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This chapter introduces the supposed problem of ethnicity: that it undermines national cohesion, or is a colonial hangover with no appropriate place in political life. In contrast, I argue that ethnicity is neither inherently desirable nor undesirable; its political effects depend on how it is known and used, and our understanding of how it is known remains underdeveloped. I establish that there is no definitive list of Kenya’s ethnic groups, and we must stop taking for granted what we think we know about ethnicity. I offer the concept of cultivated vagueness – a widespread aversion to resolving the ambiguity of lists of Kenya’s ethnic groups – to understand how ethnic knowledge works and to contrast it with legibility and governmentality. Cultivated vagueness is the response from bureaucrats, civil society, citizens and the state to the conundrum that ethnic knowledge is both common sense and impossible to settle. It also explains how ethnic classifications serve both projects of division and of pluralism. I suggest that attention to the benefits of cultivated vagueness may facilitate the advancement of the latter over the former. The chapter outlines the book’s methodology and chapters.
The conclusion reviews the evolution of transregional Arabic literature from its emergence during the Algerian War of Independence to its transformations in the twenty-first century. Decolonization catalyzed a new literary practice that sought to express Arab nationalist solidarities and critique emergent forms of oppressive power – including those exercised in the name of Arab collectives. The conclusion touches on the ways authors grappled with the faltering of revolutionary hopes and rise of new cultural hegemonies in the present century, notably the establishment of the Gulf as a major new hub for Arabic literature. The author notes the ironic reception of the decolonization generation and its concerns in the contemporary Arabic novel and the queering of Arabness in diasporic literature. Revisiting a key theme of the book, the conclusion highlights literature’s evolving work to imagine, engage, and contest shared political experiences across the Maghreb and Mashreq. The chapter concludes by affirming the ongoing political vitality of calls for linguistic and cultural pluralism in Algeria, as exemplified by the Hirak protest movement.
Chapter 6 emphasizes the Court’s practice pertaining to freedom of expression Article 10) and freedom of assembly and reunion (Article 11). It underlines ‘deliberative pluralism’ as the core principle relevant to tackle the populist erosion of democracy. However, while the Court puts emphasis on deliberative pluralism in its proportionality analysis, the Court only adduces minimal infrastructural guarantees that may be perverted by populist governments, such as ‘procedural guarantees’, while the scrutiny of media bodies and the larger media landscape remains largely cosmetic. This is reflected most prominently in a limited and parsimonious proportionality analysis.
There is a widespread assumption that both ethnicity itself and ethnic conflict, are inevitable. Yet, we know very little about how ethnic identifications function in bureaucratic terms in Africa. The stakes of this problem are rapidly escalating in moves to digital identification and population knowledge systems. Focusing on Kenya, this study provides an urgently needed exploration of where ethnic classifications have come from, and where they might go. Through genealogies of tools of ethnic identification – maps, censuses, ID cards and legal categories for minorities and marginalised communities – Samantha Balaton-Chrimes challenges conventional understandings of classifications as legible. Instead, she shows them to be uncertain and vague in useful ways, opening up new modes of imagining how bureaucracy can be used to advance pluralism. Knowing Ethnicity holds important insights for policymakers and scholars of difference and governmentality in postcolonial societies, as well as African and ethnic politics.
How should people who regard theirs as a (or the) true religion view other religions: their truth, the salvific consequences of believing in them, their role in the world, their eschatology and more? The chapter explores Jewish sources on these questions and devotes much space to an intriguing feature of Judaism: namely, that, in Jewish tradition, seeking converts is discouraged.
This chapter explores how Richard Hofstadter’s scholarly work on populism in American history – and his broader theory of populism as a “paranoid style” – was received by his historical contemporaries and how it continues to shape popular and academic perceptions of populism and the American radical right. Hofstadter argued that disparate movements in American history, from the nineteenth-century Populist Party to McCarthyism during the 1950s, were driven by “status anxiety” and a conspiratorial mindset characteristic of populism. In so doing, Hofstadter introduced concepts such as “status anxiety,” “paranoid style,” and “populism” into the popular lexicon, popularizing a Cold War liberal critique of radical political movements as irrational and misguided. While contemporaries such as Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset supported his views, historians such as C. Vann Woodward and Lawrence Goodwyn criticized Hofstadter’s account of U.S. populism. By the late 1960s, Hofstadter himself moderated his stance, acknowledging the limitations of his psychosocial theory of populism. The chapter concludes by arguing that Hofstadter’s work, while offering valuable insights, has led to analytical blind spots in understanding the structural and ideological dynamics of the American radical right.
