This paper invites reflection on the nature and role of visual illustration in economics, through a historical account of the “Hayekian triangle,” a graphical representation devised by Friedrich A. Hayek to depict the structure of production and introduced in his 1931 book Prices and Production. Tracing its origins back to Hayek’s earlier “schemes” in 1929, the paper then examines the triangle’s evolution and its applications in visualizing economic phenomena such as capital accumulation and business cycles. The paper also highlights key developments by contemporaries and successors, such as Evan F. M. Durbin, Murray N. Rothbard, and Roger W. Garrison, as well as more recent formalizations that integrate mathematical precision.

From the 1960s, the rising volatility of financial markets in the US troubled econometricians and bank managers alike. Both found it increasingly difficult to forecast savings deposit flows. This article explores these challenges by focusing on two developments. First, it analyzes the adjustment process among econometric models of the savings deposit market. I combine the analysis of the FMP model used by the Fed since 1970 and the deposit model of the Philadelphia Saving Fund Society (PSFS), thereby pioneering the historical analysis of econometric models built by private financial institutions. I find that economists failed to discover timeless determinants for deposit flows. Second, I explore how the conditions of the savings deposit market shaped the demand for macroeconomic forecast models, using the PSFS as a case study. I show that while the rising volatility led bank managers to seek sophisticated tools to predict deposit flows, the deregulation of the banking industry put the forecasting quality of macroeconomic models for individual banks to the test.

Medieval lex mercatoria refers to the customary commercial law developed by merchants to govern cross-border trade, operating alongside and sometimes independently of territorial legal systems. This paper compares that historical form of autonomous ordering with contemporary blockchain governance. Both create institutional frameworks that facilitate exchange among diverse actors and provide mechanisms that function, to varying degrees, outside traditional state authority. The key difference lies in how rules are generated and enforced: medieval merchant law relied on flexible norms interpreted by merchant courts and other human adjudicators, whereas blockchain systems seek to reduce ambiguity by encoding rules ex ante in smart contracts and automating enforcement. Decentralized decision-making and emerging forms of on-chain adjudication further reimagine dispute resolution without centralized judicial power. The central claim is that both represent polycentric legal orders whose significance ultimately depends on how they interact with, complement, or challenge formal governmental institutions.

With the Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence, the European Union strives to address the negative externalities of companies that arise in the global economy. The new Directive follows the example of national lawmakers by requiring large companies operating in their own jurisdiction to manage adverse impacts on human rights and the environment. These due diligence laws affect companies beyond European borders by cascading due diligence standards down transnational ownership ties and value chains. They are shifting gears in the complex engine of the global economy and have considerable impacts on stakeholders in third countries. These extraterritorial implications raise the question of what limits international law places on relevant unilateral legislation. This article assesses the Directive against the law of jurisdiction and international comity arguing that unilateral due diligence laws are an appropriate way to address transnational sustainability challenges, provided lawmakers take adequate precautions.