The conclusion considers theoretical and practical changes needed to begin to extricate liberalism and liberal democracies from their patriarchal roots, strengthen the protection of women’s rights in liberal democracies, and bolster the ability of liberal democracies to fight against right-wing religio-populism. The changes suggested are in the tradition of the radical internal critique of liberalism offered by Susan Okin, whose radical liberal, or humanist, feminism aimed to provide theoretical underpinnings for a liberalism that will focus on both the private and the public spheres, recognize the gendered power differentials, oppression, and prejudices maintained and supported by patriarchal liberalism, and take active steps to change them. Most of the discussion will refer to the theoretical and practical changes needed to protect women’s rights in liberal democracies from the adverse effects of patriarchal religion, including its nationalist and populist iterations. The last part will discuss the connection between the suggested changes and the urgently needed overall struggle of liberal democracies against right-wing populism.

Calls to restrict women’s rights are a most effective rallying cry for right-wing populists and religious conservatives in their surprisingly successful attack on the foundations of liberal democracy. Populist leaders across the world use the aggrandizement of patriarchy and the opposition to women’s rights as the engine of a right-wing populist revolution. The success of the populist attack on women’s rights in liberal societies, together with decisions such as the American Dobbs decision, has confirmed feminist warnings regarding the flawed protection of women’s rights in liberal societies, which have hitherto been rejected by most liberals as unfounded and alarmist. The book claims that to understand the success of the religio-populist attack on women’s rights in liberal democracies, and its centrality to the success of right-wing populism, it is necessary to acknowledge and understand the patriarchal nature of liberalism and liberal societies. The introduction defines patriarchy and explains its connections to liberalism, religion, and populism, and the contemporary threat it poses to both women’s rights and liberal democracy. It then sets out the outline of the book.

This chapter argues that the flaws in liberal theory and practice that religious conservatives and right-wing populists use to attack women’s rights are also used to undermine liberal democracy. It claims that due to the embeddedness of patriarchy in liberal theory and practice, liberals have chosen to disregard the feminist critique of the liberal public–private distinction and of the refusal to intervene in the nonpolitical sphere. As a result, prejudices that liberals have allowed to flourish in the private sphere serve as the basis for a successful right-wing religio-populist attack on the liberal state itself. Using the example of the USA, the chapter discusses the capture of the American Supreme Court by the populist and religiously conservative Republican Party led by President Trump. It analyzes two major abortion decisions issued by the captured Supreme Court – Whole Women’s Health and Dobbs – and shows how these decisions thoroughly undermine the liberal rights regime, transfer the control over women’s bodies and their rights to Christian religious hands, and are part of a wholesale Christian nationalist attack on American liberal democracy.

Populism in relation to constitutionalism is a widely discussed and critical, topic. In the literature on the phenomenon, there is a prevalence to identify populism as antithetical to constitutional democracy and as eroding the idea and fundamentals of constitutionalism. However, as this chapter will show, much depends on the definitions offered of populism and constitutionalism, and the analytical commitment to study both as historical phenomena with important contextual differences. As I will argue in this chapter, constitutionalism as such is a contested phenomenon, and populism frequently takes up different forms of critique on the predominant legal understanding of constitutionalism. Furthermore, populism is a phenomenon that manifests itself in different ways, displaying diverse guises depending on distinctive ideological position (left- or rightwing), but equally showing variety in terms of positioning regarding characteristic issues, such as sovereignty, the definition of the political community, or relations to constituent power.

The chapter provides an introduction to the relationship between politics and semiotics, to Cognitive CDA as a framework for studying politics and semiotics, and to shifts in political performance and media landscapes which demand a multimodal approach to political discourse analysis. It starts by highlighting the symbolic nature of politics and the discursive means by which politics is primarily performed. The historical development of Cognitive CDA is described. The practical aims, theoretical commitments and methodological practices of Cognitive CDA are also discussed. The central position of the media in communicating politics is considered alongside the relationship between political and media institutions. Changes brought about by the advent of the internet and digital social media are discussed with a focus on the new genres of political discourse that have emerged as a result and on the more participatory forms of politics that are potentially afforded. The chapter discusses the rise of right-wing populism that has coincided with changes to the media landscape and the shifts in communicative style by which it is marked.

Right-wing populism has been widely implicated in the destabilization of democracy in traumatic events such as the presidency of Donald Trump. Chapter 4 examines the cultural, economic, and communicative aspects of populism and its origins, addressing arguments for including populist parties and leaders more effectively in conventional party politics, before moving on to a deliberative response. It may be possible to engage citizens attracted to populism (though not leaders) in deliberative terms. Populist leaders can be demagogues uninterested in abiding by democratic norms of any sort, least of all deliberative ones, though it might be possible to induce somewhat better democratic behavior on their part. Populist citizens are more promising in deliberative and democratic terms because some of their concerns and insecurities have a reasonable core: society really is dominated by an elite, just not the one that populist leaders stress. This core could be reached by deliberation, however much its concerns have been more effectively exploited by demagogues to date. Discursive psychology can be deployed in thinking about deliberative bridges to populist citizens. Populist citizens may be attracted to democratic innovations such as deliberative mini-publics. Contestatory deliberation involving democratic activism can counter populist leaders.

