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This chapter concludes the book, but the book concludes only midway through the quiet revolution that modern public trust advocacy has engendered. The Mono Lake litigation advanced public trust principles as a source of environmental law – and even environmental rights – highlighting the role of the doctrine in providing needed support for environmental protection amid weak legal foundations. The Conclusion turns to several open questions, including objections that the judicial role the doctrine invites may threaten the constitutional separation of powers. It considers whether trust-rights claims raise the kind of generalized harms that jurisprudential standing limitations are intended to prevent, but also the counterargument that the doctrine is the original “citizen suit” provision of the common law, deputizing private attorneys general to champion diffuse environmental interests that special interests would otherwise dominate. Finally, it considers what the world might look like without public trust governance – visiting parallel stories unfolding at the Great Salt Lake, Dead Sea, Sea of Galilee, and Aral Sea – before returning at last to the ongoing story at Mono Lake itself.
This chapter explores the impacts of the Mono Lake case beyond Mono Lake. Its embrace of public trust principles quickly rippled through the California legal system, and then others. The case was cited in state and federal courts. The influence of the decision was felt in legislative, administrative, and even constitutional matters. It drew praise from many scholars but also criticism by property rights advocates, those worried about the constitutional separation of powers, and even environmentalists concerned about the intrusion of property concepts into stewardship. The chapter explores the journey of the Mono Lake doctrine through California and beyond, with special focus on the contrasting paths taken in two neighboring states, Nevada and Idaho. In California, a case protecting the Scott River extended the Mono Lake doctrine to cover even groundwater tributaries of navigable trust resources. Idaho, fearful of the burdens of environmental protection prioritized in California, rejected the majority view of the doctrine as a quasi-constitutional constraint. Nevada, already bound by a quasi-constitutional trust, sought a different approach to preserve appropriative water rights.
This chapter explores “trust-rights” climate litigation, claiming sovereign obligations to protect the atmosphere, public rights to climate stability, or both. It begins with scholarly consideration of these strategies, reviewing sources of environmental rights, application of public trust principles to climate, and critiques of the atmospheric trust. It reveals the hidden duality of trust-rights climate claims as a pairing of reciprocal rights and duties. Then it reviews the explosion of trust-rights climate advocacy around the world, including the conclusion in Urgenda Foundation v. Netherlands that the nation had failed its duty under the European Convention on Human Rights to limit contributions to climate change; the failed attempt in Juliana v. United States to partner an atmospheric trust claim with constitutional rights asserted under the Due Process Clause; and a new generation of advocacy to build trust-rights principles into U.S. state constitutions. Finally, it considers the arguments against – and in favor of – trust-rights advocacy, addressing both constitutional concerns about the separation of powers and practical concerns about bringing uncertain impact litigation.
American politics is characterized by an implicit rights-centrism, for example, when public discourse champions the freedom of speech in absolute terms. This article proposes instead an ends-centric mode of deliberation that underscores the myriad ends beyond rights that are also necessary to a polity’s health. Grounded in republican theory, the ends-centric mode maintains space to (re)prioritize ends and to redraw the boundaries of rights as required by a given moment or issue. Rather than displace rights-centrism or the courts’ role in enforcing rights, the ends-centric mode prompts other institutions also to engage in rights reasoning, thereby elevating the larger conversation and process of deliberation. It thus allows a separation-of-powers logic to operate more fully in the realm of rights by leveraging diverse institutional perspectives and capacities toward a multi-sided dialogue over rights questions. We draw from historical debates on speech and press freedom from the early republic and the twentieth century to find sight lines for an ends-centric approach in American politics. We further examine how ends-centric arguments would benefit deliberations over the regulation of social media today. Specifically, arguments that overemphasize speech in social media crowd out other desirable ends, such as protecting young people online and combating misinformation. Ultimately, we argue the benefits of rights-centric and ends-centric modes operating alongside each other across constitutional fora, as the polity deliberates rights in old and new forms.
