This article deals with the domestic politics of Estonia and Latvia after the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. It studies the cases of the Estonian Conservative People’s Party (EKRE) and Latvia’s National Alliance (NA). This piece concentrates on the cases of EKRE and NA with an interest in these parties’ formation processes, outlooks on identity politics, their stances vis-à-vis the EU and developments in international politics, and their relations with other political actors in Estonia and Latvia.

EKRE and NA anchor their ideological prerogatives in the longer trajectories of ethno-nationalism in Estonia and Latvia. However, whereas NA transformed into a party of the national conservative right, open to cooperation with centrist and centre-right partners, EKRE has remained a party of the radical right with a staunchly anti-systemic rhetoric and agenda. This particularity is largely to account for NA’s convergence with Latvia’s major parties on the increased securitisation of relations with Russia and EKRE’s divergence towards a rhetoric that urges a prioritisation of the national interest and a “pro-peace” stance vis-à-vis the war in Ukraine.

When a country sees multiple mass mobilisations over time, what accounts for variation in where protest occurs across the different protest waves? This article examines the case of mass protests in Ukraine 1990-2004, exploring how the emergence and development of activist networks aligns with changes in the geospatial dispersion of protest over time. It draws on archives and interviews with activists made available by The Three Revolutions Project, and newspaper reports from Ukrainska Pravda, Korrespondent.net and Radio Svoboda, utilising protest event analysis, along with QGIS software to visually represent findings. The article presents novel empirical findings on the geospatial scope of protest events across Ukraine from 1990 onwards, and demonstrates some of the ways in which regional activist networks expanded, developed, and sought cross-cleavage collaboration, aiming to facilitate increasing nationwide mobilisation. It provides valuable context for understanding subsequent Ukrainian mobilisation, such as the 2013-14 Euromaidan protest, and ongoing resistance to Russia’s full-scale invasion.

This research note investigates whether external military crises, short of war, in the neighbourhood of the European Union (EU) affects attitudes toward the EU. Specifically, I explore whether the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 fostered higher levels of trust in the EU and support for deeper integration among European citizens. Methodologically, I exploit the coincidental timing of the Russian annexation of Crimea on 18 March, 2014 with the fieldwork of the Eurobarometer survey (81.2) conducted in the spring of that year. The quasi‐experimental evidence establishes that European citizens who were surveyed after the Russian annexation became more trusting of the EU and presented a greater willingness for further European integration, particularly so among EU‐15 members. Moreover, the treatment effects were strongly moderated by individuals’ education levels, with the intervention exerting its greatest effect among the higher educated.

In recent years, observers have raised concerns about threats to democracy posed by external support for authoritarianism coming from regional powers such as Russia, China and Venezuela. This article assesses the efficacy of autocracy promotion through a close examination of Russian efforts to shape regime outcomes in the former Soviet Union. It finds that while Russian actions have periodically promoted instability and secessionist conflict, there is little evidence that such intervention has made post‐Soviet countries less democratic than they would have been otherwise. First, the Russian government has been inconsistent in its support for autocracy – supporting opposition and greater pluralism in countries where anti‐Russian governments are in power, and incumbent autocrats in cases where pro‐Russian politicians dominate. At the same time, the Russian government's narrow concentration on its own economic and geopolitical interests has significantly limited the country's influence, fostering a strong counter‐reaction in countries with strong anti‐Russian national identities. Finally, Russia's impact on democracy in the region has been restricted by the fact that post‐Soviet countries already have weak democratic prerequisites. This analysis suggests that, despite increasingly aggressive foreign policies by autocratic regional powers, autocracy promotion does not present a particularly serious threat to democracy in the world today.

As participatory governance approaches to local development get adopted also in transition countries, one of the key questions is how participation actually impacts local governance outcomes. This study examines the link between non-electoral participation and different public goods outcomes in rural Ukraine along with identifying the role of community-based organizations (CBOs). Using a unique survey data from Ukraine, I approach these questions empirically explicitly distinguishing between different public goods outcomes. I find that participation appears to be positively associated with local school and water supply outcomes. In addition, CBOs are found to be associated with better quality of water supply systems motivating a discussion about establishment of service cooperatives for water supply as a functional local governance arrangement.

This study explores the determinants of the low level of civic engagement in Ukraine. Applying the methodological framework of analytical sociology, we consider different social mechanisms that explain the weakness of the Ukrainian third sector. First, we discuss how the political system and economic performance of the country have shaped beliefs, values, and motives of people by creating the context for their actions. Second, we focus on different aspects of people’s experiences during the Soviet times to formulate a number of hypotheses concerning unwillingness of citizens to join CSOs. Analyzing the survey data of the years 2010 (beginning of Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency) and 2014 (survey conducted right after the “Euromaidan”), we argue that some specific features of Homo Sovieticus, such as passivity, absence of political identification, and reliance on informal networks negatively affect the propensity of people to participate in CSOs. These effects are complemented by disappointment with the post-Soviet transformation and low subjective social status. Based on the results of analyses, we formulate suggestions concerning possible ways of fostering the development of civil society in Ukraine.

