Individual firms have become the dominant lobby actors in the European Union, while associational business interest representation has declined. This is alarming because individual firms tend to overlook the long-term interests of society by focusing on what is important in the short term for their own survival. How can we explain this trend? This article argues that globalization is a key driver of firm-level lobbying and that it fractures business interest representation. The study employs an original dataset of almost 14,000 lobby contacts between senior staff of the European Commission, business interests, and NGOs. It finds support for the argument that globalization spurs individual firm lobbying in the European Union. This complicates the already challenging task of business associations aggregating and channeling the interests of their members.

This article encourages critical discussion about the economic and social consequences of the war in Ukraine. This war has global effects in various dimensions of social life: energy policy, the environmental dimension, the economic sphere, and also the political atmosphere. In each of these dimensions, it poses a threat to sustainable development and the interests of the labour class in Europe. It attempts to change the balance of power in global geopolitics and also proves to be a useful cover for attempts to change the model of relations between employees and the state and business in many European countries. Due to the conflict in Ukraine and the ensuing calls for increased efforts to ‘ensure security’, Europe has turned towards a war economy in which the interests of the arms industry are more important than the interests of the working classes. The war in Ukraine has proved to be an excellent justification for governments to lower social standards and get rid of the remnants of the welfare state. From this perspective, the atmosphere of the New Cold War becomes a challenge for the labour movement, the global left and all progressive social circles.

This paper analyses five constitutional developments in Central and Eastern Europe that can impact the domestic implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). Using Czechia, Poland and Slovenia as examples, the paper highlights four potential drivers, namely: (1) the process of constitutionalizing human rights; (2) the proliferation of the doctrine of horizontal effect of constitutional rights; (3) the constitutional legitimacy of state intervention in the free market economy; and (4) the mechanism of judicial review. Furthermore, the author underlines the most significant challenge, which is increasing resistance to international norms in some countries, e.g., Poland. The paper concludes that the jurisprudence of the constitutional courts can facilitate the domestic implementation of the UNGPs, particularly Pillars I (State duty to protect human rights) and III (access to remedy).

There has been a brewing argument on the effects of economic globalization on the repression of human rights. My argument in this article joins the optimistic perspective on the relationship between the globalizing economy and state repression. I argue that governments consider backlash from investors in their decisions about whether to use repression. Investors, motivated by international human rights norms and a fear of violent conflict, would prefer that governments not introduce brute force into a nonviolent protest. Thus, governments in countries that depend more on foreign direct investment (FDI) should be less likely to use violence against protesters than those that are less dependent on FDI. Using data analysis of protest events and inward FDI stock, I test this argument and find a negative relationship between these two variables.

The UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs) and their concept of human rights due diligence (HRDD) cannot succeed in their current form, because they reify neoliberalism’s public/private divide. This article establishes this argument across historical, theoretical, and normative dimensions, and charts a new way forward. The UNGPs’ separation of the ‘state duty to protect’ from the ‘corporate responsibility to respect’ reflects a contestable conception of companies as private actors: free to act/transact in any way that is not harmful. This is a problem because harm is often invisible, even when taking an active due-diligence approach. To resolve this, HRDD practices must also be based on the positive value of equality. However, businesses are more than mere agents; they also coordinate production and enable social connections. These structural features reveal a ‘missing fourth pillar’ of the UNGPs: a collective political responsibility to challenge and change our current world order.

Sackett et al. (2022) identified previously unnoticed flaws in the way range restriction corrections have been applied in prior meta-analyses of personnel selection tools. They offered revised estimates of operational validity, which are often quite different from the prior estimates. The present paper attempts to draw out the applied implications of that work. We aim to a) present a conceptual overview of the critique of prior approaches to correction, b) outline the implications of this new perspective for the relative validity of different predictors and for the tradeoff between validity and diversity in selection system design, c) highlight the need to attend to variability in meta-analytic validity estimates, rather than just the mean, d) summarize reactions encountered to date to Sackett et al., and e) offer a series of recommendations regarding how to go about correcting validity estimates for unreliability in the criterion and for range restriction in applied work.

What determines the bargaining power of states in international trade negotiations? The literature focuses predominantly on economic strength as the determinant of bargaining power. However, this explanation neglects the reality of modern trade, which is characterized by the globalization of production and high levels of economic interdependence. I argue that this interdependence undermines the effect of economic strength on the bargaining power of states. Specifically, I hypothesize that the effect of economic strength declines when a country's companies rely on inputs for their production from a negotiation partner because they are integrated into global value chains. The more a country's firms are dependent on a partner country, the less that country is able to coerce concessions from the partner country by bringing to bear its economic strength. To test this hypothesis, I use a dataset covering concessions on liberalization of the services sector made by 54 countries in 61 preferential trade agreements. By calculating the relative concessions of each partner, I construct a quantitative indicator of the outcome of trade negotiations. This indicator should reflect the underlying bargaining power of each negotiating party. The results of a regression analysis of these negotiation outcomes mostly support my hypotheses.

