Climate change presents significant risks to economic and financial stability, compelling central banks to address its impacts on inflation and output. As climate-induced disruptions – such as extreme weather events and carbon taxes – affect price stability, central banks must adapt their monetary policies to mitigate these risks. Climate change can trigger inflationary pressures, alter labor productivity, and impact capital stocks, influencing the natural interest rate and overall supply. The ecological transition also poses challenges, potentially causing stagflationary episodes that complicate central banks’ dual mandates of price and output stability. Consequently, central banks are increasingly integrating climate risks into their frameworks, with the aim of maintaining their inflation-targeting objectives while supporting the green transition. Effective policy responses require a deep understanding of climate-related risks, enabling central banks to adjust their monetary tools and align their operations with sustainability goals. Addressing these challenges becomes essential to strengthening economic resilience in the face of climate change.

Although coal, fossil gas, oil, and bioenergy have provided energy that has helped societies until today, such energy has come at a cost, namely increased air pollution, ground and water contamination, land despoilment, global warming, and energy insecurity. While such a cost was accepted in the past, much of the public can no longer stomach the continuous death and illness caused by air pollution from these fuels. Scientists and policymakers similarly no longer believe society can maintain a safe climate and function securely if these fuels continue to be used.

Realizing that it needs to adapt if it wants to stay in business, the fossil-fuel industry first proposed replacing coal with fossil gas as a “bridge fuel” to renewables. It then supported the development of four technologies that it argued would help reduce carbon emissions: carbon capture, synthetic direct air carbon capture, blue hydrogen, and carbon-based electro-fuels. If adopted, these technologies would permit the industry to continue producing fossil fuels in-perpetuity. Similarly, the agriculture industry argued that, because biomass, biofuels, and biogas were all renewable fuels, the industry should be allowed to continue producing energy, especially if carbon capture were added to some of their facilities. Lastly, the nuclear industry, which has suffered slowing development, rising costs, a major meltdown, and unresolved waste issues since 2000, made a concerted effort to be part of the solution by proposing the use of new small and large nuclear reactors. Because the fossil-fuel, agriculture, and nuclear lobbies are strong in many countries, the solutions proposed by these lobbies were incorporated, along with WWS technologies, into “all-of-the-above” policies to address climate change. “All-of-the-above” policies involve promoting nearly all technologies, regardless of their air-pollution impacts, carbon emissions, security risk, cost, effectiveness, or length of time between planning and operation, that allege to address climate. An addition technological fix added to the mix was geoengineering, which consists of a variety of measures largely to increase the reflectivity (albedo) of the Earth to cool the Earth’s surface.

However, all of these non-WWS “miracle” technologies result in greater global warming, air pollution, land degradation, and/or all three compared with WWS alone. Some of these technologies increase energy insecurity and/or take up to 23 years between planning and operation while costing substantially more than WWS technologies. As such, they are opportunity costs compared with investing in WWS, so are not recommended. This chapter discusses these non-WWS technologies and delineates the reasons why they are not needed or helpful for solving global warming, air pollution, and/or energy-security problems.

So far, this book has examined the main technologies needed for a 100 percent clean, renewable energy and storage system. Virtually all of these technologies exist today, and none is a miracle technology. This chapter focuses on combining the technologies together in countries, states, cities, and towns to provide end-point roadmaps for a transition. Such roadmaps provide targets for meeting energy demand among all energy sectors with 100 percent WWS in the annual average by some year, often 2050, but ideally sooner, such as 2035. Chapter 13 discusses methods of matching power demand continuously (rather than in the annual average) with WWS supply, storage, and demand response. Roadmaps and grid stability analyses are helpful for giving policymakers, utilities, and the public confidence that a transition will not cause grid failures, particularly during extreme weather events.

