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The human being is freely ‘self-determined’ rather than determined through some external authority (whether theological or teleological). This dichotomy conveniently expresses the usual understanding of modern political thought’s divergence from preceding tradition. By comparison, pre-modernity is teleological, anthropomorphic, realist; in a word, naïve – with its substantively rational nature, dictating essential ends to which we are subject. These received truths are past due for a re-examination. Just how naïve or dogmatic was the Greek understanding of freedom and nature? In this chapter, I argue that Plato’s view of man as naturally political is more complex and multivalent than our historical categorizations allow. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which, for him, politics does indeed depend upon a natural model. That model, however, is the Idea of the Good. And here, where Plato seems furthest from us, lies his greatest challenge to contemporary understandings of nature and freedom.
A decade prior to his main publications in political philosophy, Kant presented his views on the topic in his 1784 course lectures on natural right. This Critical Guide examines this only surviving student transcript of these lectures, which shows how Kant's political philosophy developed in response to the dominant natural law tradition and other theories. Fourteen new essays explore how Kant's lectures reveal his assessment of natural law, the central value of freedom, the importance of property and contract, the purposes and powers of the state, and the role of individual autonomy and the rights of human beings. The essays place his claims in relation to events and other publications of the early 1780s, and show Kant in the process of working out the theories which would later characterize his influential political philosophy.
This Element brings together the problems of economic calculation, institutional diversity, and institutional feasibility, arguing that these themes are deeply interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Building on recent developments in institutional theory, political economy, social philosophy, and logical analysis, the Element revisits the classic debates surrounding alternative economic and governance systems. The discussion is organized around three core elements: (1) an overview of recent developments in institutional theory and social philosophy, that driven by technological advances have revitalized debates on alternative economic and governance systems; (2) a reexamination of the economic calculation debate, tracing its evolution from Austrian economics to a broader theoretical synthesis incorporating institutional political economy and conflict theory; and (3) a discussion of the formal, logical, and philosophical foundations for thinking about feasibility and realizability, offering analytical tools for evaluating the plausibility of institutional alternatives within specific historical and social contexts.
In recent decades, activists and leaders of government and nongovernment organizations have increasingly and explicitly called for greater attention to human dignity in their efforts to promote pro-social relations. In this study, we investigate whether appeals to this core human value actually influence how individuals act with regard to those who might be otherwise ignored or neglected. Using the digital advertising platform on Facebook, we randomly assign ads to over 90,000 adult American users to estimate the effects of dignity appeals on their likelihood of engaging with content concerning people facing homelessness or incarceration. Consistent with preregistered hypotheses and specifications, we find that adding dignity appeals increases the likelihood of positive reactions to such ads, but only when the vulnerable are considered less “blameworthy” for their situation.
The Introduction sets out the argument of the book, and distinguishes the approach taken from those of Louis Althusser and Daniel Brudney. It offers a preliminary assessment of the difference made by reading Marx’s project as that of the actualization of philosophy, and of the implications for understanding his relationship to his philosophical predecessors.
This chapter examines Marx’s important but understudied text Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. It is shown that Marx, beginning from an enthusiasm he shares with Hegel for developing an organic theory of the state, shows Hegel’s execution of his project to be deeply flawed. Hegel’s defence of constitutional monarchy has the strange result of producing, when properly thought through, a defence of radical popular power. His attempt to use the ‘estates’ as an element in the state performing multiple many-way mediations further serves to reveal that something is amiss in the role that Hegel’s logic is being called upon to play.
It is indisputable that Marx began his intellectual trajectory as a philosopher, but it is often thought that he subsequently turned away from philosophy. In this book, Christoph Schuringa proposes a radically different reading of Marx's intellectual project and demonstrates that from his earliest writings his aim was the 'actualization' of philosophy. Marx, he argues, should be understood not as turning away from philosophy, but as seeking to make philosophy a practical force in the world. By analysing a series of texts from across Marx's output, Schuringa shows that Marx progressively overcame what he called 'self-sufficient philosophy', not in order to leave philosophy behind but to bring it into its own. This involves a major reinterpretation of Marx's relationship to his ancestors Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, and shows that philosophy, as it actualizes itself, far from being merely a body of philosophical doctrine, figures as an instrument of the revolution.
