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Professional and occupational societies rely on volunteers for leadership, expertise, member recruitment, fundraising, legislative activity, and many other activities. Yet, volunteerism in the professions has received very little analytic attention. This study uses a large, international dataset produced by the American Society of Association Executives to examine patterns of volunteer activity in 23 professional associations and societies. A comparative analysis allows us to test widespread theories on the factors that predict volunteer activity in the particular context of professional life, where the motivations to volunteer may vary. Our findings suggest that some patterns of professional volunteer activity mirror what we can expect in a non-professional context (i.e., church or community volunteering), while other patterns are distinct. Our findings have particular relevance in understanding that a professional’s demographic characteristics and voluntary preferences are context-specific and must be accounted for in volunteer recruitment efforts.
Parliaments often elect holders of important extra‐parliamentary offices such as heads of state, constitutional judges, heads of audit institutions and ombudsmen. What drives the behaviour of parliamentary actors and the outcome of such elections? This article explains actor behaviour theoretically, drawing on spatial factors, principal‐agent arguments about the importance of nonspatial candidate characteristics and signaling arguments about competitive considerations beyond the specific election. Empirically, it provides the first comparative analysis of such elections outside the United States Senate using original data on 100 elections for four external offices in 14 Western European parliaments. The findings show that spatial variables, nonspatial candidate characteristics and features of the competitive context systematically affect the election outcome. The article contributes to comparative parliamentary research in general by demonstrating how parliamentary activities, other than lawmaking, can be analysed using established theories and by showing that consensual aggregate outcomes can be explained within a competition‐based rational choice model.
Explanations of different patterns of preferences for redistribution either highlight the role of the institutional framework in a country or highlight the importance of self‐interest and rational expectations. The study introduces a unified approach to explain differences in preferences for redistributive measures for the case of intergenerational monetary transfers for families and children. Both explanatory approaches are integrated into the action‐based Model of Frame Selection that incorporates normative motives and economic self‐interest into the process of decision making. Using a large sample that deals with questions on the approval of public policies for families and accounts for the normative importance of children and family life in Germany, evidence is provided that both approaches are valid in explaining preferences for government transfers.
International security is an ambiguous concept – it has many meanings to many people. Without an idea of how the world works, or how security is defined and achieved, it is impossible to create effective policies to provide security. This textbook clarifies the concept of security, the debates around it, how it is defined, and how it is pursued. Tracking scholarly approaches within security studies against empirical developments in international affairs, historical and contemporary security issues are examined through various theoretical and conceptual models. Chapters cover a wide range of topics, including war and warfare, political violence and terrorism, cyber security, environmental security, energy security, economic security, and global public health. Students are supported by illustrative vignettes, bolded key terms and an end-of-book glossary, maps, box features, discussion questions, and further reading suggestions, and instructors have access to adaptable lecture slides.
Although there is a substantial body of research addressing the economic motivations for drug crime, fewer studies have also considered the social influences that shape individuals’ involvement in the illicit drug economy. This chapter will draw on interviews conducted in prisons in Indonesia with people convicted of drug offences. Analysis suggests that many offenders do have economic motivations for entry into the drug trade. However, personal and relational motivations for drug use and drug trading must not be ignored, given that most of our participants were not in absolute poverty when they decided to offend. Moreover, in making decisions about participation in the drug trade, they were clearly influenced by trusted peer groups. The chapter presents this empirical data within the context of increasingly punitive penalties for drug offences in Southeast Asia, including the judicial execution of drug traffickers.
This chapter explores aspects of Sen’s analysis of self-interest and commitment, seeking to highlight their interplay by probing some imagined situations. Detailing three facets of self-interest the author detects in traditional economic theory and the two forms of committed behaviour he then identifies (not confining one’s goals to the pursuit of ones own welfare and not basing one’s choices exclusively on one’s goals at the expense of those of others), the implied eightfold pattern of interrelations between these subtle concepts is presented, illustrated by a hypothetical internet dating conundrum. Sen’s stress on the self as a reasoning, self-scrutinizing agent who may but (in contrast with much prevailing theory) need not choose on the basis of self-interest underpins an account of rational choice that pays more respect to individual freedom, with significance in economics. Using an example outlining conflicting duties and pressures UK MPs might have felt during Brexit votes, Sen’s account is defended against attacks that, through reliance on strained definitions of interests and goals, seem to over-exploit the potential malleability of language.
People undertake a decision-making process when they perceive a criminal opportunity although these decisions are often not purely rational. To clarify this process, several theories have been developed to explain how criminal decisions are made. Three such theories – deterrence theory, rational choice theory, and routine activity theory – along with major concepts from each theory, are examined in this chapter. Among the topics covered are the celerity, certainty, and severity of punishment, the utility of cost–benefit analysis, and the necessity of considering the role of a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of capable guardians in explaining a criminal event. The limitations of a purely rational approach to criminal decision-making and how opportunity, incentive, emotion, and irrational thinking affect these decisions are also discussed. Finally, the practical and policy implications of these results are explored, after which recommendations for future research focusing on the methodology and domains that influence these decisions are made.
Theory in the social sciences is not written in stone and undergoes change as it is continuously being tested in new research. This allows for an appreciation of the dynamic but also volatile nature of our subject matter, politics. While physicists have plenty of time to solve puzzles within a single and common theoretical frame, political scientists keep encountering anomalies that challenge their dominant theory. This tension between constancy and renewal has been and still is a prominent feature of Comparative Politics. Its challenges become especially evident in an Africanist perspective. Theory is generated in already “developed” or “democratic” societies, making Africa a poor fit. The main issue there is not the backsliding experience of countries with a democratic tradition. Instead, it is how to build democracy in a context where its benefits were denied the local population by the colonial administrators. This chapter is devoted to reviewing the theoretical constructs that political scientists have used to advance the comparative analysis of politics. It points to three main breakthroughs that have shaped Comparative Politics since its inception sixty years ago: structural functionalism, rational choice theory, and, in recent decades, democratic theory.