Following a trend across the sciences, recent studies in lithic analysis have embraced the ideal of replicability. Recent large-scale studies have demonstrated that high replicability is achievable under controlled conditions and have proposed strategies to improve it in lithic data recording. Although this focus has yielded important methodological advances, we argue that an overemphasis on replicability risks narrowing the scope of archaeological inquiry. More specifically, we show (1) that replicability alone does not guarantee reliability, interpretive value, or cost effectiveness, and (2) that archaeological data often involve unavoidable ambiguity due to preservation, analyst background, and the nature of lithic variability itself. Instead of allowing replicability to dictate research priorities, we advocate for a problem-driven, pluralistic approach that tailors methods to research questions and balances replicable measures with interpretive depth. This has practical implications for training, publishing, and funding policy. We conclude that Paleolithic archaeology must engage with the replicability movement on its own terms—preserving methodological diversity while maintaining scientific credibility.
The conclusion of Invisible Fatherland reviews the book’s findings with a view to the rise of Nazism and the concept of militant democracy. Juxtaposing the republic’s constitutional patriotism with Nazi ideology, the author highlights the clash between two diametrically opposed “ways of life.” While Nazism was a violent political order that dehumanized marginalized groups, Weimar democracy embraced plural and hybrid identifications. Although the republic ultimately fell to the Nazi threat, the study argues that its constitutional patriotism remains a positive legacy of Western-style democracy. By reframing the narrative, Invisible Fatherland provides a forward-looking, “glass-half-full” perspective on one of history’s most misunderstood democratic experiments
Despite its explosive growth, there is considerable disagreement about the fundamental purpose of ESG. Two types of policies associated with ESG metrics and mechanisms give rise to at least two opposing views of their purpose: “profit-maximizing policies” versus “normative sustainable policies.” This chapter advocates the second type of strategy, arguing that corporate leaders who embrace ESG should be open to adopting a purpose that may undermine or even intentionally sacrifice shareholder wealth. In defending this view, the chapter considers the question of who has the legal, political, and moral authority to decide on ESG purposes. The chapter argues that business leaders already retain a great deal of legal autonomy in deciding whether or not to adopt some version of an ESG purpose as part of the firm's overall purposes. The chapter then discusses the challenges posed by what the authors call the Political Liberal Problem, which seems to suggest that corporate leaders should refrain from promoting a particular view of the good on behalf of their constituents or stakeholders. The chapter contends that a normative sustainable view of ESG purpose depends crucially on the ability to defend the relatively autonomous moral judgment of business leaders in setting ESG strategy.
The introduction of Invisible Fatherland lays the historiographical and conceptual groundwork for the book’s empirical chapters. The literature review traces the shift in Weimar studies from teleological narratives of inevitable collapse to a more balanced view of the first German democracy. Drawing on Jan-Werner Müller and Jürgen Habermas, the author clarifies the concept of constitutional patriotism by distinguishing it from civic and ethnic nationalism. She critiques the homogenizing tendencies of Weimar political thought, particularly Rudolf Smend’s influential theory of symbolic integration, for limiting our understanding of the republic’s original and innovative political culture. Finally, the introduction engages the work of scholars such as David Kertzer, Michael Walzer, and William Reddy to prepare for an empirical study of the republic’s symbolic style and emotional tone. Altogether, the introduction establishes an analytical framework for recovering Weimar’s constitutional patriotism and its relevance to contemporary debates on democratic resilience.
This chapter further develops the framework presented in the previous chapter. It does so by elaborating upon the value pluralism involved in the umbel view and the substantial interior of the framework. The chapter begins by accounting for the pluralism involved in the umbel view and discussing what that implies for political priority-setting. It then argues that the capability approach, developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, provides the best available currency of justice for a multiple threshold sufficientarian theory. The chapter then moves on to provide a suggested index of eight spheres of capabilities relevant for sufficientarian justice. The index includes the following items: Basic Needs, Health, Education, Meaningful Work, Political Equality, Community, Social Status, Reasonable Autonomy. The purpose of the index is to serve as input into the further interdisciplinary and public debate on the identification of the justice-relevant threshold. The chapter ends by emphasizing that public policy should give particular priority to manifest deficiencies, such as cases of deficiency clusters, where the same group of people face insufficiency in several value spheres.
Reading Friedrich Hayek's late work as a neoliberal myth of the state of nature, this article finds neoliberalism's hostilities to democracy to be animated in part by a romantic demand for belonging. Hayek's theory of spontaneous order expresses this desire for belonging as it pretends the market is capable of harmonizing differences so long as the state is prevented from interfering. Approaching Hayek's work in this way helps to explain why his conceptions of both pluralism and democracy are so thin. It also suggests that neoliberalism's assaults upon democracy are intimately linked to its relentless extractivism. Yet the romantic elements in Hayek's work might have led him toward a more radical democratic project and ecological politics had he affirmed plurality for what it enables. I conclude with the suggestion that democratic theory can benefit from learning to listen to what Hayek heard but failed to affirm: nature's active voice.