Despite their centrality within discussions on AI governance, fairness, justice, and equality remain elusive and essentially contested concepts: even when some shared understanding concerning their meaning can be found on an abstract level, people may still disagree on their relation and realization. In this chapter, we aim to clear up some uncertainties concerning these notions. Taking one particular interpretation of fairness as our point of departure (fairness as nonarbitrariness), we first investigate the distinction between procedural and substantive conceptions of fairness (Section 4.2). We then discuss the relationship between fairness, justice, and equality (Section 4.3). Starting with an exploration of Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness, we then position distributive approaches toward issues of justice and fairness against socio-relational ones. In a final step, we consider the limitations of techno-solutionism and attempts to formalize fairness by design (Section 4.4). Throughout this chapter, we illustrate how the design and regulation of fair AI systems is not an insular exercise: attention must not only be paid to the procedures by which these systems are governed and the outcomes they produce, but also to the social processes, structures, and relationships that inform, and are co-shaped by, their functioning.
The Introduction reviews the widely shared understanding of Schopenhauer as an apolitical thinker. It then articulates the challenge to this view. Schopenhauer, this book argues, defined politics as the rational management of perpetual human strife. The Introduction lays out the two main steps for recovering the full scope of Schopenhauer’s political thought. First, his attitude to politics must be historically contextualized. Against the backdrop of his era and the political ideas of other thinkers, the individual profile and polemical significance of Schopenhauer’s conception of politics come into view more clearly. Second, his textually dispersed political ideas must be assembled into a recognizable whole. Many of Schopenhauer’s reflections on political skills, values, ideologies, and regimes can be found in sections that do not explicitly deal with politics, and his core conception of politics becomes visible through a series of contrasts between politics and religion, politics and morality, and politics and sociability.
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) lived through an era of great political turmoil, but previous assessments of his political thought have portrayed him as a pessimistic observer with no constructive solutions to offer. By assembling and contextualizing Schopenhauer's dispersed comments on political matters, this book reveals that he developed a distinct conception of politics. In opposition to rising ideological movements such as nationalism or socialism, Schopenhauer denied that politics can ever bring about universal emancipation or fraternal unity. Instead, he viewed politics as a tool for mitigating rather than resolving the conflicts of a fundamentally imperfect world. Jakob Norberg's fascinating book reconstructs Schopenhauer's political ideas and shows how they relate to the dominant debates and trends during the period in which he lived. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Democracies may be defined as civic arrangements wherein all citizens have equal political standing. The problem is that no real-world democracy has successfully achieved this arrangement. Are they really democracies, then? For that matter, are there any democracies at all? Aikin and Talisse propose that ‘democracy’ is an aspirational concept, one that holds those who strive to achieve particular ends to exceedingly high standards. This makes democracies intelligible as democracies in their collective aspirations, but it also makes their failures instructive parts of what they are as democracies.
Our contemporary understanding of political corruption draws from two different sources, a modern view that corruption occurs where officials follow improper procedures and a more ancient view of corruption as a systemic failure to live up to political ideals. The ability to shift between these views makes it easy for political partisans to locate corruption where it suits their political interests. Since accusations of corruption easily become challenges to the legitimacy of officeholders and institutions, there is danger in carelessness with the language of corruption. Awareness of these circumstances should lead us to be cautious with the language of corruption and to resist its slide toward becoming a mere means of political struggle.
This essay offers a framework for analyzing whether government may justifiably intervene to contain the spread of disease. Nonconsensual transmission of dangerous pathogens is an inherently violent act. This framework therefore justifies government public health activities for the same reasons and only to the same extent as other government activities. Government public health interventions are legitimate only to the extent they minimize the amount of violence in society. Violence-minimization is a more egalitarian and welfare-enhancing rule than, for example, a rule prescribing that government public health activities should minimize loss of life.
This article contributes to our understanding of women in the Epicurean school. Focussing on the second- and first-century b.c.e. philosophers Zeno of Sidon and Philodemus of Gadara, it examines some neglected textual evidence and argues that a misogynist position can be traced back to Zeno. While Epicureanism contains many progressive ideas on women and early Epicureans admitted women in their communities, Zeno was much more dismissive of women than other Epicureans. This points to a significant doctrinal development in the Epicurean school.
