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Chapter 4 is devoted to technical solutions to rectify AI risks and harms. AI for social good projects, human-in-the-loop solutions, de-biasing, AI-generated text, image, and voice detection and testing are presented as potential technical fixes. Detecting AI-generated content remains a major challenge. Human-in-the-loop solutions and testing have proven to be such common-sense practices that they are promoted by AI-producing or -using businesses themselves as well as by laws. AI for social good projects and de-biasing produce a positive impact, but there seems to be a gap between expectations and reality. As is documented throughout this book, the roots of AI risks and harms are not technical; therefore, technical solutions cannot bring about transformative change in the face of AI risks and harms.
Although traditional game theory has a tendency to study games in isolation, strategic interaction in human society involves people engaged in numerous interrelated constellations over time. This chapter studies the role of sanctions and enforcement, and strategies not just to play the game that society presents us with but to change the game itself.
Forcing is extensively used in computability and computable structure theory. We use it to show various classical computable structure theory results.The version we developed here is only aesthetically new, and matches the style of the definitions of the book.
A pervasive assumption in game theory is that players’ utilities are concave, or at least quasiconcave, with respect to their own strategies. While mathematically instrumental, enabling the existence of many kinds of equilibria in many kinds of settings, (quasi)concavity of payoffs is too restrictive an assumption. For the same reasons that (quasi)concave utilities can only go so far in capturing single-agent optimization problems, they can only go so far in modeling the considerations of an agent in a strategic interaction. Besides, the study of games with nonconcave utilities is increasingly coming to the fore as deep learning ventures into multiagent learning applications. This chapter studies whcih types of equilibria exist in such games, and whether they are computationally tractable, proposing paths for game theory and multiagent learning in the next 100 years.
It is well known that any higher-order Markov chain can be associated with a first-order Markov chain. In this primarily expository article, we present the first fairly comprehensive analysis of the relationship between higher-order and first-order Markov chains, together with illustrative examples. Our main objective is to address the central question as posed in the title.