In previous work, the author has shown that $\Pi ^1_1$-induction along $\mathbb N$ is equivalent to a suitable formalization of the statement that every normal function on the ordinals has a fixed point. More precisely, this was proved for a representation of normal functions in terms of Girard’s dilators, which are particularly uniform transformations of well orders. The present paper works on the next type level and considers uniform transformations of dilators, which are called 2-ptykes. We show that $\Pi ^1_2$-induction along $\mathbb N$ is equivalent to the existence of fixed points for all 2-ptykes that satisfy a certain normality condition. Beyond this specific result, the paper paves the way for the analysis of further $\Pi ^1_4$-statements in terms of well ordering principles.

We investigate which part of Brouwer’s Intuitionistic Mathematics is finitistically justifiable or guaranteed in Hilbert’s Finitism, in the same way as similar investigations on Classical Mathematics (i.e., which part is equiconsistent with $\textbf {PRA}$ or consistent provably in $\textbf {PRA}$) already done quite extensively in proof theory and reverse mathematics. While we already knew a contrast from the classical situation concerning the continuity principle, more contrasts turn out: we show that several principles are finitistically justifiable or guaranteed which are classically not. Among them are: (i) fan theorem for decidable fans but arbitrary bars; (ii) continuity principle and the axiom of choice both for arbitrary formulae; and (iii) $\Sigma _2$ induction and dependent choice. We also show that Markov’s principle MP does not change this situation; that neither does lesser limited principle of omniscience LLPO (except the choice along functions); but that limited principle of omniscience LPO makes the situation completely classical.

We introduce a tool for analysing models of $\text {CT}^-$, the compositional truth theory over Peano Arithmetic. We present a new proof of Lachlan’s theorem that the arithmetical part of models of $\text {CT}^-$ are recursively saturated. We also use this tool to provide a new proof of theorem from [8] that all models of $\text {CT}^-$ carry a partial inductive truth predicate. Finally, we construct a partial truth predicate defined for a set of formulae whose syntactic depth forms a nonstandard cut which cannot be extended to a full truth predicate satisfying $\text {CT}^-$.

We give a survey of current research on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems from the following three aspects: classifications of different proofs of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, the limit of the applicability of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, and the limit of the applicability of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem.

We explore the problems that confront any attempt to explain or explicate exactly what a primitive logical rule of inference is, or consists in. We arrive at a proposed solution that places a surprisingly heavy load on the prospect of being able to understand and deal with specifications of rules that are essentially self-referring. That is, any rule $\rho $ is to be understood via a specification that involves, embedded within it, reference to rule $\rho $ itself. Just how we arrive at this position is explained by reference to familiar rules as well as less familiar ones with unusual features. An inquiry of this kind is surprisingly absent from the foundations of inferentialism—the view that meanings of expressions (especially logical ones) are to be characterized by the rules of inference that govern them.

It is well-known that an element of a commutative ring with identity is nilpotent if, and only if , it lies in every prime ideal of the ring. A modification of this fact is amenable to a very simple proof mining analysis. We formulate a quantitative version of this modification and obtain an explicit bound. We present an application. This proof mining analysis is the leitmotif for some comments and observations on the methodology of computational extraction. In particular, we emphasize that the formulation of quantitative versions of ordinary mathematical theorems is of independent interest from proof mining metatheorems.

We develop a number of variants of Lifschitz realizability for $\mathbf {CZF}$ by building topological models internally in certain realizability models. We use this to show some interesting metamathematical results about constructive set theory with variants of the lesser limited principle of omniscience including consistency with unique Church’s thesis, consistency with some Brouwerian principles and variants of the numerical existence property.

