Kant thinks it is possible to achieve nonperceptual cognition in three ways: (1) through practical action, (2) by analogy, and (3) through construction. The type of cognition available depends on the kind of object or concept being cognized. The fact that cognition of nonperceptual objects is possible in some cases opens the way for thought experiments to provide cognition in ways that go beyond providing fictional examples and exemplifications. In this chapter, I describe these other possibilities for cognition and show how they are at work in different kinds of thought experiments in philosophy.

Having discussed the main limitations of current approaches in theorizing international organizations, this chapter goes on to investigate their core assumptions about the state. These are the notions that the state can be analogized to the ‘natural’ person of domestic law and that it forms an opaque and closed-off unitary actor. This chapter goes on to explain how this image may inadvertently distort how international organizations are theorized – from how we are to understand the relationship with their members to more technical questions of customary international law. Concluding this chapter, I suggest that theorizing international organizations should proceed from an altogether different premise. This is the idea the state itself is an artificial entity rather than a somehow naturally irreducible one.

This chapter examines courtroom documents, focusing on trials and depositions, which offer glimpses of spoken language of the past. Trials written in English, often in the form of questions and answers, are rare before the late sixteenth century. Depositions, the oral testimony of a witness recorded by a scribe prior to trial and used as evidence, become more available in English from the mid sixteenth century. Trials and depositions exist as manuscripts, contemporaneous printed texts and later printed editions, and have recently become accessible through corpora and modern linguistic editions. Manuscripts (already one step beyond the original speech event) are less susceptible to interference by editors, printers and so on, but even these texts should not be treated as verbatim records. Nevertheless, the texts supply valuable data for researchers taking historical pragmatic and sociolinguistic approaches and/or examining linguistic variation and change, and in a wide range of other areas.

Chapter 6 examines the Sectarians’ portrait of the end-time destruction of its enemies. The depictions of eschatological violence offer insights into how the Sectarians responded to their present overmatched position while simultaneously affirming their special status. Sectarian texts imagine an imminent end of days that would usher in a period in which all of its enemies – both foreigners and other Jews – would be vanquished in the end-time battle.

In this chapter, I argue for the importance of two models in explorations of orality in the history of English: communicative immediacy and ‘oral/conversational diagnostics’, within the framework of oral vs. literate/production styles. Based on the two models, I identify certain (sub)registers and genres as reference points for assessing the nature of orality reflected in historical linguistic data. In addition, I use the major conclusions of the ‘bad’ data debate, foundational for historical pragmatics, as a springboard for a selective survey of research focused on interjections, speech acts, and specific discourse domains and genres such as wills, courtroom discourse and letters. Potential directions for future research and new data sources are also provided to indicate gaps in the coverage of historical oralities in English.

This article discusses how two late nineteenth-century public intellectuals, based respectively in Portugal and Brazil, co-opted Shakespeare into discussions that involved reimagining the communities they addressed – at a crucial point in their social, political and constitutional histories.

What is the best way to assess the role of religion in nineteenth-century India? Should it be defined by texts? Rituals and religious practice? Reform movements? Distinctive histories of each religious community? Given how multi-faceted religious experience has been and continues to be in India, the question compels no easy answer. Also, given the numerous nationalist uses of nominally religious symbols and references, the importance of defining its historical contours and boundaries has become only more prominent in recent years. Outside simplistic models of nationalism, communalism, or political ideologies that use religion as a rallying cry, how do we begin to understand the role of religion in modern Indian history? If we start with Shashi Tharoor, a prominent public intellectual, one answer would be an affirmative celebration of being Hindu, based on a notion of Hinduism as a transcendental philosophy.1 If one looks elsewhere, such as to the rich world of Dalit and anti-caste activism, what sorts of answers would we find to that question? Kancha Ilaiah Shepherd, another public intellectual, would answer that religion in India cannot be imagined outside of caste, hierarchy, and violence.2

These works both generated a fair amount of press in the various public spheres of India and raised questions for any student of religion in India. Is Hinduism, as Tharoor claims, a “tolerant” religion? When viewed from the history of religions, how shall Hinduism be distinguished from the various appropriations of it in the guise of Hindu nationalism?

This chapter discusses health insurance, including its sources (public and private) in the US and the unique quirks introduced by employer-sponsored insurance. Employer purchasing of health insurance on behalf of employees likely induces a decrease in monetary wages, so employees are paying for much of this out of their own pockets. This is due to the federal tax exclusion of fringe benefits, such that it is cheaper for employers to compensate their employees in health insurance than in monetary salary. The chapter also discusses selection, risk pooling, and coverage options in large group health insurance, as individuals will likely choose jobs with health packages that maximize their own utility, which can lead to adverse selection of which managers should be aware. The chapter concludes by addressing Medicaid and Medicare as the other two arms of insurance in the US, with a final word of caution that our private-centric system may be unstable to future political pressures.

