The current challenge of education systems is learning. Across low-income countries (LICs) and lower-middle-income countries (LMCs), 62 % of 10-year-olds could not read at a minimally sufficient level in 2015. This study provides an overview of recent spending on education and its correlation with learning outcomes. We show that the relationship between education spending and learning is historically weak. From 2000 to 2015, LICs and LMCs increased spending on education in primary schools by ~$137 per student, an 80 % inflation-adjusted increase, with no corresponding change on the average learning outcomes. We then conduct a benefit-cost analysis of candidate interventions that could increase learning at low cost. Two interventions – structured pedagogy and, teaching at the right level, with and without a technology component generate large benefit-cost ratios. If deployed uniformly to reach 90 % of the 467 million students in LICs and LMCs, these interventions would cost on average $18 per student per year or $7.6 billion annually, generating $65 in benefits for every $1 spent. The economic logic behind this finding is that the hard and costly work of getting children into primary schools has mostly been accomplished, leaving open the possibility of learning interventions that improve the efficiency of the existing education system at low cost. Our results show that increasing education expenditure by just 6 % could increase learning by 120 % if directed toward these highly cost-effective interventions.

We argue that syndicates associate venture capitalists (VCs) with uneven skill levels in order to lower their expected gains from threatening to stop financing: Non-continued participation would send a milder negative signal to alternative financiers. This can explain the empirical observations that i) early-round syndicates regularly associate VCs with different levels of experience and ii) follow-on syndicates often involve none of the early-round VCs. Consistent with the theory, we find empirically that the heterogeneity of VC experience levels in a syndicate is i) negatively related to the extent to which the founders of the VC-backed firm are professionally well connected and ii) positively related to the likelihood of syndicate switching in a later round.

We show that demand effects generated by institutional frictions can influence systematic return predictability patterns in stocks and mutual funds. Identification relies on a reform to the Morningstar rating system, which we show caused a structural break in style-level positive feedback trading by mutual funds. As a result, momentum-related factors in stocks, as well as performance persistence and the “dumb money effect” in mutual funds, experienced a sharp decline. Consistent with the proposed channel, return predictability declined right after the reform, was limited to the U.S. market, and was concentrated in factors and mutual funds most exposed to the mechanism.

This article examines the nationwide campaign by financial reformers in the 1910s to convince businesses across the United States to abandon established commercial credit practices and use trade acceptances—the quintessential “real bill”—in their stead. The creation of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) and the outbreak of World War I offered a powerful coalition of campaigners the opportunity to forcefully argue that by capitalizing open account credit, trade acceptances fostered good business practices and stabilized the banking and financial systems. These campaigners relied on trade associations to disseminate, and the federal government to legitimize, their message. While some firms obliged, many businesses and banks criticized the campaigners’ arguments, casting trade acceptances as a means of financial centralization and as being contrary to the American culture of credit. Trade acceptances did not supplant promissory notes or trade in the open market and were rarely used by banks to access Fed liquidity. Instead, their legacy lies in their adoption by finance companies in the hope of securing financing for the distribution and mass consumption of consumer durables.

After the unanimous endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) by the Human Rights Council in June 2011, human rights due diligence (HRDD) has become a common currency widely embraced among stakeholders operating in the business and human rights (BHR) field. The UNGPs envisage HRDD to be the primary tool for businesses to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for adverse impacts of their activities on internationally recognized human rights.

The take-up of mandatory human rights due diligence (HRDD) initiatives by states is continuously gaining momentum. There are now numerous states adopting some form of HRDD laws. While corporations being duly diligent in respecting human rights is a positive step towards addressing problems of business and human rights, these HRDD initiatives on their own may only be a form of window-dressing, that is, enabling states to put a smart spin on their efforts to address business and human rights issues without addressing some of the root causes of that predicament. As a result, HRDD laws are likely to be a helpful, but insufficient tool for addressing corporate abuse of human rights. One reason for this is because the root cause of many business and human rights problems is the structural elements and goals of corporate law facilitates corporate violations of human rights. So long as states fail to transform the way in which corporations operate – in part, by reconceptualizing corporate law – even the best drafted HRDD laws will be inadequate to halt corporate harms.

The scale and scope of the climate crisis and its drastically worsening impacts means that even as a ‘climate due diligence’ obligation is increasingly taking shape as a dimension of human rights due diligence, there is also growing evidence of the limitations of this emerging norm. This article provides four critiques of climate due diligence based on its insufficiency, its conceptual ambiguity, its operational limitations, and its structural limitations. It argues that these critiques could be addressed by regulatory reform that draw clear ‘red lines’ based on the need to prevent the development of any new fossil fuel and address the ‘corporate capture’ of regulatory institutions by the fossil fuel industry. Additionally, it calls for reparations to ensure effective access to a remedy for existing and potential future climate-related human rights impacts that business has caused or contributed to.

This article studies human rights due diligence by private corporate creditors in the context of sovereign debt restructurings. First, the legal bases of this specific due diligence are presented and systematized. Then, by providing empirical statistical evidence, the article analyses whether haircuts applied by creditors across countries regularly consider the social and economic human rights situation of the debtor countries in question, as part of creditors’ due diligence. Also, the main characteristics of bond markets that contribute to understanding the asymmetric power relationship between private lenders and sovereign borrowers are described. Finally, Argentina’s latest debt restructurings are studied in depth to determine whether human rights were taken into account when agreeing on the size of haircuts. From quantitative and qualitative data, this article concludes that the haircuts agreed by creditors are regularly not sensitive to the social and economic human rights situation of debtor populations or to the impact that debt agreements could have on them.

The legitimacy of multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) as institutions for social and environmental governance in the global economy has received much scholarly attention over the past years. To date, however, research has yet to focus on assessing the legitimacy of MSIs in their interactions with other actors within larger systems of deliberation. Drawing on the deliberative systems perspective developed within deliberative democracy theory, we theorise a normative framework to evaluate the roles of MSIs within the broader systems of governance they co-construct through their interactions with other initiatives, governments, non-governmental organisations, and other external actors. As we demonstrate in our evaluation of the illustrative case of the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety as a MSI in the context of the Bangladeshi garment industry, this framework can help researchers assess whether a MSI ultimately serves to enhance or undermine the deliberative legitimacy of the overall system of which it forms a part.