Chapter 10 reflects on the legacy of Guantanamo over the two dozen years since detention began in response to the changes in the United States after 9/11. It considers the impact on American law and how the outer shell of due process was after many years affirmed, but its core hollowed out. It notes how the executive knew that it had captured the wrong people but dishonestly kept up the illusion that it was doing something about terrorism. The US tortured everybody because that was what politics required even though it was well known that the process was not only wrong but futile. It also considers the impact of Guantanamo on American culture. Torture has become embedded and normalized in American life. American exceptionalism was distorted into a sense of unique grievance and entitlement to ignore core constitutional and international law principles. Guantanamo remains an image of cruelty in the service of retaliation against “the other,” in this case, Muslims. It was part of the build-up of a military security apparatus that undergirds a continuous justification for the executive to declare emergencies and suspend legal and ethical principles.
This chapter provides an introduction to the core concepts of US law, for those with an HCI background but not a legal background. The chapter covers the history of U.S. law, the basic constructs of the U.S. legal system, the core sources of legal rules: constitutions, statutues, regulations, and case law, differences between civil and criminal law, the differences between law and policy at the federal versus state level, searching for and using legal resources, and how to apply basic legal principles to HCI research.
Based on a qualitative and quantitative research design, this article examines the implementation of a morality policy – the medical cannabis policy in Switzerland – to investigate three understudied aspects of bureaucratic entrepreneurship. First, moving away from mono‐professional studies, the focus is on a policy characterized by a dispute between two groups of bureaucrats: physicians and jurists. Second, key conditions triggering bureaucratic policy entrepreneurship are identified, with a focus on mid‐level administrative entrepreneurs. Third, vertical alliances between bureaucrats and politicians of the executive and legislative branches are examined and these processes are reflected in the wider perspective of the politics‐administration dichotomy. Results show that law obsolescence, disputes between groups of bureaucrats and the need for political arbitration are favourable conditions for bureaucratic policy entrepreneurship. The study also shows that within the traditional separation of powers, bureaucratic entrepreneurship reinforces the executive power and creates dividing lines within the different branches of government.
Democracies in Europe fail to take adequate climate mitigation measures. In response, not only legal, but also illegal acts of climate protesters are multiplying in Europe. This paper examines the criminalisation of climate protests in France, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK. Against the overarching concept of dissensus to which this special issue is dedicated, this contribution reflects on the role of judges who deprive the disobedient from the opportunity to communicate about their motives. The paper pays particular attention to the case of David Nixon in the UK, in which the judge prohibited Mr. Nixon from sharing his motivation or mentioning climate change in the court room. This demeans civil disobedience to an ordinary criminal act and deprives democracy of its self-correcting potential.
The US and the EU have undergone a process of institutional convergence. While Madison argued that the US was subject to a systemic imperative to promote an anti-hegemonic order, the same has revealed itself to be true of the EU too – this because of the asymmetry of powers between its member states. However, because of the anti-hierarchical structure which supports it, an anti-hegemonic order is weak in terms of decision-making capacity. Thus, the price of the preservation of internal complexity is external ineffectiveness. The article considers the most appropriate trade-off between the two. The Madisonian approach to the compound of American states can help the EU in facing the dilemma of the integration process.
This article critically assesses the claim that smaller states may be structurally and socially pre-disposed towards more effective government performance. A review of recent experience in Iceland and Ireland indicates that the domestic characteristics that have been argued to foster superior small state performance can, under certain conditions of size and homogeneity, contribute to government failures. Furthermore, experience in these states suggests that high levels of social cohesion and homogeneity may increase the risk of a specific social phenomenon (‘Volkthink’) with adverse consequences for public policy.
