Why are politicians selective in granting investment incentives to foreign direct investment (FDI) projects? One understudied reason is that politicians want to minimize backlash from voters. In this article, I present the first study to systematically analyze voter preferences toward investment incentives. I theorize that voters should be more likely to support investment incentives for FDI projects that they perceive as “high quality”—that is, projects that voters perceive to be highly effective in improving the living standards of their communities. As a result, I expect that politicians who support low-quality FDI projects with incentives will lose voter support. A factorial survey experiment in the United States provides evidence in favor of this argument. Voters reward politicians only if they provide investment incentives to high-quality projects. An additional conjoint survey experiment highlights the importance of project characteristics that indicate high quality in increasing the approval of investment incentives. To demonstrate the external validity of these experimental results, I present descriptive evidence that illustrates the consistencies between the determinants of investment incentives for FDI projects and voter preferences.

During the 1930s, the British government in Palestine introduced new regulation for the country’s banking sector. This regulation brought about a sharp decline in the number of banks and consolidated the large banks’ position in the country. Contrary to prior accounts of the subject, which view the regulation as a welcome governmental response to an unstable banking sector, in this article I argue that the main forces behind the regulation were the British Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial, and Overseas) and the Zionist Anglo-Palestine Bank. Based on governmental reports and internal banking correspondence, I show how, despite the opposition of local credit institutions, these two large banks successfully pushed for regulations that benefited them at the expense of their smaller competitors. The regulation of Palestine’s banking sector is therefore a case study of regulatory capture in the context of the British Empire.

Research on interorganisational collaboration is longstanding however the role leadership plays in such collaborations is often neglected. Using grounded theory, we present a process model of ‘leadership by cavea’ whereby the relationships across organisations involved in a collaborative project were structured according to hierarchies of privilege, determined by the inherent power of ‘bonding’ social capital. While it emerged that cultural capital was a more valuable resource, this was recognised too late in the leadership process for it to make a necessary contribution. Our findings demonstrate that when seeking to practice collaborative leadership across organisations, individuals and the organisations they represent must be aware of the power they hold and wield, even needing to share or relinquish power to ensure that hierarchies of privilege do not hinder efforts to achieve mutual goals.

While most literature on federal climate change policies has focused on failures to adopt broad policies, this article describes and explains successes in two important sectors. Regulations to improve the fuel economy of motor vehicles and efficiency standards for appliances and equipment have produced substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, although they largely have other goals and hence can be considered implicit climate policies. We synthesize the existing literature with our analyses of case studies to offer three explanations for the adoption of effective policies in these two sectors. First, the policies delivered politically popular co-benefits, such as reducing consumers’ energy bills, enhancing energy security, and promoting public health. Second, they gained business acceptance because they were narrow in their scope, avoided long-term economic costs, and helped industry cope with state-level regulations; industry often strategically tried to influence these policies rather than resist them. Third, the legislation that initiated and expanded these policies received bipartisan support, which was aided by co-benefits and business acceptance; more recently, these laws have been strengthened through the actions of Democratic administrations. We conclude by comparing these policy areas to the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022.

There is currently disagreement in the international sports world about whether Russian and Belarusian athletes should be admitted to international competitions. While initially proposing to ban these athletes, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) is now recommending that sports federations readmit Russian and Belarusian athletes under certain conditions. The IOC believes that this is unavoidable in order to respect human rights. Sports federations are invoking their autonomy on this issue, with some following the IOC’s advice, some maintaining a ban, and others allowing unconditional participation. This piece seeks to correct the IOC’s interpretation of the applicable human rights standard. It asserts that sporting bodies must respect human rights, and that the principles of autonomy and neutrality of sport must be considered in light of internationally recognised human rights standards. If these are used as a yardstick, it becomes clear that collective exclusion can be justified in the extreme case of a war of aggression.

This article compares the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) ex ante cost analysis of its 1995 Large Municipal Waste Combustor (MWC): New Source Performance Standards and Emissions Guidelines rule to an ex post assessment of its cost. Unlike many retrospective cost analyses, where ex post assessments are limited due to lack of data on compliance costs, this case study is unique because we located and used plant-level survey data from the U.S. Department of Energy and Governmental Advisory Associates in a comparison of ex ante and ex post costs of individual MWCs. We find the ex post capital expenditures for nitrogen oxide control systems are typically lower than the EPA ex ante estimates, while the ex post capital expenditures for mercury control systems tend to be higher than the EPA ex ante estimates. Finally, while we find a few outliers, the average ratio of ex post to ex ante capital expenditures for particulate matter and sulfur dioxide emissions control is near unity.

This paper conducts a benefit–cost analysis of expanding agricultural research and development (R&D) in the Global South. We extend a recent modeling exercise that used IFPRI’s IMPACT model to estimate the investments required to reduce the global prevalence of hunger below 5%. After 35 years, the increased funding is estimated to increase agricultural output by 10%, reduce the prevalence of hunger by 35%, reduce food prices by 16%, and increase per capita incomes by 4% relative to a counterfactual where funding continues to rise on historical trends. Using an 8% discount rate, the net present value of the costs of agricultural R&D are estimated at $61 billion for the next 35 years, while the net present benefits in terms of net economic surplus (the sum of consumer and producer surplus) are estimated at $2.1 trillion. The central estimate of the benefit–cost ratio (BCR) is 33, consistent with previous research documenting high average returns to agricultural research and development. The central BCR reported in this study places the intervention at the 91st percentile of all previous Copenhagen Consensus BCRs in agriculture, and 87th percentile for all BCRs regardless of sector. Agricultural R&D is likely one of the best uses of resources for the remainder of the Sustainable Development Goals and decades beyond.