This chapter adopts a two-stage analysis of legal resilience against far-reaching restrictions of migrants’ rights. It first investigates the resilience of the Belgian constitutional system against potential hostile take-over by right-wing populists. It is concluded that the constitutional framework provides relatively robust protection against democratic decay, as a result of which the separation of powers remains intact. At the same time, most constitutional safeguards that prevent a hypothetical slide towards authoritarianism in Belgium only provide weak constraints against the very real and systematic undermining of migrants’ rights. Therefore, during the second stage of the analysis an assessment is made of the room for legal resilience in Belgium. Unlike in Poland and Hungary, it is shown, civil society actors have been able – and often forced – to resort to the independent courts in a bid to safeguard migrants’ rights in Belgium. In practice, the chapter concludes, this has led to mixed results, in that courts have only safeguarded minimal respect for migrants’ rights rather than adopting a maximalist interpretation. The room for legal resilience against restrictive migration laws and policies in Belgium thus remains more limited than could be expected.

This chapter adopts a two-stage analysis of legal resilience against far-reaching restrictions of migrants’ rights. It first investigates the resilience of the Belgian constitutional system against potential hostile take-over by right-wing populists. It is concluded that the constitutional framework provides relatively robust protection against democratic decay, as a result of which the separation of powers remains intact. At the same time, most constitutional safeguards that prevent a hypothetical slide towards authoritarianism in Belgium only provide weak constraints against the very real and systematic undermining of migrants’ rights. Therefore, during the second stage of the analysis an assessment is made of the room for legal resilience in Belgium. Unlike in Poland and Hungary, it is shown, civil society actors have been able – and often forced – to resort to the independent courts in a bid to safeguard migrants’ rights in Belgium. In practice, the chapter concludes, this has led to mixed results, in that courts have only safeguarded minimal respect for migrants’ rights rather than adopting a maximalist interpretation. The room for legal resilience against restrictive migration laws and policies in Belgium thus remains more limited than could be expected.

This chapter investigates the role of ‘crisis’ narratives in the incremental undermining of migrants’ rights. It argues that the right-wing populist politics of Sweden Democrats, not least in their narrative of migration as a ‘crisis’, have had a considerable impact on migration discourse and policy in Sweden. As radical-right ideas have become normalized, limitations on migrant rights appear to be regarded as much less problematic by mainstream political parties. At the same time, the Swedish constitutional system promotes a set of core values that, taken together, provide for legal resilience. Although there are weaknesses built into the system, such as the relatively limited system of judicial review and the limited scope of fundamental rights included in the Constitution, core values such as independence of the administration and transparency of the legislative process are powerful tools to prevent anti-democratic and anti-pluralist parties from pushing through their ideas. It is thus suggested that the inherent inertia of the administrative system and the legislative process is a key element of legal resilience against rights erosion, for migrants as well as for other vulnerable groups.

This chapter investigates the role of ‘crisis’ narratives in the incremental undermining of migrants’ rights. It argues that the right-wing populist politics of Sweden Democrats, not least in their narrative of migration as a ‘crisis’, have had a considerable impact on migration discourse and policy in Sweden. As radical-right ideas have become normalized, limitations on migrant rights appear to be regarded as much less problematic by mainstream political parties. At the same time, the Swedish constitutional system promotes a set of core values that, taken together, provide for legal resilience. Although there are weaknesses built into the system, such as the relatively limited system of judicial review and the limited scope of fundamental rights included in the Constitution, core values such as independence of the administration and transparency of the legislative process are powerful tools to prevent anti-democratic and anti-pluralist parties from pushing through their ideas. It is thus suggested that the inherent inertia of the administrative system and the legislative process is a key element of legal resilience against rights erosion, for migrants as well as for other vulnerable groups.

The last chapter of the textbook briefly reflects on the road travelled so far in BHR and the challenges that still lie ahead. Despite significant acheivements in improving corporate accountability for human rights in recent years, there is still a lot to be done to improve the situation of affected rights-holders on the ground. However, in the light of the rise of right-wing populism and the global Covid-19 pandemic, the global environment for human rights protection has become more, rather than less challienging in recent years. On a positive note, businesses can be progressive forces in promoting human rights in these challenging contexts. Recent incidents of companies engaging in human rights advocacy and activism demonstrate that a growing number of companies are willing to use their leverage to push for pro-social and human rights issues. In such situations, crisis can become an opportunity for ethical renewal.

This chapter traces Latin America’s labor movement’s long, tumultuous struggle for workers’ rights, equity, and democracy through periods of corporatism, authoritarian rule, neoliberalism, and contemporary left- and right-wing populist governments. This chapter argues that, while segments of Latin America’s labor movements have, at times, collaborated with autocratic elites, a significant share of labor leaders and members have fought for democratization not out of perceived partisan advantage, but rather out of commitment to the principles of liberal democracy – and labor has often realized that commitment by strengthening democracy. This chapter examines theoretical debates on labor and democracy and labor’s role in the struggle for democratization and equity during crucial periods in regime formation and transition in Latin America.