Steffen Ganghof’s Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers (Oxford University Press, 2021) posits that “in a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not” (Ganghof, 2021). To consider, examine and theorise about this, Ganghof urges engagement with semi-parliamentarism. As explained by Ganghof, legislative power is shared between two democratically legitimate sections of parliament in a semi-parliamentary system, but only one of those sections selects the government and can remove it in a no-confidence vote. Consequently, power is dispersed and not concentrated in the hands of any one person, which, Ganghof argues, can lead to an enhanced form of parliamentary democracy. In this book review symposium, George Tsebelis, Michael Thies, José Antonio Cheibub, Rosalind Dixon and Daniel Bogéa review Steffen Ganghof’s book and engage with the author about aspects of research design, case selection and theoretical argument. This symposium arose from an engaging and constructive discussion of the book at a seminar hosted by Texas A&M University in 2022. We thank Prof José Cheibub (Texas A&M) for organising that seminar and Dr Anna Fruhstorfer (University of Potsdam) for initiating this book review symposium.
I examine the transformation of Italy during the fascist era and the way in which it was explained by one of the most prominent constitutional lawyers of the time, Costantino Mortati (1891–1985). A member of the Constituent Assembly of 1946–1948 and later a constitutional judge, Mortati had a deep influence on the Italian post-War constitutional thinking. Here I focus on Mortati’s understanding of the state’s transformation after 1922. I show how he conceptualised Italy’s transition from a liberal state to an authoritarian regime as a shift from the parliament to the executive of the power of ‘political direction’, ie, the power of identification of the aims and values of the state. Mortati did not envisage in the Italian transformation the full erasure of the separation of powers, but rather a large reshuffle of political direction moving from the Parliament to the Head of Government, allegedly a process in line with the country’s needs in the 20th century. He read the growth of executive powers as the most enduring constitutional transformation of his time, one destined in his mind to persist even after the downfall of the regime.
This essay aims to clarify the characteristics of the political theories of Montesquieu and Adam Smith by comparing their views on liberty. Montesquieu divides political liberty into two categories: “liberty in its relation with the constitution” and “liberty in relation to the citizens.” The former concerns the security of the governed in their relationship with those who govern, whereas the latter concerns the security of citizens and their property against infringements by other citizens. Smith concentrates on civil liberty and elaborates on Montesquieu’s framework to develop a more refined theory of the separation of powers. However, their views diverge on constitutional liberty. Montesquieu expects the nobility, as an intermediate group, to restrain sovereign despotism, whereas Smith emphasizes that this group historically threatened citizens’ security and valued the central government’s role in checking it. A comparison of their views deepens our understanding of the foundations of a free society.
Court-curbing legislation seeks to constrain judicial independence and create a judicial environment that aligns with the preferences of the state legislature. Much of the existing court-curbing literature focuses on court curbing at the national level and state courts of last resort. However, most cases in the United States are decided by lower state courts. This article examines the motivations to curb lower state courts. Our results suggest that as legislative professionalization increases, the legislatures are more likely to introduce legislation that curbs state trial courts. Unlike existing literature on federal courts and state courts of last resort, the ideological distance from the bill sponsor and the state lower courts does not influence court-curbing activity. Our results hold when tested at both the bill and state levels.
The Article examines the counter-majoritarian difficulty through the lens of political constitutionalism. To this end, it develops a dual framework for understanding the counter-majoritarian difficulty, distinguishing between internal and external dimensions. Based on this distinction, the Article proposes an institutional development of political constitutionalism—combining strong and weak judicial review—as a cogent response to these challenges.
The internal counter-majoritarian difficulty stems from distortions in majoritarian processes that undermine their representative legitimacy. The external counter-majoritarian difficulty, conversely, embodies the belief that courts, rather than legislatures, should be the pivotal institution in realizing citizens’ expectations regarding justice and rights.
