This chapter explores how the postcolonial predicament bequeathed by the British Empire challenges us to rethink conceptions of ‘postmodernism’ and ‘Britishness’. The specifically Anglo-American sense of the close connection between postmodernism and postcolonial studies is established via the identification of ‘grand narrative’ with the ‘civilising mission’, but this equation is problematised through a reading of Ian McEwan’s novel Saturday (2005) and a review of the changing history of British imperial ideology. A different approach to the interplay of fictive and historical narrative is identified in Ngugi we Thiong’o’s A Grain of Wheat (1967), a novel that locates characteristic postmodern concerns within the late colonial violence of the Kenyan Emergency. The novel is shown to anticipate a contemporary cultural moment in which postmodernism’s choreography of certainty and uncertainty proves increasingly ill-suited.

Policy stability and politicization are not dichotomous. Rather, both disruption of the carbon lock-in status quo and the generation of policy stability around transformation toward decarbonization are inherently political. The desired relationship between policy stability and politicization changes depending on the structural and institutional conditions in place that reinforce carbon lock-in or catalyze and scale decarbonization. In this chapter, we elaborate on the relationship between stability and politicization and discuss how these dynamics are captured by a phenomenon we call the carbon trap. We conclude with the suggestion that the concept and politics of just transition offer ways to understand and pursue desirable politicized disruption of carbon lock-in and to catalyze stable policies and systems around decarbonization.

This chapter argues that in the Late Antique notion of “the people,” a normative aspect is present: the people is not just a social designation, but also acquires a constitutional sense if a group of individuals puts itself in a relationship of justice with the emperor (or, for that matter, a bishop). Indeed, the notion of emperor and people are coconstitutive: the one cannot exist without the other. This helps us to understand the political role the people played in Late Antique society, in the absence of institutions such as voting assemblies through which it could express itself. Seen through this lens, riots are occasions when it was questioned if the ruler truly was just. If the relationship could not be mended, the people could favor someone else as ruler. Thus, although there were numerous riots in Late Antiquity, they never questioned the social system but only sought to establish a personal interaction that could ensure justice.

The chapter explores the regulation of professional tennis as a sub-species of transnational law and as part of the lex sportiva. It goes on to show how this transnational character plays out in disputes arising from regulatory matters and then moves on to ascertain the relationship among the three key tennis actors, namely the ITF, WTA and ATP. The chapter next explores the relationship between professional tennis and domestic law, including governance of the sport globally, as well as the relationship between national tennis federations and the ITF, and the latter’s relationship with the International Olympic Committee. The chapter further delves into the labor status of professional tennis players, as well as the relevance of international law in professional tennis, including the sport’s status in the Olympic Movement, as well as the human rights standard-setting role of transnational tennis entities.

This chapter aims to provide conceptual clarity on animals’ current legal status by addressing the long-debated question of whether they can have legal rights. By taking a legal positivist approach to legal rights, I suggest that there are no conceptual barriers to animal legal rights – whether we draw on the interest or the will theory of rights. Furthermore, by considering an example of animal welfare legislation that recognises the ‘intrinsic value’ of animals, we see evidence that certain animals already have legal rights. Nevertheless, even the strongest animal welfare laws are replete with exemptions that protect the interests of human individuals and industries that subject animals to poor levels of welfare or outright cruelty. As such, the legal rights that animals do have are weak. Finally, the chapter addresses three counters to the claim that animals have legal rights: welfare, enforcement, and personhood objections. With none of these objections posing a fatal challenge to animals’ legal rights, we can move on to the next chapter to consider what, precisely, is in the way of animals’ greater legal inclusion if not their rightlessness per se.

The first instalment of Zola’s novel Vérité appeared on 10 September 1902, just nineteen days before the author died under suspicious circumstances that were likely related to his involvement in the Dreyfus Affair. The novel provided an allegorical transposition of the contemporary political drama that had divided the nation, but which, as yet, had been denied its proper dénouement. This chapter explores how Zola imagined the right and just resolution of the legal case, as well as of the national crisis it galvanised. Working across Zola’s journalistic and fictional versions of the Affair, it argues that Zola understood the Dreyfus case as an aesthetic problem: as a matter of style, taste, plot, and plausibility. In order for the truth to win out, Zola must imagine the aesthetic and ethical re-education of a nation; and this happy ending involves harnessing an acceptable version of the idealist imagination.

Norway is an active player in international climate politics, with strong consensus on the issue underpinned by cross-party Climate Settlements. Despite this, Norway has only marginally reduced its domestic greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, attempts to establish a new Climate Settlement in 2021 failed. Does this failure constitute a break with Norway’s consensual climate tradition, and is this good or bad news for climate policy? In this chapter, we investigate whether and to what extent the consensus characterizing the 2000s and 2010s contributed to climate policy development or stasis. Focusing on two key sectors – petroleum and transport – we find that key Norwegian climate policies have developed through a dynamic tension of depoliticization and repoliticization over time, with mixed effects. We identify reasons for depoliticization and repoliticization and argue that it is useful to embrace agnosticism in the debate over politicization versus policy stability, instead exploring this on an empirical and contextual basis. Moreover, we uncover a dynamic of politicization in one policy area affecting policy development in another, arguing that such spillover effects warrant analytical attention.