Bioethics is taking an institutional turn, where organizations are being taken seriously as moral agents. Within US healthcare, this is difficult to do without confronting “the market” as a highly influential context for organizational behavior. In the 1990s, pioneering thinkers such as David Mechanic,1 Brad Gray, and Mark Schlesinger2 undertook a first round of organizational ethics scholarship focused on how market forces influence health insurer behavior — motivated by a particular concern for health maintenance organizations (HMOs).3 And more recently, owing partly to a transfer of financial risk4 to healthcare delivery organizations,5 rapid consolidation within health system markets,6 and the pronounced uptick in physician employment,7 the behavior of healthcare delivery organizations is also being assessed in relation to market forces.
This essay explores what can be learned from understanding EU law as a language in the literary sense of being a set of resources for manifold ethical and political expression and social action. As a contribution to new methodological approaches to studying EU law, it will propose a method highlighting how EU law can be studied in such a way by paying attention to the various linguistic and structural features of a legal text while, at the same time, diversifying the rationales through which we understand and make sense of such textual features. The Sayn–Wittgenstein decision will serve as point of reference in order to illustrate the value-added of this new theoretical and methodological insight to understanding EU law. This essay will conclude that it is not only worth taking the language of EU law seriously because it allows us to ’see’ more in the law, but also because it enables us to elevate the deeper ideas about Europe to the surface of the language we use when writing and speaking about EU law and to thereby contribute to a more productive dialogue about the foundations and future of the EU polity.
John Stuart Mill is central to parallel debates in mainstream contemporary political epistemology and philosophy of federalism concerning the epistemic dimension(s) of legitimate authority. Many scholars invoke Mill to support epistemic arguments for democratic decision-making and decentralized federalism as a means of conferring democratic legitimacy. This article argues that Millian considerations instead provide reason to reject common epistemic arguments for decentralized federalism. Combining Mill's own insights about the epistemic costs of decentralization and recent work in philosophy, politics, and economics undermines purportedly Millian arguments for federalism focused on political experimentation, diversity and participation. Contrary to many interpretations, Millian considerations weaken, rather than strengthen, arguments for federalism. Any valid justification for federalism must instead rest on non-epistemic considerations. This conclusion is notable regardless of how one interprets Mill. But it also supports Mill's stated preference for local decisions subject to central oversight.
I argue that the use of elected political representatives undermines the political equality of citizens. Having elected representatives politically stand-in for individual constituents makes ordinary citizens the political inferiors of their representatives. This in turn creates democratically problematic social inequality between elected politicians and their constituents. I then offer an alternative to representative politicians that does not face the avatar of the people problem: representative mini-publics. Through these bodies, we can achieve a representative system without a class of political elites, where citizens share the responsibilities and powers of government as equals.
Les instruments auxquels un État peut avoir recours pour atténuer les risques que font peser les inégalités économiques sur la démocratie sont nombreux et peuvent prendre différentes formes. Dans cet article, nous cherchons à mettre en lumière la dimension normative des trois principaux instruments auxquels on a généralement recours pour mitiger l'influence de l'argent dans la compétition électorale, ainsi que le contexte dans lequel ils furent institués, remodelés – et parfois démantelés – au Canada. Ces trois mécanismes sont la limitation des dépenses électorales, le plafonnement des contributions privées et le financement public des partis. Il ne s'agit toutefois pas uniquement de décrire ces instruments, mais de réfléchir aux justifications normatives spécifiques à chacun, et d'en comprendre leur complémentarité. Plus largement, il s'agit d'offrir un cadre pour penser les enjeux de financement électoral en philosophie politique, un sujet trop souvent laissé dans l'ombre par la théorie démocratique.
In this introduction, I briefly summarize Sophia Moreau's Faces of Inequality. I situate her monograph within two highly contemporary bodies of literature — relational egalitarianism and discrimination theory — to show how it provides important insights for understanding both what it means to treat others as equals in society and how to define wrongful discrimination. Moreau's work on discrimination is of great relevance for philosophers and socio-legal theorists alike as the commentaries from the symposium contributors demonstrate, including Dale Smith, Pablo Gilabert, Andrea Sangiovanni, Daniel Viehoff, Jessica Eisen, Alysia Blackham, and Iyiola Solanke.