This chapter focuses on the Ethiopian government's successful use of debt-based financial statecraft. It examines Ethiopia's shift from heavy reliance on traditional donor aid to borrowing from Chinese lenders and issuing a debut international bond. Using interviews with government and donor officials, it highlights how this diversification of external finance allowed the Ethiopian government to obtain more favorable terms in aid agreements, including lenience from donors on governance issues, flexibility on economic monitoring, and donor support for the government's state-led approach to development. When Ethiopia's financing options later narrowed, the government's bargaining leverage with donors declined, further corroborating the role of alternative finance in aid negotiations. The chapter underscores the importance of donors' perceptions of Ethiopia's strategic value and donors' trust in the government for their willingness to accommodate the Ethiopian government's preferences.

This chapter describes the book's case study approach, which compares Ethiopia, Ghana, and Kenya. All three countries experienced the regional trend of increased borrowing from China and in international bond markets in the 2000s. However, the countries vary in strategic significance and donor trust, allowing for tests of heterogeneity in the financial statecraft of borrowers. The chapter discusses the data collection process for the case studies, with over 170 elite interviews, mostly with government and donor officials participating in aid negotiations, and how this data is used to trace debt-based financial statecraft in each country. The chapter briefly provides background on each country's political and economic context and previews findings on how their external finance portfolios impacted aid negotiations with traditional donors.

This chapter outlines the theoretical framework of the financial statecraft of borrowers, drawing on bargaining frameworks to develop expectations for how a diversified portfolio of external finance enhances a country's leverage in aid negotiations with traditional donors. The chapter begins with donors' and recipients' preferences in negotiations, highlighting that donors have strategic and institutional reasons to provide development assistance, which leads them to compete in a marketplace for aid. When recipient countries diversify their portfolios of external finance, this diminishes their reliance on traditional donors and donors risk losing influence, in turn encouraging donors to provide more attractive aid. However, recipients vary in their ability to exploit this leverage, which depends on their strategic significance to donors and donor trust in their credibility.

Against the dominant tendencies to either overlook the interwar period, or to dismiss it as dead-end conservative nationalism irrelevant to the important history that will unfold after WWII, this chapter reveals it as an engagement with problems of ongoing relevance in Ghana. Resting on different ideas about Akan culture and political values, thus chiefs, the debates are conscious of contemporary thinking in the wider world, and based on different opinions about how to go forward. It is a defining moment in time when the notion of Akan homogeneity enmeshed debaters in personality squabbles, factional and party rivalry. The chapter employs Emma Hunter’s insight about other liberalisms, arguing that the debaters had a vision that employed an older but still relevant communal, group rights liberal vision. This connects them to the contemporary, and removes them from the place they are often placed: as backward looking and refusing to think constructively.

The label “cultural nationalist,” deployed by David Kimble in 1963 continues to be used by scholars to describe early Gold Coast intellectuals. Kimble and others like Kweku Larbi Korang assumed that nationalism in the Gold Coast was a continuum of anti-colonial “resentment and criticism.” Contrary to the theme of the early twentieth century as a period of cultural nationalism and of opposition to colonialism, it was a period of constructive criticism of an inchoate colonial system and advocacy for synthesis of local customs within a liberal imperial frame. Regarding the intellectuals as anti-colonial cultural nationalists proved difficult because of their apparent pro imperial statements and actions. Critics disparaged the intellectuals as motivated by self-preservation, blindly pro-colonial, deluded, or traitorous to their culture. So-called cultural nationalists can be more properly understood by not assuming Kimble’s unchanging problematic and recognising the British presence then, now homogenized as “colonialism,” as something less cogent.

The introduction previews the argument that developing countries can use borrowing relationships to their advantage. It situates this argument about the financial statecraft of borrowers within the literature on sovereign debt, foreign aid, and African politics. It explains the specific focus on sub-Saharan Africa by outlining three dynamics that enabled African governments to diversify their portfolios of external finance in the early twenty-first century: debt relief, Chinese lending, and liquidity in international bond markets. The chapter describes the book's mixed-methods research design, combining statistical analysis of the terms of aid agreements with three case studies of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Ghana. Finally, the chapter highlights how the financial statecraft of borrowers contributes to debates on financial interdependence, multipolarity, and the agency of developing countries.