This article examines the role of business interests in shaping the structures of global environmental governance between the United Nations (UN) Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 and the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio in 1992. It demonstrates how the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) managed to establish itself as a key partner for the UN while articulating a neoliberal vision that emphasized the market mechanism and business self-regulation as sources of environmental governance. The article provides empirical evidence that the ICC institutionalized business self-regulation in environmental governance and contributed to the very definition of the concept of sustainable development as we know it today.

How do corporate political ties impact firm performance in a transition economy? This topic has attracted wide attention in the strategy field. Accordingly, our study replicates a highly influential study, ‘Managerial ties and firm performance in a transition economy: The nature of a micro-macro link’ (Peng & Luo, 2000). The original study found that managerial political ties greatly improve organizational performance, and that this ‘micro-macro’ link varies across ownership types, business sectors, firm sizes, and industry growth rates. This replication study offers a hierarchical view of political ties by extending it from the individual to the organizational level and explores the complex link between the two levels of corporate political ties and firm performance. The results of a staged quasi-replication exercise show some similarities with the original study in the mechanism of corporate political ties on firm performance but, more importantly, reveal some key differences in the effect size and contingent effects. Furthermore, an extended test shows that corporate political ties are multilevel, and different levels of political ties vary in their mechanisms and effects on firm performance. The findings reveal temporal and contextual sensitivities of political ties studies in transition economies.

Private equity funds implement various management and governance practices in firms they endorse, signaling higher quality of sponsored IPOs (Initial Public Offer). However, the participation of such PE funds comes at a cost for newcomer firms, as they may lose both autonomy and future post-IPO earnings. If they do not choose to signal quality through PE funds, the IPO literature points to the validity of other mechanisms, such as the experience and centrality of the board of directors. We theorize and test the effect of the tradeoff between private equity sponsorship and board centrality and experience on IPO performance. We analyzed the effects of signaling on long-term performance through the one-year cumulative abnormal return in Brazilian IPOs issued between 2004 and 2013. Our results indicate that private equity sponsorship is the most effective signal, completely overtaking the relevance of board centrality and experience to explain IPO performance. However, these latter board characteristics significantly affected the performance of non-private equity-backed IPOs. Between PE-backed companies, there is a reverse effect of the board centrality on the IPO's performance and a substitution effect of the board's previous experience with IPO processes.

Organisations increasingly use digital nudges to influence their workforces’ behaviour without coercion or incentives. This can expose employees to arbitrary domination by infringing on their autonomy through manipulation and indoctrination. Nudges might furthermore give rise to the phenomenon of “organised immaturity.” Adopting a balanced approach between overly optimistic and dystopian standpoints, I propose a framework for determining the moral permissibility of digital nudging in the workplace. In this regard, I argue that not only should organisations provide pre-discursive justification of nudges but they should also ensure that employees can challenge their implementation whenever necessary through legitimation procedures. Building on Rainer Forst’s concept of the right to justification, this article offers a way to combine contract- and deliberation-based theories for addressing questions in business ethics. I further introduce the concept of meta-autonomy as a capacity that employees can acquire to counter threats of arbitrary domination and to mitigate organised immaturity.

International alliances are important strategic vehicles to build geographic scope and enter foreign markets, especially for firms lacking the resources or facing limitations to direct foreign expansion. Addressing recent calls to study alliance structure, we investigate the design parameters of nonequity international alliances and their performance implications. Building on the resource-based view of the firm, we theorize the effect of three key structural dimensions – formalization, interface, and specialization – on firm effectiveness. Our empirical work focusses on the legal service industry where international interfirm alliances are common, and resources like expert workers and knowledge are essential. We study 121 French, German, Italian, and Spanish law firms; and our data include the structural features of the alliances to which they belong, as well as various measures of firm effectiveness. Our analyses via structural equation modelling point toward the importance of informality and strong interface for effectiveness in these contexts. This study contributes to a finer understanding of international alliances by directly addressing the structural variation among nonequity international alliances, and analyzes their implications for firms. We thus respond to calls to investigate structural dimensions of alliances, operationalizing relevant dimensions of alliance organizational structure. Second, we add to understanding of the performance effects of international alliances, showing the benefits of individual structural parameters for firm effectiveness. Finally, we extend research on the use of international alliances as a strategic vehicle to enter foreign markets, capturing essential aspects of the internal arrangements of these interorganizational collaborative relationships, and thus adding to understanding of this strategic entry mode.

We examine the effect of corruption control on efficiency and its implications for efficiency spillovers by a stochastic frontier model. Our dataset covers 102 countries from 1996 to 2014. We find a positive relationship between corruption control and efficiency. If neighboring countries have difficulty in handling corruption, the country would be negatively affected by its neighbors' corruption through efficiency spillovers. We then compare the efficiency differences across countries for three time periods: 1996–2002, 2002–2008, and 2008–2014. On average, technical efficiencies slightly increased in the second period compared to the first period. In the third period, the efficiencies declined, particularly in China.