This chapter traces a series of stark, occasionally stunning historical reversals by the Supreme Court in interpreting the Free Speech Clause. It highlights doctrines under which the Court treats almost all content-based regulation of speech as constitutionally suspect. That position, which draws little support from research into original constitutional understandings, reflects a commitment – increasingly embraced by conservative justices of a libertarian stripe – to the principle that the Free Speech Clause bars the government from censoring speech based on fears that the speech might prove persuasive to its audience. The resulting doctrine, which makes the United States an outlier among liberal democracies, provides robust protection for a good deal of “hate speech,” some outright lies, commercial advertising, and corporate expenditures to promote political candidates. This chapter also discusses cases that have held that the Free Speech Clause protects a right to “freedom of association” that lacks any clear textual basis. It concludes by considering cases involving speech rights in “managerial domains” in which the government performs functions, such as providing public education, that it could not perform successfully without engaging in content-based regulation of speech.

This chapter looks at the work and critical reception of B.S. Johnson (1933-73), focusing on the influence that the development of the critical term postmodernism on his reputation by dividing it into three stages of two decades each: before postmodernism (1960-1980), during postmodernism (1980-2000) and after postmodernism (2000 to present). It argues that Johnson’s career was essentially proto-postmodernist, engaged in a struggle to undermine the realist hegemony of the 1960s, but that the theoretical concerns of postmodern writing were at odds with his own and it was never a term he used or had the opportunity to refute. As a result his work remained unassimilable while postmodernism held sway and only later- with the aid of a biography- could criticism get to grips with Johnson’s double-coded rejection of convention and commitment to his own brand of social realism.

This chapter examines the Supreme Court’s historically evolving interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, including its recent embrace of the view – initially uttered by a solitary dissenter in an 1896 decision in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson – that “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind.” In equal protection cases, the Court has rarely claimed originalist support for its decisions, even when effecting sharp changes of course, as in its iconic decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). In a recurring pattern, the Court’s leading equal protection decisions have condemned forms of discrimination –– first on the basis of race, then sex, and then sexual orientation –– only when public opinion began to view them as unjustifiably bigoted. This chapter analyzes the Court’s recent decision to invalidate practices of affirmative action in higher education that prior decisions had permitted for more than forty years. It also surveys a branch of equal protection doctrine that strictly scrutinizes deprivations of rights that the Court deems “fundamental” under the Equal Protection Clause, centrally including voting rights. It explains continuities, but also revealing disparities, between the approaches to voting rights of the liberal Warren Court, on the one hand, and the conservative modern Court, on the other.

This chapter examines the serialization of Ulysses in The Little Review (New York) and The Egoist (London). Each and every issue of The Egoist and The Little Review in which Ulysses appears has a specific geography, cultural meaning, and temporality. Though there are overviews dealing with the whole process of serialization, the significance of the individual periodical issues in which Ulysses appeared has not been closely examined, particularly in respect of The Egoist. This chapter pays close attention to the contexts of periodical publication, including editorial matters, and focuses in particular on early versions and revisions to the episode ‘Nestor’.

How can the state make durable policies and control resistance of incumbent fossil fuel interests for rapid decarbonization? Through the lens of policy feedback and coalitions, we argue that in certain contexts the state can manage political conflicts to ensure durable policies for decarbonization. We use the case of China – the world’s largest carbon emitter with a political economy system where the state has large influence on the market – to illustrate the possibility of conflict management for energy transition. We show how the central government has used regulatory power to induce big power companies to shift away from fossil fuels toward renewable energies. Reflecting upon the Chinese case, we identify some conditions under which the state can redirect the interest of incumbent actors toward net zero transition. Our study suggests that while political conflicts are inevitable to combat climate change, policymakers can strategically manage them to deepen and accelerate transition.

This chapter surveys the Supreme Court’s evolving role and interpretive approaches during five historical eras leading up to the present one. During the chief justiceship of John Marshall (1801–35), the Court rendered important decisions and issued expansive interpretations of judicial power and national legislative authority that today are viewed as cornerstones of the constitutional order. The succeeding era under Chief Justice Roger Taney (1836–64) brought the fiasco of Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), which held that Congress had no power to regulate slavery in the territories, and the erosion of judicial authority during the Civil War. During the Lochner era (1865–1937), the Court recoiled from enforcing Reconstruction Amendments that had enshrined rights of racial minorities while simultaneously taking aggressive steps to shield businesses from regulatory legislation. The ensuing era (1937–69) began with the collapse of judicial resistance to economic regulatory legislation during the New Deal and continued as the Court under the leadership of Earl Warren expanded the rights of racial and other minorities. During the post-Warren period (1969–2016), the Court, like the country, turned to the right. Nonetheless, many liberal decisions endured, and the Court upheld abortion rights, permitted affirmative action, and established a right to gay marriage.