Understanding confidence in one’s knowledge has been a longstanding goal in judgment and decision-making research. This study takes an initial step toward identifying the psychological and behavioral consequences of unjustified confidence—confidence not supported by actual knowledge—by examining its associations with multiple psychological and behavioral variables within the domain of sports betting. A sample of 997 participants completed either a knowledge-confidence or forecasting-confidence assessment, followed by measures of empowerment, decisiveness, openness to information, risk taking, information search, and information use. Psychologically, unjustified confidence was related to greater feelings of empowerment and decisiveness, but unrelated to openness to information. Behaviorally, unjustified confidence was related to greater risk taking and information search, but showed little consistent relationship with information use. These patterns were largely consistent across knowledge and forecasting tasks, with only minor variations. Multiple regression analyses revealed distinct predictor patterns for different behavioral outcomes, suggesting that confidence’s role varies across decision-making behaviors. These findings provide an extensive examination of multiple theorized consequences of confidence within a single domain, identifying which relationships warrant experimental investigation and suggesting that understanding confidence’s causal effects will require nuanced, behavior-specific models.

This study aimed to identify barriers and facilitators to reducing free sugar intakes while participants were in the process of attempting to do this. Sixty-two adults with free sugar intakes >5% total energy intake; participants in a randomised controlled trial examining the effects of three different dietary recommendations versus control for reducing free sugar intakes were interviewed at either 1, 2, 4, 8, or 12 weeks after receiving their recommendation. Data were analysed using thematic analysis and framework analysis based on recommendation received, time for change, and success in reducing free sugar intakes at 12 weeks. Thematic analysis revealed seven interactive themes leading to dietary change: ‘Is it possible?’; ‘Power of knowledge’; ‘Personal balance and empowerment’; ‘Habitual approach’; ‘Realities of life’; ‘Extensive awareness and viewpoint’; and ‘Proof and impact’. Framework analysis revealed greater knowledge, including knowledge related to practical solutions, in intervention groups compared to control; greater intentions and expectations at the start of the process, followed by increasing or decreasing engagement and satisfaction over time, with noticeable physical and subjective proof occurring from 4 weeks; and active engagement, with growing confidence and motivation in those who ended the trial having reduced their free sugar intakes compared to more passive attitudes in those less successful. Our findings demonstrate clear variation in barriers and facilitators to reducing free sugar intakes throughout the process, dependent also on recommendation received and individual orientation. Suggestions for improving free sugar intake reduction can be offered based on these differences.

International Relations scholarship has shown that persisting epistemic hierarchies rooted in colonial domination continue to exclude, silence, or sideline alternative knowledges in global governance, even as International Organizations increasingly open up to formally marginalized groups and attempt to pluralize their expertise. While building on such accounts, this article argues that epistemic hierarchies are deeply entangled with political-economic logics, which permeate global epistemic politics in multiple ways. These intersecting epistemic and political-economic logics produce complex forms of ‘political-epistemic disciplining’, which do not simply exclude alternative knowledges, but rearticulate them. I identify three intertwined modalities of this process: de-epistemization, whereby alternative knowledge claims are recoded as social or identity concerns rather than treated as competing epistemologies. This operation recognizes the subjects of the critique but not the epistemic critique itself. Conditional recognition occurs when prevailing criteria of validity regulate the acknowledgement of such claims. Finally, transposition constitutes or reformulates alternative knowledge claims through the lenses of dominant epistemic frameworks and categories. These processes rearticulate alternative knowledges and transform them a new into ‘globalized alternative knowledges’. The argument is developed through an in-depth analysis of engagements with Indigenous knowledges in Global Mental Health governance.

This article examines Numenius’ use of the concept of undiminished giving in fr. 14 des Places, discussing briefly its philosophical antecedents and parallels from Plato to Early Imperial thinkers and highlighting the striking similarity of the fragment to Philo of Alexandria’s De gigantibus 25–8. This similarity indicates the potential direct influence of Philo on Numenius, contributing to the debate on Philo’s impact on pagan philosophy, particularly Neoplatonism.

In recent epistemology, introspection principles are commonly rejected. One of the central reasons for this is the adoption of Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments (1996, 2000) and the popularity of the associated epistemic externalist position. This rejection, however, comes with theoretical costs concerning the applications of introspection principles in epistemic and doxastic logic and modeling cooperative behavior. In this paper, I provide a way to solve this dilemma by arguing that the principle KB – expressing one’s privileged knowledge of their beliefs – remains unscathed by Williamson’s argument while saving the important theoretical applications introspective principles are used for. I propose a way of justifying KB and rejecting KK on principled grounds using Byrne’s (Byrne, A. (2005). ‘Introspection.’ Philosophical Topics 33(1), 79–104., Byrne, A. (2018). Transparency and Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) transparency account of introspection, improving upon a previous attempt by Das and Salow (Das, N. and Salow, B. (2018). ‘Transparency and the KK Principle.’ Noûs 52(1), 3–23.). This defense of KB, unlike many in the literature, is consistent with epistemic externalism and allows one to reject the problematic KK principle and maintain that non-introspective knowledge is guided by Williamson’s margin-for-error principle.

This article addresses coloniality’s imposition of forgetting in the Afro-Atlantic world and attends to the gut as a “site of memory” in Afro-Diasporic religions. It opens with a consideration of what forgetting means for communities in which “counter-memories” could have mounted a challenge to dispossession and the establishment of settler-colonial political institutions. It then turns to Black Atlantic religious memory and to the colon as a metonym for gastrointestinal interiority. Building on The Gut: A Black Atlantic Alimentary Tract (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), the author contends that the emphasis on the gut in initiatory Black Atlantic traditions (such as Vodou and Lucumí) reflects the gastronomic and epistemological impact of coloniality and racial capitalism. The article ends on a cautionary note, warning that while the current focus on the head in Afro-Diasporic religious discourses may contest colonized epistemologies, it threatens to reinscribe coloniality’s erasure of the gut’s role in cognition.