This chapter delves into the United States’s treatment of Indigenous peoples, with a specific focus on Indigenous sovereignty and economic rights. It begins by introducing the topic and setting the context for the discussion by providing a history of the treatment of Indigenous peoples in the legal framework, with an emphasis on the series of cases dubbed the Marshall Trilogy. This includes the struggles and advancements in recognizing tribal nation sovereignty and economic rights. It examines the recognition and affirmation of tribal nation sovereignty within the United States, including legal developments and court decisions that have shaped Indigenous self-governance. This chapter analyses the landmark case of McGirt v. Oklahoma, emphasizing its role in addressing past legal injustices, establishing tribal reservation boundaries, and strengthening tribal jurisdiction. It also investigates US tribal sovereignty in the context of international Indigenous trade, showcasing the ways in which Indigenous communities engage in economic activities and exercise their sovereignty on the global stage.

This chapter offers a new reading of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, which argues that Shelley draws on Darwin’s, Thelwall’s, and Percy Shelley’s depictions of materialist, active speech in the novel’s portrayal of speech production. This coda makes the case that Shelley’s novel posits speech production and acquisition as a thoroughly interdisciplinary project and suggests that the Romantic concerns with physicalised models of impressive vocal power, traced throughout this book, present a new way of reading the creature’s speech as a radical act of self-governance.

Although the 13 United States courts of appeals are the final word on 99 percent of all federal cases, there is no detailed account of how these courts operate. How do judges decide which decisions are binding precedents and which are not? Who decides whether appeals are argued orally? What administrative structures do these courts have? The answers to these and hundreds of other questions are largely unknown, not only to lawyers and legal academics but also to many within the judiciary itself. Written and Unwritten is the first book to provide an inside look at how these courts operate. An unprecedented contribution to the field of judicial administration, the book collects the differing local rules and internal procedures of each court of appeals. In-depth interviews of the chief judges of all 13 circuits and surveys of all clerks of court reveal previously undisclosed practices and customs.

Although the 13 United States courts of appeals are the final word on 99 percent of all federal cases, there is no detailed account of how these courts operate. How do judges decide which decisions are binding precedents and which are not? Who decides whether appeals are argued orally? What administrative structures do these courts have? The answers to these and hundreds of other questions are largely unknown, not only to lawyers and legal academics but also to many within the judiciary itself. Written and Unwritten is the first book to provide an inside look at how these courts operate. An unprecedented contribution to the field of judicial administration, the book collects the differing local rules and internal procedures of each court of appeals. In-depth interviews of the chief judges of all 13 circuits and surveys of all clerks of court reveal previously undisclosed practices and customs.

Most often, solitude starts out neutral, like a lump of sculptor’s clay that we can shape into whatever we want. Our experiences, and those of our research participants, have shown us that there are a lot of positive outcomes possible when choosing to carve out some time alone. Why is solitude so potentially powerful for all kinds of people? That’s a question that has driven a large part of our research, and we continue to build on what we have learned. What we’ve seen so far points to the fact that solitude creates an environment where two important things can happen: each of us can captain our own ship, and while in that role, we can connect to our true selves. Think of it as the ultimate place to do what you want (autonomy) and be who you are (authenticity).

The social reality that Comparativists typically disaggregate in their political analysis is the replica of a society that has gone through an agrarian as well as an industrial revolution. It is organized into interest groups that constitute the basis of political parties. Political life is conceived within a right–left spectrum. Party systems are durable and subject to only minor alterations. The ability to encourage compromises and to produce sub-optimal policy outcomes is one of its key ingredients. Little attention, however, is paid to the underlying structures that keep the party system going, notably the fact that institutional stability in developed societies is effectively grounded in the economic production process. This variable is too often overlooked in the analysis of the quality of democratic institutions. The colonial powers encouraged the institutional fundament of such politics, but the ambition was unfinished at the time of independence. Trade unions, like cooperative societies, had started to emerge and provided the basis for the rise of a new political leadership. Once in power, however, these leaders introduced legislation to ban or reduce the powers of these non-state organizations. Because there was no independent African middle class with capital to influence development, the post-independence political organizations never took on a “class” character. The neo-Marxist criticism that flourished in the 1970s and onwards imputed too uncritically the exploitation and oppression on the continent to the presence of social classes similar to what would be found in Western society. Its influence, not surprisingly, waned quickly. By too readily assuming the hegemonic nature of colonialism, these neo-Marxist authors downplayed the role of indigenous African social formations in the same way as advocates of neo-liberal theory did in the decade that followed.

In the mirror literature, power and sovereignty are identified with the king’s person. The king’s conduct established a model, which his subjects would follow; consequently, the ruler’s actions and behaviour determined the nature of the polity. The king’s cultivation of virtue is, in consequence, a pragmatic as well as a moral imperative. The mirror-writers insist on the importance of the king’s self-discipline as a prerequisite for his governing other people; if he is unable to govern himself, he will be incapable of governing anyone else. The three extracts in this section describe the virtuous and effective king. From different perspectives, they treat some of the ethical and philosophical problems of human nature; in particular, they discuss how to strengthen, acquire and practise virtues and how to overcome and eradicate vices. The texts in this section are drawn from Yūsuf Khāṣṣ Ḥājib, Kutadgu bilig; al-Māwardī, Tashīl al-naẓar wa-taʿjīl al-ẓafar; and Kaykāʾūs, Qābūsnāmeh.

Protecting individual rights is a core feature of democratic constitutionalism. The centralization of the means of coercion gave rise to the Hobbesian dilemma, the fear that this enormous power might be abused unless it be effectively controlled. In addition to dividing power among different branches of government or sharing it between the federation and its units, constitutions have fortified individual rights with judicial review and enforcement mechanisms against the executive branch to rein in state power.

Proposing a collective right to effective self-government sits oddly with a vision that pitches free individuals against an all-powerful state. Such a right can, however, be justified on two interrelated grounds. First, in the absence of effective protection by a state, individual civil and political rights remain empty declarations. Stateless people, Hannah Arendt has taught us, are the most vulnerable; they have no legal rights and no way of seeking protection as a matter of right.

This chapter defends the existence of negligence, understood here as a form of inadvertent moral wrongdoing for which the wrongdoer is presumptively and non-derivatively responsible and blameworthy. The wrong in question is failure of due care. This common-sensical claim needs defense in view of widespread skepticism about the possibility of non-derivative inadvertent wrongdoing. A major source of this skepticism is the conviction that all wrongdoing must ultimately derive from intentional or knowing violations.

In much of the developing world, legal titling – the registration of land ownership through a formal, judicial process – is viewed as a path to economic development and political order. The introductory chapter explains why legal titling is unlikely to fulfill this promise. It begins by making a case that the new institutional economics and public choice, which were developed and applied to date in mostly Western contexts, are useful in understanding political, economic, and social institutions in the Islamic world. We then introduce our theory of emergence and change in property rights, which explains the situations when we expect the government to define and enforce property rights, when self-governance of property rights can work, and why it is unlikely that legal titling will be feasible as a development strategy in a typical fragile state. We conclude by introducing our empirical study of Afghanistan. The highlights of the empirical study include fieldwork conducted by one of the authors in thirty villages in rural Afghanistan, which resulted in hundreds of interviews with ordinary villagers, customary village leaders, and local government officials.