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This chapter introduces the broad conceptual framework of the processes of subjectivisation within global discourses and connects it to agency. It introduces the idea of situational agency and draws upon Mahmood’s work to suggest that agency can be found in the ‘inhabitation of norms’. the chapter provides a background context to post-genocide Rwandan policies, introducing the key agenda of unity and reconciliation, and presents Rwanda as a post-colonial state. Finally, this chapter problematises the collection and interpretation of field data in a post-colonial setting.
The first half of this chapter explores the linguistic means by which Twa tell their story. By mobilising linguistic resources, they are challenging their continued exclusion under the charge of ‘mind-set’ problems and are attempting to renegotiate the social constructs that govern the position of Batwa in Rwandan society. As such, the language practice of contradiction is read as an assertion by Twa of their full membership in society and a demand for equal care. The second half of the chapter locates the Rwandan state as the key mediator of global life for Rwanda’s Twa, translating global ordering narratives into the everyday. The state makes use of the development narrative, refracting it through the prism of national unity, to offer Twa an attractive and accessible vision of a non-fragmented modern Rwandan subject.
This chapter unpacks how narratives about Rwanda’s Twa are created. It seeks to understand how knowledge about Twa is produced, and how the Twa are created, re-created, and re-positioned as indigenous and development subjects in the jurisdictional encounters of the global discourses of development and indigeneity with national policies on unity and reconciliation. The chapter identities three main stories told of the Twa. The first story is that of indigeneity, of a forest people distinct, dispossessed, and suffering. The second tale is of a community historically marginalised but not ethnically different. The third account views Twa simply as poor and vulnerable, positioning them as national development subjects.
This chapter explores the construction of Twa as global development subjects within the Rwandan context and asks how they position themselves within that landscape, formed by the intersection of the global development narrative and Rwanda’s unity and reconciliation agenda. This chapter interrogates the state’s development narrative in the context of the global development discourse and examines its ability to offer a believable and accessible vision of progress. The Twa in our study push back against the de-politicising effect of development and its processes, whereby the emphasis is placed on the individual and their mind-set. However, they do so not to emphasise their ethnic apartness but to assert their right to the attributes of Rwandanness, notably land. Their answer is thus not to refuse to participate in the modern Rwanda but actively to seek it by demanding equal care.
This chapter explores the processes and form of the imagined national community in Rwanda in light of global discourses of difference, focusing on the space of identity that the state narrative of unity allows for Twa to navigate their subjectivisation as Rwandans. Our data shows that many Twa buy into the government’s narratives of national unity and ‘Rwandan-ness’. They choose to identify themselves as Rwandan and appear willing to forgo Twa identity for the promise of belonging and progress that they understand national narratives of unity to offer. To understand this as forced assimilation – whether through the violence of law or economic circumstances – is too simple a reading: Twa individuals are actively using the ‘Ndi Umunyarwanda’ programme messaging to create spaces of inclusion for themselves within Rwandan society.
This chapter explores how the Twa’s space of nature is created in Rwanda by the encounter between global narratives of indigeneity and conservationism with global capitalism and national social norms. These are refracted through the state’s nationalisation agenda and through policies that condition the access of Twa to resources such as land and together form an important element of the space in which they can negotiate their place in Rwandan society. The response of Twa to questions about nature suggests that they have no special connection to nature or to the forests more particularly. Instead, their responses locate them as ordinary villagers focused on subsistence farming and on survival, but draw also upon national cultural norms of success and status. Whereas traditional land is a key part of articulating indigenous identity in global discourse, the Twa’s desire for land cultivation is non-traditional and instead symbolises the aspiration to inclusion and belonging in the mainstream.
