The article explores the interplay between imperialism and ethnonationalism, revealing how these seemingly conflicting ideologies coalesced in Russian political thought. The period of 1989–1994 saw a struggle between civic nationalism, which sought to redefine Russia within its existing borders, and imperialist-nationalist currents that viewed Soviet disintegration as a geopolitical catastrophe. Within this ideological conflict, the “time bomb” metaphor emerged as a potent rhetorical device, encapsulating anxieties about territorial fragmentation and national decline. The study identifies Russian émigré intellectual Gleb Rahr as a key figure in introducing the metaphor, later popularized by figures such as Dmitry Rogozin and Vladimir Putin.

To what extent can drones be the primary determinants of victory in warfare? This question is at the heart of the drone revolution debate in security studies. Proponents of a drone revolution argue that drones provide ‘game-changing characteristics’, act as ‘magic bullets’ against adversaries, and even provide the key defence to decide the ‘fate of nations’. Sceptics disagree, arguing that no matter the nuances or contexts of war, drones can never be considered the primary determinant of victory. In this article, we argue that the two sides of the debate rest upon a false dichotomy – that technologies must either be revolutionary or evolutionary. We reappraise country-specific case studies used by both sides of the debate: the Ethiopia–Tigray War, the Houthi–Saudi War, and the Russia–Ukraine War. Our analysis reveals a welcome synthesis; the impact of drone employment depends on the types of war waged, the drone capabilities deployed, and the political objectives sought in each conflict. In this sense, drones can have an impact on war that is sometimes ordinary and sometimes revolutionary. It is only by clarifying the analytical scope of the debate that the impact of drones on the practice of war can be fully understood.

Despite the destruction it inevitably engenders and the opposition it often elicits, war remains a near-human universal. There is almost no society, across time or place, that has not experienced some form of violent conflict, whether internally or against its neighbors or adversaries. The most common explanations for the causes of war and conflict tend to center around social and material factors, such as conflicts over resources, territory, or regime type. Certainly, these factors play a role in many conflicts, but they cannot alone explain every war. Other arguments, however, drawn from evolutionary psychology and biological anthropology, based on fundamental aspects of human nature with regard to male coalitionary psychology, do posit specific sources for conflict that provide an underlying platform for its emergence and can help explain its wide variety across time and space. A comprehensive and accurate understanding of the nature of war must include these considerations.

In this article, we show that the Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered a pro-democratic reaction from citizens in liberal democracies, which we term the “rally for democracy.” Unlike the conventional “rally ‘round the flag” effect that boosts government popularity, this involves citizens rallying behind democracy as an international ideal. It includes expressing stronger proximity to democratic powers, stronger approval for democratic leaders abroad, and greater aversion to authoritarian regimes. Through a survey quasi-experiment conducted in six countries between February and May of 2022, we provide evidence that the “rally for democracy” emerged immediately following Russia’s invasion. Exploring this observation further via analysis of data from 55 countries between 2014 and 2023, we find this to be the intensification of a longer-term trend in response to the rise of authoritarian great powers. A new cleavage exists in geopolitical loyalties, based on the degree to which citizens feel attachment to democracy, and this divide runs both between and within countries.

The article focuses on the Ukrainian official language policies and their impact on Ukrainian people-building, claiming the state promotion of Ukrainian as an exclusive language of public life and the ethnically-based understanding of the Ukrainian people, inevitably lead to the exclusion of non-Ukrainian communities from participation in democratic processes, politicise the already problematic language situation and risk undermining the role of Ukrainian as an official language.

For such an analysis, and a conceptualisation of how the state can shape the nature of the people, the article proposes a new theoretical understanding of the people as an organisational system, based on a functional adaptation of Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory and Charles Taylor’s social imaginary.

How do autocracies use nationalism to normalize and contain unsettled times? The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a decisive point in Russia’s politics from which there could be no return to an antebellum normality. Rather than attempt to mobilize the Russian public to war, state-run television sought to normalize the war as a banal reality for domestic audiences. Drawing on a content analysis of 1,575 reports from the state-run First Channel [Pervyi Kanal] from 2022 to 2024, this article argues that the Ukrainian regions occupied by Russia — the so-called “new regions” — are crucial to this strategy through their incorporation into banal nationalist depictions of Russia. In turn, televised depictions of residents in the “new regions” confer emotional weight and moral examples for ordinary Russians through their everyday practices: their fortitude in voting for Putin despite ongoing attacks; through their shared excitement in acquiring routine aspects of daily life from passports to pensions; and through their embodiment of Russia’s future. In the process, media depictions normalize imperial nationalist justifications for Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory in terms of the distinctiveness of the Russian people, Russia’s civilizing mission, and presentation of its war as defensive.