We examine whether the differences in the legal origins of countries (Common Law versus Civil Law) can explain the variations in the price efficiencies of the stock markets of different countries. Based on multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis of the daily stock indices of 34 countries over 21 years, we find that the stock price indices in Common Law origin countries show greater price efficiency than the stock price indices in Civil Law countries. These results provide additional evidence that the legal origins of countries affect their economic activities and outcomes.

GC Harcourt made many fundamental and essential contributions to the development of capital investment theory – most famously via his development of the Cambridge Capital Controversies, exposing conceptual and analytical flaws and contradictions in neoclassical approaches to defining and measuring capital. Relatedly, Harcourt also made essential contributions to our understanding of how accounting rules, used by real-world businesses to guide their investment decision-making, create anomalies and deficiencies in the accumulation of capital at a microeconomic level – with significant, deleterious consequences for the accumulation of capital at a macroeconomic level. In developing Harcourt’s contributions, this paper links Harcourt’s early insights about accounting rules with subsequent developments in behavioural economic models of business decision-making, thus aligning Harcourt’s contributions with insights from behavioural models of investment decision-making. These insights are then combined in showing how the misapplication of investment appraisal criteria at a microeconomic level contributes to under-investment and investment volatility in the macroeconomy, with negative implications for output, employment, labour productivity, wages and cyclical volatility.

“Capitalism,” etymologists say, is rooted neither in Adam Smith nor in Karl Marx but in The Newcomes, a long-forgotten novel by William Makepeace Thackeray, in which a fallen French nobleman regains his dignity when the rising price of railway shares restores his “sense of capitalism” (Project Gutenberg ebook edition, p. 1016). It's one of those you-know-it-when-you-see-it kinds of words, meaningful mainly when set against “socialism,” a word first used in the 1820s to describe collective ownership of property. Capitalism has taken on all sorts of meanings since Thackeray coined the term in 1854, describing everything from the repression of miners by late-nineteenth-century robber barons to the venture-capital-fertilized blossoming of Silicon Valley. The three histories discussed in this essay all address its meaning in the modern world economy. None believes that future capitalism will be like capitalisms past.

Parochialism, by which we mean in-group preferences and out-group prejudice, has the potential to influence public policy. In-group preferences and out-group prejudice can lead individuals to evaluate a policy based on how that policy affects the groups they belong to rather than on the basis of their ideological priors or the impact of that policy on society at large. Unchecked, parochialism likely leads to problematic policies and perverse social outcomes. While the evidence suggests that this bias can be mitigated if issues are framed in ways that encourage reflection as opposed to unreflective immediate responses, policy makers face incentives to leverage parochialism rather than combat it. The solution may instead require limiting policy makers and our ability to make decisions for others and promoting an institutional environment that encourages our interacting with diverse others rather than insularity. Stated another way, limited government and open society may be the path beyond our parochialism.

The present study investigates the relation of procedural transparency and compliance with authorities’ regulations. The underlying assumption is that procedural transparency encourages compliance with regulations. In an incentivized experiment, 666 participants took on the role of a business owner and had to fill in a form and spend a certain amount of their income as compliance costs to adhere to safety rules. In a 2 (Business Size: small vs big) × 2 (Penalty Rate: equal vs unequal) × 2 (Penalty Scheme: transparent vs nontransparent) between-subjects design, we investigated whether an unequal penalty rate for small-size in contrast to big-size businesses had a different effect on compliance when this difference was transparent compared to when it was not transparent. Business income, compliance costs, and audit probability were varied within-subject, over 18 decision rounds. We find that the deterring effect of a higher penalty rate for big-size compared to small-size businesses under a nontransparent unequal penalty scheme is attenuated when the same information is available. This supports the idea of a backfiring effect and suggests that authorities need to carefully consider what information about their procedures to communicate in order to avoid the unintended negative effects of increasing transparency.

In February 1956, Ronald Prain–chairman of the Rhodesian Selection Trust group of mining companies, and a significant figure in postwar international business—was subpoenaed and appeared before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation of the U.S. Senate Committee of Government Operations as it sought to determine whether British international business was exporting copper to the Soviet Union. Following the seemingly contrived nature of the proceedings, and because of a hostile interrogation by Robert F. Kennedy, Prain was later to describe his appearance as a “witch-hunt”—a conscious reference to the political paranoia of the period. Using a microhistorical approach, this article examines how Prain understood and narrated his role in an event to which he was a minor actor, drawn into a larger narrative of the political and economic conflict of the Cold War. It evaluates the historical veracity of Prain’s testimony and discusses the limits of memoir and archival sources. It discusses the implications of the event to the historiography of international business, in particular with reference to debates about the “nationality of the company” and the decline of the “Free-Standing Company.” And by examining one personal experience in a wider context, the article also shows that the history of international business and its relationship to the politics of the Cold War should not be seen as remote, monolithic, impersonal, or abstract but as individually lived and suffused with emotion, memory, and personal meaning.