Suicide prevention requires a systematic approach to develop a framework that brings together different elements of a prevention strategy, including surveillance, mental health service access, restriction of lethal means, and public awareness campaigns. Originating with Finland's pioneering efforts in the 1980s, such strategies have since expanded worldwide, driven by the World Health Organization's call for action and alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals. It is imperative that these programmes/strategies are evidence-based, informed by local research, continuously monitored and regularly evaluated for effectiveness. By developing suicide prevention programmes/strategies, governments around the world show their commitment to mitigating preventable deaths, underscoring the need for sustained funding, leadership, and research-driven implementation.

This chapter opens Part I of the book, focusing on social media as a digital participatory space. It examines the relationship between the state and platform firms in social media governance over two consecutive leaderships. It firsts map the landscape of social media platforms in China and the variety of participatory spaces they offer. Based on survey data, it identifies two platform companies that have evolved into important players in managing social media platforms with a significant reach in political information – Tencent and Sina. It then examines the significant changes in social media governance over two consecutive leaderships. Under Hu, social media governance was characterized by loose command and control with many choices for users, while popular corporatism emerged at the end of the Hu Jintao leadership and took off under Xi Jinping. Based on procurement data, the chapter elaborates on the state’s reasoning to rely on Tencent and Sina as the only corporations with the expertise and resources to provide key services in managing online public opinion. Its findings demonstrate that under popular corporatism large platform firms can leverage their superior expertise, data, infrastructure, and reach to gain concessions from the state due to their consultant and/or insider status.

CEO hubris is a vital construct in research on the psychology of organisational decision-makers. Hubristic CEOs influence strategic decisions, from acquisitions to product and geographic market entry. To date, research has mainly focused on how and when CEO hubris impacts CEOs and their organisations. I offer a framework in which CEOs predisposed to inflated self-evaluation engage in behavioural processes that yield overconfident strategic decisions associated with hubris. The framework reviews and summarises how such evaluations stem from CEOs’ psychological and social circumstances. It then links inflated self-evaluation to the three drivers of over-confidence that are associated with hubris: over-estimation, or the tendency to exaggerate prospective outcomes; over-placement, or the tendency to rank one’s capabilities and situation ahead of others; and over-precision, or the tendency to issue unduly bounded or narrow forecasts which tend to be inaccurate. The framework is illustrated by the case study of Elizabeth Holmes, formerly founder and CEO of Theranos, who was lauded as a celebrity entrepreneur before being convicted of crimes associated with her hubris.

By focusing on the British blockade of Germany, the prevailing narrative over-privileges one aspect of the use of food for belligerent purposes during the First World War. Blockade was not just Britain’s concern. France played a key role in its implementation, especially in respect to land routes and in the Mediterranean. Also, it was not just imposed in the Atlantic approaches. The other seas lapping both Europe and western Asia were vehicles for the application of sea power. In addition, starvation was not just an instrument of maritime warfare: it was also used by armies. Nor was Germany the only target; so too were its allies: Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. How the blocking of maritime trade affected their fighting power varied, depending on the management of their domestic food production, their distribution networks and their agricultural workforces. The blockade may have looked like a blunt instrument but its effectiveness depended on its interactions with other conditions, not all of them under governmental or even human control.

This chapter describes German and Soviet strategies for the year 1942 and covers operations from May 1942 to March 1943. These includes the Soviet offensive towards Kharkiv, German preliminary operations such as the conquering of Sevastopol and the Kerch peninsula, but also operations on other sections of the Eastern Front like Soviet offensives against Rzhev and the German operation ‘Whirlwind’. However, the focus is on the German summer offensive and the Battle of Stalingrad. By linking these events to the operations along the eastern front as well as decisions and events outside the eastern theatre, the chapter argues that Germany’s failure in 1942 was a consequence of Allied superiority in men and material, but also of a German leadership that underestimated Soviet warfare capabilities. The German command wanted to achieve too many objectives with too few resources in too short a period of time. This failure was part of a larger turn of the tide in the war, that finally led to the Axis defeat.