This theoretical and empirical study describes and explains the patterns of changes in domestic illicit trade and related transnational illicit flows of goods, services and money during the extreme social crises based on the case of the war in Ukraine. Depending on the legal status of the civil circulation of items, illicit trade is categorized into two groups: illicit (criminal) trade outside the economic sphere; and illicit (illegal) trade within the economic sphere. Typical destructive practices and their peculiarities during the war are considered in each group of illicit trade with the use of quantitative and qualitative methods. In terms of the dichotomy “war as a cause and consequence of crime”, this article addresses significant transformations in established criminal activities outside the official economy, such as drug trafficking and human trafficking, while also highlighting newly emerging crimes, specifically the illegal movement of conscripts across national borders. Furthermore, the article explores illegal trade within the economy, focusing on the trade in excisable goods and the new growing issue of abuse of humanitarian aid. The authors discuss the main deficiencies in adequate counteraction related to both war circumstances and systematic problems of state institutions, in particular, the criminal justice system.

When the European Union was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 2012, the citation stated that military conflict on the continent was “virtually inconceivable” owing to its action. This article will examine what role its acts and omissions played in the origins of the Ukraine crisis. The tensions stoked by potential NATO membership have been well aired. However, this article will argue that the treatment of minorities and particularly of the Russian language was equally important. The EU’s failure to address these questions by insisting Kjiv grant substantial linguistic rights, or even regional autonomy as foreseen by the second Minsk agreement, was a significant cause of the conflict.

This study examined changes in public knowledge, behaviours and attitudes towards individuals with mental health disorders in Ukraine. A nationwide survey was used to gather data from Ukrainian adults; this data was then compared with data gathered by Quirke et al. (2021, Cambridge Prisms Global Mental Health, 8) to form a comparison study. In congruence with the original study, the Mental Health Knowledge Schedule, the Community Attitudes towards Mental Illness Scale and the Reported Intended Behaviour scales were used. Measures of knowledge and attitudes towards individuals with mental disorders reflected a small reduction of knowledge (r = 0.13, p < .001) and a large reduction in benevolent attitudes (r = 0.96, p < .001). Conversely, there was a large decrease in authoritarian attitudes (r = −0.50, p < .001). Measures of behaviour reflected a medium positive increase in past and present behaviour (r = 0.33, p < .001) and a small positive increase in intended future behaviour towards individuals with mental illness (r = 0.24, p < .001). These findings provide a snapshot of changes in stigma towards those with mental health disorders in Ukraine and highlighted the growing need for evidence-based anti-stigma interventions and the monitoring of their impact.

The future of Ukraine depends on its relations with the EU. What is the law governing accessions? What are the main challenges facing Ukraine on the path towards EU membership? Going through the pre-accession scrutiny in times of war, Ukraine sets a unique precedent, where more experimentation could be possible to mitigate a huge risk that the EU repeats and amplifies the same mistakes it made in the Western Balkan countries – making the region a hostage of its contradictory and lethargic politics for too long. The evolution of EU enlargement law and the legal-political framework surrounding accessions across the different rounds of EU enlargement demonstrates that EU law is flexible while the practice of its application is volatile and deeply political. Enlargement practice shows that applying pre-accession conditionality may cause significant delays, while not delivering the results expected of it. A new approach to regulating accessions to the EU needs to be tested out before it is too late. This approach should build on Article 49 TEU and seek at least some depoliticisation of the enlargement process to guarantee the rule of law without dubious pre-accession techniques. Such an approach would speed-up accessions while making EU enlargement more predictable, serving the interests of Ukraine and other partners.

The war in Ukraine has fostered a renewed sense of common purpose and solidarity in the West. It has also exposed deep-seated divisions regarding the provision of military support to Ukraine and the fate of the European strategic architecture. While some states have committed high levels of military support to Ukraine, others have limited their help to token military aid. This paper examines why democratic allies diverge in their foreign policy on Ukraine and Russia using an integrated framework of strategic, economic, and domestic incentives and constraints. It offers a Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 32 Western allies to uncover causal paths leading towards the provision of military support to Ukraine. The findings highlight the role of defence spending, geography, and threat perceptions during the first year of the war. Ultimately, the analysis identifies four causal paths covering 9 of the 13 greatest military aid contributors to Ukraine, as well as 14 of the 19 token aid donors. It reveals the Baltic states and Poland as the most typical military supporters, while Belgium, Romania, and Canada feature as typical token contributors.