Constitutions are not mere sets of written words and letters: they, most of the time, touch upon deeper layers of human nature - our emotions. Constitutions are imagined worlds we use as an element to craft social reality. Cognitive sciences help us understand how we use emotional rationality to do this.
Constitutions - in a political sense - provide solutions to the age old problem of leadership changes and how majorities and minorities should interact. If political communities solve these problems the can better coordinate their efforts, which in turn will give them a competitive advantage (military, fiscal, economic, etc.) to other (less coordinated) political communities. This chapter looks into the political effects constitutions have, and how they try to calibrate these kind of balances. It also look into the possibilities of calculating or engineering (new) balances like this, for instance for divided societies and transitional democracies (constitutional engineering)
This paper explores Elinor Ostrom's account of practical reason through the conceptual lens provided by a typology of dimensions of rational conduct advanced by Amartya Sen. On Sen's view, self-interested behaviour has three independent, and separable, features: self-centred welfare, self-welfare goal and self-goal choice. We suggest that Ostrom is committed to a version of rational choice theory that retains the assumptions of self-welfare goal and self-goal choice but, by acknowledging that people's welfare is affected by factors beyond their material consumption, departs from the assumption of self-welfare goal. We argue that this departure is not necessarily driven by an acknowledgement, along Senian lines, that people may have reasons for action other than the single-minded pursuit of their own goals, but rather by Ostrom's belief that the decision problem people face is so complex that maximising behaviour is rendered impossible. We illustrate this argument by analysing how Elinor Ostrom's position differs not only from Sen's but also from that of her husband and long-time collaborator Vincent Ostrom, who in his analysis of the covenantal aspects of rule-making seems to depart from the assumptions of instrumental rationality and preference-satisfaction.
This article refines a foundational tenet of rational choice theory known as the principle of description invariance. Attempts to apply this principle to human agents with imperfect knowledge have paid insufficient attention to two aspects: first, agents’ epistemic situations, i.e. whether and when they recognize alternative descriptions of an object to be equivalent; and second, the individuation of objects of description, i.e. whether and when objects count as the same or different. An important consequence is that many apparent ‘framing effects’ may not violate the principle of description invariance, and the subjects of these effects may not be irrational.
We introduce BPS, a research paradigm which takes seriously the cognitive limitations and varied motivations of citizens and elites as they make politics happen around the world. The most important claim in this book is that a set of ideas from psychology, economics, political science and communication studies can be combined in a simple way to greatly enhance our understanding of politics. These approaches can help explain the many deviations we see in political attitudes, political decision making, and political behavior that are often predicted from the dominant, alternative approach to understanding politics: RCT. The BPS paradigm encapsulates a broad set of research programs that challenge traditional assumptions about the processes and motivations structuring political decision-making, including: (1) the role, use and influence of heuristics and cognitive biases on decision-making, 2() the effects of message framing on political attitudes, (3) institutional factors and the psychology of group-decision making in state policy formation, (4) the role of emotions in political behavior, (5) individual differences in preferences stemming from personality, values and norms, and (6) the importance of motivation and identity in information processing.
How and why do people make political decisions? This book is the first to present a unified framework of the Behavioral Political Science paradigm. – BPS presents a range of psychological approaches to understanding political decision-making. The integration of these approaches with Rational Choice Theory provides students with a comprehensible paradigm for understanding current political events around the world. Presented in nontechnical language and enlivened with a wealth of real-world examples, this is an ideal core text for a one-semester courses in political science, American government, political psychology, or political behavior. It can also supplement a course in international relations or public policy.
There are decision problems where the preferences that seem rational to many people cannot be accommodated within orthodox decision theory in the natural way. In response, a number of alternatives to the orthodoxy have been proposed. In this paper, I offer an argument against those alternatives and in favour of the orthodoxy. I focus on preferences that seem to encode sensitivity to risk. And I focus on the alternative to the orthodoxy proposed by Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility theory. I will show that the orthodoxy can be made to accommodate all of the preferences that Buchak’s theory can accommodate.
This chapter introduces the research puzzle of the study, provides a brief background on Christians in Turkey and Muslims in France, and reviews existing work on religious minorities in these contexts. The chapter examines existing explanations (modernization theory, historical institutionalism, ideology and rational choice theory) and elaborates the argument of the book. It also discusses how the theory developed in the book can contribute to scholarly debates in the study of religion and politics. It defines relevant concepts and describes data sources and methodological tools.
Revealed preference approaches to modelling agents’ choices face two seemingly devastating explanatory objections. The no self-explanation objection imputes a problematic explanatory circularity to revealed preference approaches, while the causal explanation objection argues that, all things equal, a scientific theory should provide causal explanations, but revealed preference approaches decidedly do not. Both objections assume a view of explanation, the constraint-based view, that the revealed preference theorist ought to reject. Instead, the revealed preference theorist should adopt a unificationist account of explanation, allowing her to escape the two explanatory problems discussed in this paper.
Feminism and rational choice theory have both been hailed as approaches with the potential to revolutionize political science. Apart from a few exceptions, however, work utilizing these two perspectives rarely overlaps. This article reviews their main contributions and explores the potential for a combined approach. It argues that a synthesis of feminism and rational choice theory would involve attending to questions of gender, strategy, institutions, power, and change. The contours and benefits of this approach are illustrated with reference to one particular area of research: the adoption of electoral gender quotas. Despite a current lack of engagement across approaches, this example illustrates that the tools of feminist and rational choice analysis may be brought together in productive ways to ask and answer theoretically and substantively important questions in political science.