WWS technologies eliminate energy-related emissions of air pollutants that affect health and climate. Energy-related emissions are responsible for about 90 percent of anthropogenic air-pollution health problems worldwide and 75–80 percent of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. As such, some emissions that affect human health and climate do not come from energy sources, but they must still be reduced or eliminated in order to help solve the air-pollution and climate problems the world faces. Such nonenergy emissions include gases and particles from open biomass burning; methane from agriculture and landfill waste; halogens from leaks and their reckless disposal; and nitrous oxide from fertilizers, industry, and wastewater treatment. This chapter discusses these sources of emissions and methods of controlling them.

Climate finance has grown significantly in recent years, reaching $1.8 trillion in 2023. However, this remains insufficient to meet the Paris Agreement's temperature goals, particularly with net-zero emissions by 2050 requiring an annual investment of $5 trillion. Current investments in renewable energy remain lower than those in fossil fuels, contributing to a substantial global investment gap. While redirecting investments from carbon-intensive sectors could reduce this gap, the remaining shortfall is still projected at 2 percent to 3 percent of global GDP annually. Emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs), face greater financial constraints in addressing climate challenges, with most climate finance concentrated in developed regions and China. Despite sufficient liquidity in global capital markets, private sector contributions to climate finance in these regions remain low, often due to limited fiscal space and financing access. Innovative financing solutions and public–private partnerships are critical to mobilize the necessary resources for green investments and climate adaptation in these vulnerable regions.

Emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) face significant obstacles in attracting the capital necessary to achieve climate and development goals, requiring at least $1 trillion annually for a successful green transition. Investment needs escalate further when adaptation and resilience measures are included, placing vulnerable populations at greater risk despite their minimal contributions to climate change. Current climate financing to EMDEs is insufficient, primarily public, focused on mitigation over adaptation, and often delivered as debt. Barriers such as high credit risk and regulatory uncertainties exacerbate the investment gap. Thus, private sector engagement is crucial to meet the Paris Agreement targets. Innovative financial strategies, including blended finance, can mobilize private capital by using concessional funds to enhance project viability. A coordinated global approach, involving partnerships among governments, international financial institutions, and the private sector, is essential for effectively addressing climate investment needs and fostering sustainable development in EMDEs.

Since the early 2000s, substantial progress has been made toward raising awareness about the need for a rapid transition to WWS. A movement toward 100 percent clean, renewable energy has begun. Popular support for such a transition has grown, as have the numbers of laws and commitments furthering that goal. Such commitments have been made by cities, states, provinces, countries, international businesses, nonprofits, community groups, policymakers, and individuals. This chapter discusses my personal journey to develop and implement 100 percent WWS roadmaps, and how these roadmaps and collaborations with other scientists, cultural influencers, business leaders, and community leaders have helped to shape the 100 percent WWS movement.

The transition to a low-carbon economy requires a transformative shift akin to past industrial revolutions. This shift involves three key changes: redirecting corporate investment toward green technologies, reallocating capital from carbon-intensive industries, and adjusting household consumption toward sustainable practices, potentially affecting productivity, growth, and well-being. The process will incur short-term economic costs as investment is redirected, leading to stranded assets and slowed productivity. Additionally, global disparities in transition policies may also distort competitiveness and reshape trade patterns. Despite these challenges, the long-term potential for green growth remains promising, as falling renewable energy costs suggest that sustainable growth could eventually surpass that of fossil fuel-based economies. However, during the transition, the focus on environmental investments may not immediately expand production capacity, resulting in temporary economic and social costs.

The solution to global warming, air pollution, and energy security requires not only a technical and economic roadmap but also popular support, political will, and a rapid rollout of the solution. In fact, the main barriers to transitioning to 100 percent clean, renewable energy are neither technical nor economic; instead, they are social and political. People need to be confident that a solution is possible, to understand what changes they can make in their own lives to solve the problems, to make such changes, and to support policymakers in passing laws to speed a transition. Policymakers, themselves, need to understand the urgency, and therefore take bold steps. One of the most important factors leading to a change is education about what is needed and how fast it is needed. This chapter discusses the necessary timeline for a transition, obstacles in the way of meeting the timeline, actions that individuals can take, and policies that are needed to overcome the obstacles to reach the 100 percent goal on time.