After collective violence, states often work to rebuild and repair the social fabric by promoting legal institutions and fostering peaceful relationships. The case of legal aid in post-genocide Rwanda provides insight into how legal aid providers manage cases in the context of overburdened courts and the state’s prioritization of reconciliation. This study relies on ethnographic and interview data with legal aid providers at legal aid centers throughout Rwanda to show how legal aid providers communicate the state’s moral vision of social cohesion to manage an overburdened court system through two interconnected strategies. First, legal aid providers orient people to moral beliefs about ways of being through community awareness-raising initiatives and extra-legal obligations that promote peaceful relations. Second, legal aid providers stall cases from going to court by counseling through narratives of forgiveness and reconciliation. These strategies prevent cases from reaching the courts by managing emotional expectations about the law’s limitations and reminding people of their societal obligations. Building on the law and culture literature, these findings highlight how social actors charged with interacting with vulnerable people creatively navigate the lasting ramifications of collective violence in everyday dispute resolution and conflict mediation.
This article reconsiders the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) “Media Trial” that followed in the wake of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. While both the original trial (2000–03) and its appeal (2007) have been widely analyzed, most observers have approached it as a case against three media bosses. This article suggests that the Media Trial was not only invested in the line between press freedom and criminal hate speech and, in relation to Ferdinand Nahimana, not solely concerned with his role at “hate radio” station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). Drawing on trial transcripts, other court records, and press coverage of the trial, I show how the tribunal actively interrogated Nahimana’s status as a historian and his research and scholarship as part of its judicial process. As such, I argue that the Media Trial helped codify the notion that Rwandan history had become “deadly” before the genocide and that the Rwandan historical field would need to be fundamentally transformed.
‘The price of victory’ was how Jean Monnet, pioneer of European integration, described Britain’s self-exclusion from the foundational years of European integration. As a late entrant (1973), it was obliged to accept many arrangements that did not suit its interests. Margaret Thatcher and her successors tried to negotiate opt-outs to protect what they deemed Britain’s vital interests as the European Community developed into the European Union (EU), until David Cameron tried to resolve the issue once and for all through renegotiation and an in-or-out referendum. Cameron was outwitted by Boris Johnson – a brilliant political showman – but he in turn had no strategy for his surprise Brexit victory. The chapter explores the struggles of successive Tory premiers – especially May, Johnson and Sunak – to hold their party together and get Brexit done, without isolating Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK. After the Tories lost the 2024 election, the new Labour government was left on the sidelines of the EU, trying to sort out piecemeal opt-ins – an ironic inversion of Britain’s posture when it was inside the EU.
The services sector has been the centrepiece of Rwanda’s development strategy since 2000. This chapter describes the evolution of the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) goals of transforming its landlocked disadvantages into an opportunity through becoming land-linked. In particular, the goal involves Rwanda becoming a regional hub for transport, tourism, sports and finance. The chapter begins by providing a critical overview of services-based strategies, highlighting their merits and limitations. It then describes the contradictory tensions emerging within Rwanda’s services-based strategy, particularly because the progressive image the RPF attempts to portray is often at odds with domestic realities. The evolution of Rwanda’s tourism strategy is discussed, which focuses on attracting high-end tourists and transforming Kigali into a hub for transport, high-profile events and conferences. The chapter describes how services strategies have evolved in line with Rwanda’s political settlement: at first, providing opportunities to private Rwandan capitalists but then gradually relying on foreign investors and government-affiliated investors. The chapter highlights that Rwanda’s strategy failed to prioritise linkages, which is a result of the elite vulnerability shaping domestic state–business relationships.
This chapter introduces the ‘structuralist’ form of political settlements analysis employed in this book. The political settlements framework, initially developed by Mushtaq Khan, has gained increasing popularity but has evolved in very different directions. Political settlements analysis (PSA) was appealing to scholars because it encouraged analysis of power relations shaping development policy, highlighting how distributions of power among organised groups shaped how institutions operated. Influential donor-funded research programmes have aligned it more with neoclassical economics, and this has led to the obfuscation of the structuralist and historical materialist roots of the framework. This chapter elaborates the structuralist and historical materialist roots of political settlements analysis. It highlights the differences between non-structuralist and structuralist approaches to political settlements analysis in relation to the concept of holding power and its components: economic structure, rents, ideas and ideology, and violence and conflict. The chapter highlights how PSA can be used to help understand the contemporary transnational nature of vulnerabilities shaping late-development challenges.