In this paper, we examine the limit of applicability of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem ($\textsf {G1}$ for short). We first define the notion “$\textsf {G1}$ holds for the theory $T$”. This paper is motivated by the following question: can we find a theory with a minimal degree of interpretation for which $\textsf {G1}$ holds. To approach this question, we first examine the following question: is there a theory T such that Robinson’s $\mathbf {R}$ interprets T but T does not interpret $\mathbf {R}$ (i.e., T is weaker than $\mathbf {R}$ w.r.t. interpretation) and $\textsf {G1}$ holds for T? In this paper, we show that there are many such theories based on Jeřábek’s work using some model theory. We prove that for each recursively inseparable pair $\langle A,B\rangle $, we can construct a r.e. theory $U_{\langle A,B\rangle }$ such that $U_{\langle A,B\rangle }$ is weaker than $\mathbf {R}$ w.r.t. interpretation and $\textsf {G1}$ holds for $U_{\langle A,B\rangle }$. As a corollary, we answer a question from Albert Visser. Moreover, we prove that for any Turing degree $\mathbf {0}< \mathbf {d}<\mathbf {0}^{\prime }$, there is a theory T with Turing degree $\mathbf {d}$ such that $\textsf {G1}$ holds for T and T is weaker than $\mathbf {R}$ w.r.t. Turing reducibility. As a corollary, based on Shoenfield’s work using some recursion theory, we show that there is no theory with a minimal degree of Turing reducibility for which $\textsf {G1}$ holds.

We prove that the Weihrauch lattice can be transformed into a Brouwer algebra by the consecutive application of two closure operators in the appropriate order: first completion and then parallelization. The closure operator of completion is a new closure operator that we introduce. It transforms any problem into a total problem on the completion of the respective types, where we allow any value outside of the original domain of the problem. This closure operator is of interest by itself, as it generates a total version of Weihrauch reducibility that is defined like the usual version of Weihrauch reducibility, but in terms of total realizers. From a logical perspective completion can be seen as a way to make problems independent of their premises. Alongside with the completion operator and total Weihrauch reducibility we need to study precomplete representations that are required to describe these concepts. In order to show that the parallelized total Weihrauch lattice forms a Brouwer algebra, we introduce a new multiplicative version of an implication. While the parallelized total Weihrauch lattice forms a Brouwer algebra with this implication, the total Weihrauch lattice fails to be a model of intuitionistic linear logic in two different ways. In order to pinpoint the algebraic reasons for this failure, we introduce the concept of a Weihrauch algebra that allows us to formulate the failure in precise and neat terms. Finally, we show that the Medvedev Brouwer algebra can be embedded into our Brouwer algebra, which also implies that the theory of our Brouwer algebra is Jankov logic.

We characterize Weihrauch reducibility in $ \operatorname {\mathrm {E-PA^{\omega }}} + \operatorname {\mathrm {QF-AC^{0,0}}}$ and all systems containing it by the provability in a linear variant of the same calculus using modifications of Gödel’s Dialectica interpretation that incorporate ideas from linear logic, nonstandard arithmetic, higher-order computability, and phase semantics.

Here, we present a category ${\mathbf {pEff}}$ which can be considered a predicative variant of Hyland's Effective Topos ${{\mathbf {Eff} }}$ for the following reasons. First, its construction is carried in Feferman’s predicative theory of non-iterative fixpoints ${{\widehat {ID_1}}}$. Second, ${\mathbf {pEff}}$ is a list-arithmetic locally cartesian closed pretopos with a full subcategory ${{\mathbf {pEff}_{set}}}$ of small objects having the same categorical structure which is preserved by the embedding in ${\mathbf {pEff}}$; furthermore subobjects in ${{\mathbf {pEff}_{set}}}$ are classified by a non-small object in ${\mathbf {pEff}}$. Third ${\mathbf {pEff}}$ happens to coincide with the exact completion of the lex category defined as a predicative rendering in ${{\widehat {ID_1}}}$ of the subcategory of ${{\mathbf {Eff} }}$ of recursive functions and it validates the Formal Church’s thesis. Hence pEff turns out to be itself a predicative rendering of a full subcategory of ${{\mathbf {Eff} }}$.

We study the structure of families of theories in the language of arithmetic extended to allow these families to refer to one another and to themselves. If a theory contains schemata expressing its own truth and expressing a specific Turing index for itself, and contains some other mild axioms, then that theory is untrue. We exhibit some families of true self-referential theories that barely avoid this forbidden pattern.

