This chapter explores the cross-cultural dissemination of Arthurian literature through the lens of a single case study: the lai of Lanval, attributed to Marie de France. It begins by discussing the figure of Marie, her works, and her compositional practice, situated in the wider twelfth-century contexts of multilingual, cross-Channel literary cultures and the development of Arthurian narratives and vernacular literary forms. The study then considers the dissemination of Lanval in terms of its manuscript tradition, as well as through analogues, adaptations, translations, and other textual traces or allusions. As such, the study follows both Lanval and Lanval across medieval Europe, through the Welsh Marches, England, northern France, Flanders, Norway, Swabia and Austria.

According to Dazai Shundai, ritual and music are essential elements of the government of the sages. They complement each other, with ritual drawing strict distinctions of status and establishing ethical standards for different types of human relationships, while music functions as a gentle force for bringing people together in harmony. Compared with other methods of governing, the superiority of ritual and music lies in their ability to enter people on a deep level and transform their customs, creating long-lasting stability without the need to rely solely on explicit laws. In order for ritual and music to work properly, though, they must be established by rulers who look back to the traditions of the ancient Chinese sage kings. In earlier times, Japan learned such ritual and music from China and used these to govern, but in recent times, vulgar ritual and music have arisen from among the common people, with detrimental effects for Japanese society. To remedy this situation, vulgar ritual and music need to be suppressed and replaced with proper ritual and music.

This chapter presents agreements between Indigenous peoples and governments, specifically those in Bangladesh and Mexico that focus on their roles in promoting sustainable development. The introduction sets the stage for subsequent discussions by emphasizing the importance of global legal and policy frameworks in shaping these agreements, with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The two case studies from Bangladesh and Mexico are then analysed, shedding light on the unique characteristics, provisions, and outcomes of agreements between Indigenous peoples and governments in these contexts. A comparative analysis is conducted to identify commonalities, differences, and lessons learned from these case studies. Ultimately, the chapter concludes by highlighting the significance of ongoing dialogue, collaboration, and respect for Indigenous rights in achieving sustainable development goals globally. It underscores the importance of incorporating Indigenous perspectives and aspirations into the design and implementation of such agreements.

The origins of Arthur are in the Welsh language, and this chapter presents the Welsh Arthur from those origins to the end of the Middle Ages and beyond. While Geoffrey of Monmouth reconfigured the Arthur he found, propelling him into a new trajectory, the Galfridian route does not provide the telos for the Welsh material: the most important manuscripts of the period show court poets and prose writers engaging self-consciously with traditions old and new, aware of the colonial implications of French and English Arthurs, and energetically navigating strategies of irony, satire, postcolonial reimagining and culturally confident re-engagement with the pre-Galfridian (and pre-Chrétien). Arthur is at once signifier of the ‘Britain’ of the bards (a half-imagined Welsh-speaking Britain, inheritor of Romanitas) and a field of signification on which to project contemporary political realities, over the best part of a good millennium.

On a cold and snowy day in March, I met Isaac Levi (1930–2018) in his New York City home. Their friendly dog welcomed me exstatically when I entered their Upper West Side apartment near Columbia University. While he had long passed his eightieth birthday, Levi was still attending talks and seminars at the philosophy department when we met and was known as an active and provocative discussant with strong opinions. I met Levi a few months before his eighty-fourth birthday. He accompanied me into the living room, offered coffee, and then we started talking. Levi was extremely sharp and critical but also very funny and witty; three hours passed so quickly, I had not even noticed that the batteries of my recording had given up. Our conversation confirmed that he has been one of the most important formal epistemologists and decision theorists in philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century. Notably, Levi had turned slightly cynical, however, obviously affected by the fact that decision theorists might not have given his contributions the attention that he had sought for throughout his career.

Creative engagement with the Arthurian myth has been prolific in the modern period and shows no sign of abating. This chapter provides a panoramic shot, an overview of how and where the Arthurian myth surfaces in texts in English in Great Britain and Ireland from 1920 to the present. Additionally, it provides close-ups, more detailed readings of selected works that capture the critical concerns of modern artists and their audiences, foregrounding especially trauma and the impacts of war and industrialised culture; expressions of the interconnectedness between all living things, often in response to contextual ecopolitical crises; and human interactions, including tragic relationships and empowering female networks. The discussion breaks materials into broad categories that are loosely determined by form – poetry, prose and drama – and moves between foundational works and newer narratives. Where possible, the discussion foregrounds Arthuriana that has previously received little or no attention, especially works by women.

The manageability of the technical obstacles set out in Chapter 4 established, this chapter turns to the adaptive challenges amalgamation faces – most notably its inconceivability to the judiciary. The chapter details the maladaptive constraints that underlie the constitutional drafters’ and legal establishment’s resistance to embracing vernacular law as part of South Africa’s ‘law of general application’ or ‘common law’, as well as the urgency of overcoming such resistance. Depicting the severe decline in institutional trust and rising support for undemocratic governance amidst the public’s waning hopes of material security, the chapter argues that, to strengthen South Africa’s rule of law, constitutionalism must be founded on the vernacular legal traditions that resonate with everyday South Africans, who often feel alienated by a legal system rooted in ‘uncommon’ law. Alter-Native Constitutionalism offers a sustainable path to transformation that would counteract public disillusionment with a constitutionalism that embraces rigid colonial precedents and simultaneously restore trust in the judiciary as the last line of defence. The chapter therefore argues for judicial praxis that re-envisions courts as mediators supporting collective agency, rather than mere adjudicators, thus fostering a relational approach aligning with Ubu-Ntu and honoring the country’s diverse normative traditions and social justice aspirations.

There are significant ambiguities in how “atheism” is to be understood or interpreted. Having considered these, we turn to Hume’s arguments and assess to what extent his views in the Dialogues should be interpreted in these terms. While it is evident that Hume opposed “superstition” and that he was, in this sense, plainly an irreligious thinker, this does not settle the question of his “atheism”. Although Hume has been read by some as an theist of a minimal kind, and by others as a sceptic or agnostic, both these accounts are rejected. Hume was, it is argued, a “hard sceptical atheist”, by which we understand him to take the view that we have probable (non-dogmatic) grounds for denying the theist hypothesis in all its forms. His “speculative atheism” is accompanied by a “practical atheism” which, while firmly opposed “superstition”, is willing to ally itself with both sceptics and those theists (or deists) who share Hume’s opposition to “superstition”.

I take this chapter as an opportunity to ask what Hume might think of rational religious belief given developments in philosophy of religion, epistemology and contemporary cognitive science of religion (which explores the natural roots of religion). To that end, I will consider some basic findings in the cognitive science of religion concerning the origins of religion in human nature. I will also reflect on some significant developments in twentieth-Century philosophy, including recent developments in religious epistemology, that I think Hume might have found insightful. I will argue that twenty-first-century Hume, perhaps ironically in line with the thought of Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (who in turn align themselves with Thomas Reid), would defend rational belief in God.