This chapter describes Rwanda’s record within the manufacturing sector. Until recently, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) did not prioritise manufacturing-based growth because of the high transport costs associated with its landlocked geographical position. While there has been some attempt at refocusing on industrial policy since 2015, because of a rising trade deficit and the urgent need to create employment, there has not been substantial progress. Rwanda has not achieved significant advances in increasing industrial employment, production and exports. After presenting the evolution of Rwanda’s industrial policy, the chapter provides detailed examples of three sectors: apparels (textiles and garments), construction materials and pharmaceuticals. In line with dynamics in other sectors, domestic capital has been marginalised in favour of supporting RPF-affiliated firms or relying on foreign investors. Some foreign investors like Volkswagen and BioNTech have invested in Rwanda with much fanfare, but most success has been driven by RPF-affiliated firms. Rwanda’s hopes for structural transformation fall at a key domestic hurdle: building effective state–business relationships aimed at technological capability acquisition for latecomer firms.
This chapter describes the evolution of the mining sector in Rwanda, both its domestic mining sector and in relation to the trade of minerals from the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Trading minerals from mineral-rich Eastern DRC has benefited Rwanda’s domestic economy through providing access to foreign exchange revenues. However, dependence on minerals from the DRC has been a double-edged sword. While providing significant revenues and being central to national security interests, increased reliance on the DRC contributes to the empowerment of individual business and military elites that may later become threats to the RPF’s ruling coalition. The RPF has transformed the domestic minerals sector with increased investments in geological investigations, as well as significant increases in domestic production. Dynamics in the domestic minerals sector mirror the elite vulnerability characterising other sectors. Though individual elites initially benefited from privatisation efforts, there is increased reliance on government-owned firms (like Ngali) for its most ambitious upgrading strategies. Attempts at beneficiation have been impeded by difficulties in developing effective domestic state–business relationships and challenges in centralising control over supply chains.
This chapter provides a snapshot of Rwanda’s evolving political settlement and economic development trajectory. The chapter begins by highlighting significant structural vulnerabilities that shaped Rwanda’s domestic politics historically, including ethnicity-based inequalities and political contestation, historical divisions associated with the royal family and aristocracy, refugee issues, inadequate employment opportunities and regional inequalities. It then highlights the rapid growth that took place in Rwanda over the last three decades, which has also been accompanied by significant export diversification. It then provides a brief political settlement analysis of present-day Rwanda, highlighting how development is being contested transnationally, pointing to the key vulnerabilities characterising its hub-based strategy. In particular, it describes how increased elite vulnerability has meant that the government has been reluctant to support domestic capital. As a result, the Rwandan government has failed to develop effective state–business relations aimed at achieving structural transformation.
The book is motivated by the question of analysing how Rwanda’s development trajectory can contribute to our understanding of why structural transformation remains so elusive. This chapter introduces the central contributions of the book. First, the book employs structuralist political settlements analysis to highlight how contemporary late development is contested transnationally, prompting the need for analysis across different scales. Second, the book describes how African growth has been largely driven by the services sector and Rwanda is emblematic of contemporary African growth experiences, especially since, like elsewhere on the continent, structural transformation has remained elusive. Third, the book contributes to existing literature on Rwanda by highlighting that the Rwandan Patriotic Front prioritised services-based strategies partly to reduce its reliance on domestic businesspeople because of the elite vulnerability that has characterised its rule. This strategy has yielded growth and export diversification without achieving structural transformation because elite vulnerability has inhibited effective state–business relations. The introduction also includes a discussion of the methodology employed in the book and the structure of the chapters that follow.