Given this distinction, the analysis demonstrates that political constitutionalism can address both internal and external counter-majoritarian difficulties without compromising its foundational commitment to equal participation through a combined application of strong and weak judicial review. Strong judicial review aligns with political constitutionalism’s core principles by safeguarding against electoral distortions that pose internal counter-majoritarian issues. Weak judicial review enables courts to play a crucial role in realizing constitutional rights, as advocated by external counter-majoritarian critique, while leaving the final word on such matters to the legislature.
Recent UK legislative reform has further empowered the UK Executive, degrading horizontal and vertical constraints on powers interfering with human rights, and this has largely taken place via the ‘back door’ through repeated marginalisation of Parliament. Between 2021 and 2023, 11 pieces of primary legislation were given Royal Assent which narrowed Executive accountability mechanisms in relation to coercive and administrative powers identified as weakening human rights protections by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Echoing both recent and long-standing trends in UK law-making, such reform has been sent through Parliament while employing mechanisms of parliamentary marginalisation, undermining the ability of parliamentarians and broader civil society to scrutinise the changes. The passing of a constitutionally significant group of legislation in this manner created a ‘back door’ through which the UK Executive was able to expand its powers with minimal scrutiny. Such backdoor Executive empowerment supports scholarship highlighting the lack of firm UK constitutional constraints of the Executive. While the paper’s analysis does not make a claim on the overall status of UK democracy, it does argue that the recent legal reform mirrors dynamics identified with respect to democratic erosion, suggesting the need for further assessment of the UK’s democratic health.
The Feyerabend lectures (1784) anticipate many fundamental theses of Kant’s political thought in the published writings of the 1790s. In three fundamental topics – 1) the transition from the state of nature to the civil state, 2) the conception of sovereignty and of the division of powers, 3) the infallibility of the sovereign, with the related topics of the non-coercibility of the executive and the denial of the right to rebel – Kant has the basic structure of his political thought already clear and his intellectual debt to Achenwall is limited. These lecture notes also include a fundamental distinction between two senses of legislative power: understood as constituent and operative in the defining moment of the constitution of the state (what Achenwall would call the moment yielding fundamental laws) and understood as the specification of the fundamental laws agreed upon in their hypothetical origin. This distinction is never fully spelled out by Kant but is absolutely crucial to making sense of his body of political thought and addressing some apparent difficulties, including a proper understanding of his (in)famous denial of people’s right to rebel.
Chapter 19 looks at two landmark decisions that were issued after the submission of the full manuscript of this book for publication: the Advisory Opinion of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on climate change and marine protection, and the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v Switzerland. The authors situate these decisions within the broader context of climate litigation, examining their implications for future cases and drawing connections to the themes explored in other chapters. They demonstrate how these decisions both reflect and advance emerging best practice in climate jurisprudence, potentially inspiring further innovation based on science and rigorous legal reasoning.
Chapter 6 on Separation of Powers offers a comprehensive exploration of how the balance of power between the judiciary and other branches of government plays out in climate litigation. The authors critically analyse key cases where these doctrines have been invoked, shedding light on how these doctrines shape the courts’ approach to climate cases. They underscore the significant variation in how this issue is dealt with across jurisdictions, acknowledging the diversity of constitutional and legal frameworks globally. Despite this diversity, the authors distil an emerging best practice where courts are increasingly recognising their crucial role in safeguarding fundamental rights and constitutional values in the context of climate change. This recognition is not a one-directional or universal trend but a nuanced evolution detectable across various jurisdictions and legal systems.
Chapter 4 explores the intricacies of the legal principle of standing, its role in climate litigation, and how it impacts the ability of parties to bring climate change-related lawsuits to trial. The author discusses interpretations of standing across different jurisdictions, such as the United States, New Zealand, and countries in Europe, and explains how these interpretations can either impede or facilitate climate litigation. He distils emerging best practice from this analysis, providing an insightful guide for future climate lawsuits. The author then identifies emerging best practice in interpreting standing rules in a flexible manner, thus allowing a broader range of actors to bring climate-related lawsuits and enhancing access to justice.