created and they increased control over foreign merchants. As a result of growing government intervention, the rules relating to trade were found in bylaws, charters and statutes. Besides those there were customs of trade, which were mostly local. New mercantile techniques, becoming widespread in this period, were maritime insurance, bills of exchange and partnerships of merchants. Insolvency became regulated in the sixteenth century. From the 1500s onwards, rights of hospitality for traders and a right of trade were developed in ius gentium writings. However, due to the mostly local customs and legislation, trade across European countries was far from harmonised. Gerald Malynes proposed a universal custom of trade, but he struggled with the combination of ius gentium ideas with the more factual customs of trade. His views nonetheless laid the basis for later categorisations of commercial law as being customary and transnational.