Russian regions exhibit wide diversity in institutional arrangements, not only due to varying natural conditions and economic development, but also due to the different political strategies pursued by their governors. Governors have wide discretion over the kinds of relationships they establish with local economic and social elites in the pursuit of nationally established goals. Some regional regimes are more pluralistic, others more authoritarian. Strategies for social and economic development vary as well. Some governors cooperate with local business associations and firms to induce investment and to overcome collective dilemmas such as those associated with skill formation. Characteristically, it is state actors who usually take the initiative in shaping state–society relations.
There are five levels in social inquiry: ontology; epistemology; approaches; methodology; and methods, which we see as means of gathering information. There is no determinate relationship such that one school will consistently choose the same options all the way down. We can cross between what are often seen as competing world views at various of these levels. Natural sciences have not arrived at a unified field theory and there is no reason why social sciences have to do so.
In this article, I use Boltanski and Thévenot's (2006) work on “logics of justification” to make the case that diversity, defined broadly as engagement with otherness, has limited worth as a “civic argument” in the United States. I argue that “diversity talk” has not been effective in civic spheres because it does not challenge the underlying pluralist architecture of the US political system. Instead, diversity in the civic sphere is regarded as producing conflict or an apolitical “improvement in manners” (Rorty 1999) rather than as a mechanism for citizenship development. This diminishes the ability for diversity to enhance democratic citizenship by fostering the development of a type of civic wisdom necessary for effective decision making in a democratic society.
This article proposes a critical discussion of an increasingly influential strand of contemporary democratic theory that attempts to justify majoritarian institutions on the grounds that they are the most adequate “epistemic” means for discovering and implementing an objective standard of normative truth. The analysis is divided in two parts. In the first I show that the appeal to such epistemic standards is unnecessary because it is possible to justify majority rule on the “purely procedural” grounds that it is the best way of instantiating the values of freedom (as consent) and equality (as impartiality). In the second part I suggest that the appeal to epistemic standards is also undesirable because it conflicts with three key democratic values: autonomy (as self-government), inclusion (as lack of discrimination in terms of political competence), and pluralism (as fair representation of conflicting interests within the political process).
Is it possible to rescue the concepts of ‘the people’ and popular sovereignty from their use and abuse at the hands of right-wing populist politics? In this article I look at two competing challenges to populist ideas of popular sovereignty. Underpinning a liberal critique of populism is a constrained view of democracy that either rejects any ideal of popular sovereignty altogether or reserves popular sovereignty for hypothetical moments of constitutional justification. The second view, which I call democratic pluralism, defends a dispersed view of popular sovereignty in which the people are conceived of as both inclusive and as ruling. In conclusion, I argue that this second option offers the most adequate answer to the populist challenge.
The means, motives, and opportunity of cooperation must be present if organizations are to establish mutual ties. Public benefit and conflict oriented organizations are hypothesized to have stronger motives for cooperation than member benefit and consensus oriented groups, and organizations with broad activity scope are likely to face more opportunities of cooperation than specialized organizations. These hypotheses are strengthened by results from regression analyses. The article further shows a historical decline in both the motives and opportunities for such cooperation in the case of Norway through processes of depoliticization, individualization, and specialization. Thus, here, the preconditions for cooperation within organizational society are gradually deteriorating. Such developments are likely to weaken the interconnectedness of voluntary organizations and the potential micro, meso, and macro benefits of such ties.
This article examines the widely held assumption that Germany’s political foundations pursue distinctively partisan approaches that promise to be advantageous with regard to the furtherance of pluralist civil societies abroad. It reviews this assumption through a qualitative analysis of their partnerships in transitional Tunisia, following a comparison between the German foundations and other Western agencies. It exposes a common secular bias in Western civil society support and qualifies the assumption that the partisan approaches lead easily to pluralist civil society support. While the foundations partner with rather diverse organizations, they still favor organizations that follow Western lines, and their civil society support practices display interest in the furtherance of both pluralism and democratic stability promising corporatism.
The introduction of Education for Citizenship into the Spanish school system has given rise to a strong controversy with the Catholic Church and other conservative actors in Spanish society, who claim that the students’ moral education is an exclusive realm, reserved for families. Challenging these criticisms, this article points to the reasons that justify both the substantive content of the subject and the competence of democratic government with regard to civic education.