This chapter describes how dependence on coffee and other primary commodities exacerbated foreign dependency, especially during fluctuations in global primary commodity prices. The chapter discusses the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) origins, including the key paradigmatic ideological foundations of the party while discussing the civil war and the 1994 genocide. The chapter ends by outlining three periods of the evolution of political settlement under RPF rule. Between 1994 and 2000, RPF loyalists were rewarded, while there was increased concentration of power among Tutsi RPF members. In the 2000s, until the early 2010s, RPF leadership centralised control among a smaller clique within the RPF, with increasing elite fragmentation characterising this period. In the third phase after the early 2010s, there has been increased external reliance, and the visible threat of transnational coalitions, comprising RPF dissidents and disenchanted domestic elites, has emerged but been contained.
This chapter analyses the political economy of Rwanda’s financial sector. It presents the evolution of Rwanda’s national banking sector and the ways the Rwandan Patriotic Front has sought to mobilise domestic resources to invest in strategic sectors. It provides an overview of how African financial sectors have been transformed in varied ways through adapting to three kinds of financial sector reforms: policies influenced by the market-led consensus, developmentalist strategies and the influence of offshore sectors. Rwanda, in its attempt to transform Kigali into a financial sector while mobilising state-driven investments for strategic investments and adopting ‘best practice’ financial sector reforms, encapsulates the contradictions associated with being influenced by these three sets of policies concurrently. Next, the chapter describes how the Rwandan government has innovatively mobilised domestic resources to fund strategic investments. Innovations include its pension fund, the Rwanda Social Security Board. The chapter concludes by discussing how elite vulnerability has constrained the capacity of the Rwandan government to concentrate resources and financial expertise in one specific financial institution, thereby inhibiting the effectiveness of strategic investments.
This chapter describes the evolution of agriculture sector policies during the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rule. Most Rwandans still live in rural areas, and agriculture continues to employ most Rwandans. Prior to RPF rule, the Grégoire Kayibanda and Juvénal Habyarimana governments presented their parties as prioritising rural interests, as well as the production of cash crops for export (particularly coffee). However, since the RPF assumed power, policy priorities have shifted to diversifying agriculture exports (including producing higher-value coffee and tea) and encouraging the market-oriented commercialisation of agricultural production. The RPF’s attempts at reorganising rural society has been characterised by rural resistance and increasing inequality. However, there have been some successes, which have been driven by RPF-affiliated firms, sometimes in partnership with philanthropic investors. Successes include upgrading primary commodities and diversifying agricultural exports. However, agrarian policies have also been marked by increased land differentiation and rural inequality. Ultimately, sustained structural transformation is inhibited by elite vulnerability. The chapter highlights that there are few signs of the emergence of leading domestic agrarian capitalists.
This concluding chapter reiterates the main contributions of the book. Growth in most African countries has been characterised by a transformation from low-value agriculture to low-value services. As a result, structural transformation has remained largely elusive within Africa. Services has been the fastest-growing sector on the continent. Rwanda is unique among rapidly growing African countries in explicitly focusing on becoming a services hub. Using the case of Rwanda, this book shows that contemporary late development, which is more dependent on services, results in more transnational forms of dependence and political contestation than experienced in prior experiences of late development. The book ends with thoughts about the future of Rwanda. It argues that in the immediate short term, any instability will depend on what happens in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the long term, Rwanda’s political stability depends not on the government’s capacity to contain domestic popular mobilisation alone but on the capacity of transnational coalitions of dissident elites and external actors capitalising on existing horizontal inequalities to challenge the Rwandan Patriotic Front rule.
Drawing on a decade of research and more than 580 interviews, this innovative political economy case study explores Rwanda's bold attempt to transform its economy after the 1994 genocide into one of the most rapidly growing countries in Africa. Pritish Behuria offers a multi-sector analysis of how globalisation and domestic politics shape contemporary development challenges. This study critically analyses the Rwandan Patriotic Front's ambitions to reshape Rwanda into a regional services hub while grappling with foreign dependency, elite vulnerability and limited financial resources. Through extensive analysis of the political economy of multiple sectors and the macro-economy, Behuria uses the Rwandan case as a window into answering why structural transformation remains so elusive on the continent. The Political Economy of Rwanda's Rise provides fresh insights into highlighting the contemporary challenges facing African countries as they integrate into the global economy. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.