This chapter proposes that thought experiments are a cognitive apparatus and situates this view among contemporary accounts of thought experiment. I set forward the project of the book, which is to (1) propose a new account of thought experiments as a method and (2) trace the historical foundations of the term and concept of “thought experiment” from Kant through Ørsted to Kierkegaard. I define “cognition” [Erkenntnis] for Kant as a synthesis of concepts with intuitions and propose that Kierkegaard, like Kant and Ørsted, views thought experiments as useful for achieving cognitions. I introduce the term Tanke-experiment in Kierkegaard and suggest why it has been little emphasized by Kierkegaard scholars and remains widely unacknowledged in contemporary descriptions of the history of thought experiment.

The US corporate tax is over 100 years old, and many academic observers have doubted its value. The standard explanation for why we tax corporations is that it is an indirect tax on shareholders, but that is not a valid reason to have a corporate tax because (a) shareholders can be taxed directly and (b) many shareholders are tax-exempt and should not be taxed at all. However, there is another reason to tax corporations, which was in fact the original rationale why we adopted the corporate tax in 1909: to limit the power of large monopolistic corporations and regulate their activities. If that is the reason for the corporate tax, the US should have a different tax structure than the current 21 percent flat tax. The corporate tax should be set at zero for normal returns and at a sharply progressive rate for supernormal returns (rents).

Chapter 3 examines the history of the clean energy regime complex, which sets the stage to delve into questions of its effectiveness in later chapters. This chapter traces the role played by states, multilateral and bilateral organizations, transnational initiatives, and norm diffusion in driving regime complex emergence over the three periods of analysis (Period 1: 1980–2001, Period 2: 2002–2008, Period 3: 2009–2023). The chapter demonstrates that diverging state interests alone do not explain the regime complex’s emergence, but that organizational expansion, transnational actor agency, normative change, and institutional interplay all contribute to its formation.

This chapter analyzes Stages on Life’s Way as an extended thought experiment. Though it has some similarities with a literary work of art and is sometimes called a novel, I distinguish extended thought experiment narratives like Stages from literary novels. I will show how Stages, like Repetition, embodies and develops Ørsted’s core elements of variation, active constitution, and the pursuit of genuine thought. I will also contrast Stages as a “psychological experiment” with the field of empirical psychology emerging in the 1800s. Against increasing interest in empirical observation, Kierkegaard’s thought experiments direct attention to what is not outwardly observable.

Global value chains (GVCs) are a manifestation of the contemporary global political economy. Viewing them solely as economic constructs, however, obscures the role that law and the wider regulatory environment play in their development and facilitation. The issue of modern slavery within GVCs has been the subject of careful scrutiny from a variety of legal sub-disciplines, including labour, welfare, and immigration law. In this chapter, I examine the role of company law, and particularly the fiduciary duty of directors to act in the interests of the company, in creating conditions under which modern slavery flourishes in GVCs. I suggest that the ideology of shareholder primacy that helps shape board decision-making is flawed both normatively and as a matter of legal doctrine. The central argument advanced is that shareholders’ interests are typically treated as a proxy for a company's interests due to the ambiguity in defining what it means to act in the interests of the company as a legal construct. Yet this focus on prioritizing the interests of shareholders can motivate lead companies’ directors to make decisions that deliver investor returns at the expense of fundamental labour rights and human dignity. The chapter concludes by exploring the potential of incorporating principles of proportionality into board decision-making. It is suggested that this approach can enhance directors’ knowledge and awareness of balancing competing interests, thereby avoiding the most egregious abuses of corporate power in the pursuit of profit.

Introduction

Writing in 2016, the IGLP Law and Global Production Working Group (the IGLP Working Group) observed that residing ‘at the heart of the GVC phenomenon’, law serves as ‘the vehicle through which value is generated, captured, and distributed within and between organizational and jurisdictional domains, and diverse and geographically disparate business operations are coordinated and governed’ (IGLP, 2016: 61). Law and the wider regulatory environment, comprising a complex mix of national, transnational, hard law, and soft law norms, are concerned with GVCs in numerous ways that influence the organization of GVCs. Company law is typically considered to be implicated in GVCs insofar as it shapes the structuring of activities within a chain and the liability (or lack thereof) of investors.

This chapter critically examines how international lawyers have conceptualized the structural relationship between organizations and their members. First, it argues that popular accounts behind the notion that international organizations enjoy a personality that is opposable to non-members rest on problematic, and ultimately unproven, assumption. Next, the chapter explores the idea of volonté distincte. This is the notion that international organizations must exhibit a will of their own before they can be thought of as distinct from their members. The chapter zeroes in on the discipline’s most commonly employed test in this respect, namely checking the capacity of an organization to adopt decisions without the consent of all of its members. It argues that, on closer inspection, this test turns out to be incoherent and cannot serve the purpose it was devised for.