This chapter is focused on game theory and mechanism design, presenting them as an important branch of analytics science that has impacted our world. Like all other chapters, it starts by presenting the big picture ideas, and showcasing various real-world examples in which those ideas have been impactful. It educates the reader though various familiar examples such as the simple decisions involved in cutting a cake and more critical decision-making scenarios such as what happened during the Battle of the Bismarck Sea or finding ways to reduce racial segregation in the society, and from policies that revolutionized life-saving ideas for those who are in dire need of transplantation to governments’ complex efforts in improving voting mechanisms. The chapter provides engaging stories showcasing how the main ideas in game theory and mechanism design have been impactful in a myriad of ways.

Conventional war is organized violence subordinate to a political objective in which there is pervasive uncertainty and chance. Technology has changed the way war is fought in many ways, but many wars are decidedly low-tech. Often linked to the technologies of war are typical strategies by which states conduct regular war. These strategies are distinguished by the attention they pay to punishing the adversary versus denying them their goals, as well as to attacking capabilities versus the will to go on fighting. Each strategy bases a theory of victory on identifying how the military actions will link to a state’s political objectives. While the advent of nuclear weapons has raised the costs of war between nuclear states, there appears to be no end to the practice of war in the near future.

Some common themes emerge from these lessons about strategy and bureaucracy. The statesman and strategist also need wisdom to take the long view, prudence to discern what is practical, persistence and fortitude in implementation, courage to overcome groupthink and pride and bureaucratic resistance, temperance and humility to toil in unglamorous details. Above all the strategist must have a passion to pursue justice and peace. Statesmen and stateswomen need wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. If that is true, such timeless principles do not apply only to the individual policymaker. They apply to the nation we serve. American foreign policy should be characterized by wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice; our role in the world should serve those principles. Our grand strategy should take the long view, be practical and aware of our limits yet also courageous and visionary, fearless and uncompromising in the face of obstacles. Above all it must aim at justice – which means it must serve American interests, but it must do so with an awareness of how our interests are entwined with others.

The Archidamian War was in Thucydides’ view caused mainly by Sparta wanting to ‘take down’ the power of Athens, while its course was shaped largely by Sparta’s reliance on conventional tactics and limited resources, compounded by its ‘slowness’ to act. This notion of a mismatch between highly ambitious strategic objectives and deeply inadequate tactical means remains pervasive in scholarship on the war. However, Thucydides’ record of Spartan actions is open to a different interpretation: Sparta’s main strategic goal was merely to preserve its hegemony over its allies, and accordingly it needed to support the military ambitions of the latter, especially Corinth and Thebes on whose military resources Sparta was dependent. Sparta initially did the minimum necessary to keep Corinth and Thebes onside but, in the face of Athens’ refusal to compromise, gradually developed more ambitious strategic goals of its own. When Sparta applied conventional tactics and limited resources it was in pursuit of specific, restricted strategic aims, but when Sparta pursued more ambitious strategies it developed new, complex and often daring tactics to match. Their ultimate lack of success was largely the result of Sparta having to make concessions to the mutually incompatible strategic interests of Corinth and Thebes.

This chapter focuses on the importance of circular business models and the synergies they create within circular economy liveable cities. Circular business models emphasise reducing waste, reusing resources, and recycling materials, promoting sustainable economic growth while addressing environmental challenges. By fostering innovation, resource efficiency, and collaboration across various sectors, these models help cities transition to a circular economy. The chapter highlights the role of leadership, imagination, and curiosity in driving this transformation. Leaders are key to setting ambitious goals and mobilising resources, while imaginative thinking and curiosity foster the development of innovative solutions to urban challenges. Examples from companies like Interface, Patagonia, and Philips Lighting demonstrate how visionary leadership and creative business models contribute to sustainability and circularity. The chapter explores the synergies between circular business models and urban systems, with case studies from cities like Amsterdam and Paris. These cities have adopted circular strategies that integrate sustainable waste management, renewable energy, and resource-efficient practices, showcasing the transformative potential of circular economies. Ultimately, the chapter argues that circular business models are essential for creating resilient, sustainable cities. By leveraging leadership, innovation, and cross-sector collaboration, cities can foster circular economies that promote environmental sustainability, economic growth, and improved quality of life.