Over a period of three months, starting in late 2013, Ukraine experienced a remarkable civic transformation. What started as peaceful protests largely consisting of young idealists, grew quickly into an organized yet decentralized social movement, a conglomeration of semi-formal initiatives, and a loosely defined network of related formal and informal organizations—a process that ultimately prompted significant political and social changes in Ukraine. This paper offers three case studies related to EuroMaidan to provide insight into the formal and informal dimensions of civil society, contrasting those with official designations. The discussion contributes to the long-debated question of the strength or weakness of civil society in the context of Eastern Europe and suggests directions for future research with regard to the conceptualization of civil society and our understanding of formality.

This article reflects on the significance of Ukraine’s European choice—a series of pro-European political choices that both Ukraine’s citizens and its political elites gradually committed to, and which crystallized during and after the 2013 Euromaidan protest. Russia refused to accept Ukraine’s European choice, starting the first wave of aggression against Ukraine as soon as the Euromaidan won in early 2014, and ultimately launching the full-scale invasion in February 2022. As Ukrainians defend their European choice, important lessons can be drawn from their resistance to Russia’s aggression. We identify three lessons for Europe and three lessons for political science.

In a late October 2022 international YouGov public opinion poll, findings indicated that more Indians attributed responsibility for the Russian invasion of Ukraine to ‘the West’ rather than Russia (28% compared to 27%, while 45% indicated both were accountable or expressed uncertainty). This study seeks to elucidate why such perceptions prevail, drawing upon the longstanding strategic partnership between the former Soviet Union and, subsequently, Russia, with India dating back to the 1950s and the portrayal of the Russian invasion within Indian broadcast news media. We argue that the media coverage of the conflict exhibits three main frames: the invasion as an attack by Russia on Ukrainian sovereignty, an anti-West pro-Russia frame, and a perspective aligning with Indian national interests. Both international and domestic proponents of these frames actively seek to shape the narrative presented, with media organizations deciding which frames to prioritize and which political actors to endorse. Consequently, we argue that the news media plays a pivotal role in shaping public perceptions of the conflict, influencing the Indian government's approach toward the war.

The symposium is motivated by the question of how the war in Ukraine is ‘framed’ and ‘narrated’ in media outside the West. It aims to shed light on the diverse ways in which information is manipulated and disseminated to serve political interests. The emphasis on developing an interdisciplinary conceptual prism is particularly noteworthy. Integrating insights from International Relations, Geopolitics, and Media and Communication studies offers a holistic understanding of the complex dynamics at play. Moreover, by highlighting the influence of foreign propaganda and disinformation campaigns, the symposium underscores the importance of critically analysing media representations in shaping public perceptions and potentially influencing foreign policies. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for mitigating the impact of misinformation and fostering informed public discourse on global conflicts. The symposium promises to contribute significantly to the scholarly understanding of the nexus between conflict and communication, while also offering valuable insights for policymakers and media practitioners alike.

This article deals with the main obstacles in the way of conducting field research in Eastern Europe. Focusing on Ukraine, the article confronts a number of research design rules with the post-Soviet reality. Taking into consideration cultural and political factors, the article seeks to highlight the challenges that await researchers. Thanks to personal experience acquired in Ukraine, the author points to some of the potential difficulties, as well as opportunities awaiting political scientists conducting research in the region.

This article focuses on Finnish political scientists’ contributions to the public debate at a time when the relationship between academia and the government was tenser than usual. More specifically, it addresses the public roles and relevance of political scientists during three salient political crises of the 2010s: the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and the war in Donbass, the so-called European migrant crisis beginning in 2015, and the failure of major Finnish governance reform in 2019. I examine scholars’ interventions into them in a corpus of eighty articles collected from the online journal Politiikasta and use qualitative content analysis to study the polarisation of their views and the style of interventions, including scholars’ relationship with the government. I discuss the visibility and impact of political science in the context of gender and seniority of researchers, the presence of political science in the Finnish media, in general, and against other social-scientific disciplines, and with the other countries studied in this Special Issue.

The Russia-Ukraine war generates fear, depression, loneliness, burnout and substance misuse among civilians. Our study examines mental health among Ukrainian university female students during 3 years of war. A total of 3,467 students were surveyed on three occasions: August to October 2022 (T1, n = 1,416), March to July 2023 (T2, n = 747) and September to November 2024 (T3, n = 1,304). The respondent’s average age was 19.3 years, 25.3% identified as secular and 36.9% were married/partnered. The respondents included 81.2% who were not relocated, 10.7% who were internally displaced and 8.1% who were refugees. Valid and reliable survey instruments were used to gather data. One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows a significant decrease in fear of war, depression and burnout in 2023 compared to 2022; however, there was a marked increase in 2024. Regardless of the survey period, one-way ANOVA shows a significant difference in fear of war and burnout scores associated with depression and loneliness levels. Stepwise regression analysis shows fear of war, depression and loneliness associated with burnout. This study provides usable information for mental health services planning and intervention purposes associated with young women affected by war in Ukraine. Additionally, it has relevance for training to address client and service personnel needs, for academic curriculum development and course instruction, and as a reference source for mental health personnel addressing student needs.