Much business ethics and corporate social responsibility literature suggests, implicitly or explicitly, that firms ought to engage in activities that can be characterized as philanthropy, namely, expending resources beyond what is required by law and market norms to promote others’ welfare at the expense of firm profits. However, this literature has struggled to provide a normative framework for evaluating corporate philanthropy, although scholars have noted that such expenditures can potentially remedy market failures and provide public goods more efficiently. I articulate two specific rationales that can justify corporate philanthropy based on considerations of welfare economics: 1) firms making strategic but high-risk investments in activities that are likely to generate positive externalities even if they prove unprofitable and 2) firms possessing a strong comparative advantage in their ability to address a social problem at lower social cost. Moreover, these rationales can be evaluated by a concept I develop called the philanthropy multiplier, indicating the ratio of net positive externalities to net costs. I suggest that firms consider publicizing their philanthropy multipliers, and I discuss theoretical and practical implications.

This article aims to explain the considerable state ownership in listed companies in Norway (SOiN) at present. The extant literature has pointed to alleged national idiosyncrasies to explain this special feature of Norwegian capitalism. The main contribution of this article is a comparative perspective. It shows that most European countries have pursued selective protectionism (i.e., to secure national ownership in key companies). It also shows that financial capital was not crucial for selective protectionism. On this background, the article discusses why state ownership became the mode of selective protectionism in Norway. It argues that the main reason is that large private (often multinational) companies did not develop in the wake of the second Industrial Revolution. Another key reason is that a specific hybrid ownership model that was developed after 1945 became an available institutional solution for securing national ownership after 1990. A common ground and a compromise were found on this model, based both on trust and distrust toward the state: a trust in that the state could operate as a passive and private owner, and a corresponding distrust in the state as an active industrialist and owner.

Using a large sample of leveraged loans, we provide evidence that, despite having fewer creditor control rights, covenant-lite (Cov-Lite) loans have similar recovery rates and significantly lower spreads than loans with maintenance covenants. We find that the propensity to borrow Cov-Lite is related to various proxies for the reputational capital of a borrowing firm’s private equity sponsor. We construct a simple model to illustrate the relationship between reputational capital, covenants, and loan spreads in the leveraged loan market. Our model illustrates how reputational capital can substitute for covenants in mitigating agency costs of debt, leading to lower loan spreads for Cov-Lite loans.

In emerging economies, economic development and pro-social policies are closely entwined. Multinational corporations have presented a positive image of their economic and social activities to investors and society to justify exploiting countries’ natural resources. This study examines the Arabian American Oil Company’s (Aramco) pro-social/corporate social responsibility programs in employment, housing, and healthcare from 1932 to 1974. These programs did not stem from a philanthropic rationale but were necessary to enable Aramco to create the infrastructure to find, extract, and control the oil assets. Hierarchical control was institutionalized through racism and discrimination in employment, housing, and health regulations. However, Aramco adopted impression management strategies to present a positive image of itself as a socially responsible company contributing to the economic and social development of Saudi Arabia. We analyze management statements in company reports and internal documents to identify and categorize the application of these impression management techniques up to when the Saudi government took a controlling stake in Aramco.

The myriad applications of artificial intelligence (AI) by the private and public sectors have exploded in the public consciousness in the postpandemic period. However, researchers and businesses have been working on AI technology applications for decades, and in many ways, governments are rushing to catch up. This article presents an argument that the future of AI policy in the United States will be driven in large part by current and future state-level policy experiments. This argument is presented by drawing on scholarship surrounding federalism, regulatory fragmentation, and the effects of fragmentation on business and social equity. The article then presents the case of autonomous vehicle policy in the states to illustrate the degree of current fragmentation and considers the effects of layering new AI policies on top of existing rules surrounding privacy, licensing, and more. Following this consideration of existing research and its application of AI policy, the article presents a research agenda for leveraging state differences to study the effects of AI policy and develop a cohesive framework for governing AI.

In 2019, the prime ministers of the United Kingdom and Australia both declared their intent to ban indirect, or secondary, boycotts. In the United Kingdom, the ban was directed against public bodies engaging in the “boycott, divest, and sanction” (BDS) campaign against Israel. In Australia, the proposed ban was directed against environmental action groups. Research on market-based activism to date has focused primarily on conceptualizing the use of the market by nonstate actors to achieve social change, with less attention paid to the role of the state in these dynamics. State efforts to curtail social movements’ repertoires of contention require careful scrutiny to understand the state's role in legitimizing or delegitimizing political activism and to reveal the complex power dynamics between corporations, social movements, and the state. This article analyzes two key instances of the state declaring an intent to prevent activists from protesting through the market. By investigating how indirect boycotts were problematized by state actors, we aim to reveal the rationale behind the state's intervention in marketplace politics. Our findings indicate that opposition to the political cause behind the boycott, rather than a problematization of the strategy itself, drives state intervention.