This chapter introduces methods for generating and documenting paradata before and during data creation practices and processes (i.e. prospective and in-situ approaches, respectively). It introduces formal metadata-based paradata documentation using standards and controlled vocabularies to contribute to paradata consistency and interoperability. Narrative descriptions and recordings are advantageous for providing contextual richness and detailed documentation of data generation processes. Logging methods, including log files and blockchain technology, allow for automatic paradata generation and for maintaining the integrity of the record. Data management plans and registered reports are examples of measures to prospectively generate potential paradata on forthcoming activities. Finally, facilitative workflow-based approaches are introduced for step-by-step modelling of practices and processes. Rather than suggesting that a single approach to generating and documenting paradata will suffice, we encourage users to consider a selective combination of approaches, facilitated by adequate institutional resources, technical and subject expertise, to enhance the understanding, transparency, reproducibility and credibility of paradata describing practices and processes.

The AI Act contains some specific provisions dealing with the possible use of artificial intelligence for discriminatory purposes or in discriminatory ways, in the context of the European Union. The AI Act also regulates generative AI models. However, these two respective sets of rules have little in common: provisions concerning non-discrimination tend not to cover generative AI, and generative AI rules tend not to cover discrimination. Based on this analysis, the Chapter considers what is currently the Eu legal framework on discriminatory output of generative AI models, and concludes that those expressions that are already prohibited by anti-discrimination law certainly remain prohibited after the approval of the AI Act, while discriminatory content that is not covered by Eu non-discrimination legislation will remain lawful. For the moment, the AI Act has not brought any particularly relevant innovation on this specific matter, but the picture might change in the future.

During the 1930s and early 1940s, numerous groups in Uruguay coalesced to oppose fascism. This chapter examines the antifascist efforts organized by ethnic societies, labor unions, women’s groups, Afro-Uruguayans, students, intellectuals, and artists, among others. The emergent antifascist movements in Uruguay served as nodes in the broader transnational struggle for democracy and against totalitarianism. While some Uruguayans traveled to Spain to directly take part in the Spanish Civil War, others sought to marshal support at home to combat the influence of European fascism. The ideological struggles in Europe were also pressing at home, as President Gabriel Terra initiated a dictatorship in the 1930s that revealed his supporters’ fascist leanings. Likewise, an engrained sense of national exceptionalism tied to Uruguay’s decades-long democratic tradition, augmented the need to resist Terra’s dictatorship (1933–38) and later to repudiate any remnants of its legacy.

The introduction addresses questions about Kant’s access to Stoic philosophy and other matters about Stoicism in his immediate intellectual context. After this biographical and historical contextualisation, the individual chapters are introduced.

This chapter examines the Jürgen Klopp era, focusing on nine key moments in his hugely successful time as LFC manager (2015-24). It culminates in the near-tragedy at the Champions League final in Paris in 2022, when Liverpool supporters drew lessons from history that UEFA failed to draw. In the process, they saved European football’s showpiece event from a disaster on the scale of Heysel and reaffirmed a post-Hillsborough reputation for holding the establishment to account for dangers and untruths that still too often threaten the modern fan.

This chapter situates Kant’s rejection of Stoic eudaimonism within his overarching anti-eudaimonist agenda. The chapter begins by emphasizing the importance of the Stoic tradition for Kant’s critical reception of ancient ethical theory. It then reconstructs the central commitments of ancient Stoic eudaimonism and of Christian Garve’s quasi-Stoic eudaimonism. Turning to Kant’s anti-Stoic argument in the Dialectic of the Second Critique, the chapter argues that the primary target of Kant’s error of subreption (vitium subreptionis) is the Stoic Seneca, specifically his account of joy (gaudium) as an accompaniment of one’s consciousness of virtuous activity. After reconstructing Kant’s argument in detail, the chapter offers a new way to understand its anti-eudaimonist implications: practical illusion leads the Stoic to rationalize and, ultimately, to disfigure the moral law. Even in their moral ardor – or, rather, propelled by it – the Stoic commits an error of self-love.

Chapter 6 examines Iranian cult and myth as evidenced in the Nart sagas of Transcaucasia, but also among Scythians as well as in Zoroastrian tradition, including the psychotropic cult substances Haoma (Iranian) and Soma (Indic). The Greek polis of Dioscurias in the Caucasus is explored as a place where Hellenic and Indo-Iranian divine-twin myth and cult affiliation meet, as indeed they do in the Pontic polis of Sinope. Aeolian connections are conspicuous at both locales.

Chapter 3 presents the case of Cameroon, a long-standing electoral autocracy in Central Africa. It provides a political history of the country, focused on the foundation, organization, and operations of Cameroon’s many political parties. It also elucidates the nature of Cameroon’s political geography, concluding with a section on the ways in which Cameroon may or may not be considered a “typical” case of electoral authoritarianism.

Kant’s account of the function of orientation vis-à-vis human agency has been the subject of a recent debate in the literature. On the reading this chapter puts forward, orientation consists in giving me a sense of myself and my activity in relation to the world so that I can reach the destination I have chosen. By contrast, Melissa Merritt has argued that orientating myself consists in having a sense of the direction I should follow in order to realize my rational vocation. This chapter revisits this debate by examining Kant’s notion of orientation through the prism of the Stoic notion of oikeiōsis. While Kant and the Stoics share the view that agency requires orientation and orientation requires a certain form of self-awareness, they disagree on the function of orientation, and locating the source of their disagreement will shed light on Kant’s account.