In 1932, von Neumann proposed classifying the statistical behavior of differentiable systems. Joint work of B. Weiss and the author proved that the classification problem is complete analytic. Based on techniques in that proof, one is able to show that the collection of recursive diffeomorphisms of the 2-torus that are isomorphic to their inverses is $\Pi ^0_1$-hard via a computable 1-1 reduction. As a corollary there is a diffeomorphism that is isomorphic to its inverse if and only if the Riemann Hypothesis holds, a different one that is isomorphic to its inverse if and only if Goldbach’s conjecture holds and so forth. Applying the reduction to the $\Pi ^0_1$-sentence expressing “ZFC is consistent” gives a diffeomorphism T of the 2-torus such that the question of whether $T\cong T^{-1}$ is independent of ZFC.

We investigate relationships between versions of derivability conditions for provability predicates. We show several implications and non-implications between the conditions, and we discuss unprovability of consistency statements induced by derivability conditions. First, we classify already known versions of the second incompleteness theorem, and exhibit some new sets of conditions which are sufficient for unprovability of Hilbert–Bernays’ consistency statement. Secondly, we improve Buchholz’s schematic proof of provable $\Sigma_1$-completeness. Then among other things, we show that Hilbert–Bernays’ conditions and Löb’s conditions are mutually incomparable. We also show that neither Hilbert–Bernays’ conditions nor Löb’s conditions accomplish Gödel’s original statement of the second incompleteness theorem.

In this note we give a simplified ordinal analysis of first-order reflection. An ordinal notation system $OT$ is introduced based on $\psi $-functions. Provable $\Sigma _{1}$-sentences on $L_{\omega _{1}^{CK}}$ are bounded through cut-elimination on operator controlled derivations.

The prevalent interpretation of Gödel’s Second Theorem states that a sufficiently adequate and consistent theory does not prove its consistency. It is however not entirely clear how to justify this informal reading, as the formulation of the underlying mathematical theorem depends on several arbitrary formalisation choices. In this paper I examine the theorem’s dependency regarding Gödel numberings. I introduce deviant numberings, yielding provability predicates satisfying Löb’s conditions, which result in provable consistency sentences. According to the main result of this paper however, these “counterexamples” do not refute the theorem’s prevalent interpretation, since once a natural class of admissible numberings is singled out, invariance is maintained.

We consider the Lambek calculus, or noncommutative multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic, extended with iteration, or Kleene star, axiomatised by means of an $\omega $-rule, and prove that the derivability problem in this calculus is $\Pi _1^0$-hard. This solves a problem left open by Buszkowski (2007), who obtained the same complexity bound for infinitary action logic, which additionally includes additive conjunction and disjunction. As a by-product, we prove that any context-free language without the empty word can be generated by a Lambek grammar with unique type assignment, without Lambek’s nonemptiness restriction imposed (cf. Safiullin, 2007).

This paper clarifies, revises, and extends the account of the transmission of truthmakers by core proofs that was set out in chap. 9 of Tennant (2017). Brauer provided two kinds of example making clear the need for this. Unlike Brouwer’s counterexamples to excluded middle, the examples of Brauer that we are dealing with here establish the need for appeals to excluded middle when applying, to the problem of truthmaker-transmission, the already classical metalinguistic theory of model-relative evaluations.

We investigate a recent proposal for modal hypersequent calculi. The interpretation of relational hypersequents incorporates an accessibility relation along the hypersequent. These systems give the same interpretation of hypersequents as Lellman’s linear nested sequents, but were developed independently by Restall for S5 and extended to other normal modal logics by Parisi. The resulting systems obey Došen’s principle: the modal rules are the same across different modal logics. Different modal systems only differ in the presence or absence of external structural rules. With the exception of S5, the systems are modular in the sense that different structural rules capture different properties of the accessibility relation. We provide the first direct semantical cut-free completeness proofs for K, T, and D, and show how this method fails in the case of B and S4.

It is well-known that natural axiomatic theories are well-ordered by consistency strength. However, it is possible to construct descending chains of artificial theories with respect to consistency strength. We provide an explanation of this well-orderedness phenomenon by studying a coarsening of the consistency strength order, namely, the $\Pi ^1_1$ reflection strength order. We prove that there are no descending sequences of $\Pi ^1_1$ sound extensions of $\mathsf {ACA}_0$ in this ordering. Accordingly, we can attach a rank in this order, which we call reflection rank, to any $\Pi ^1_1$ sound extension of $\mathsf {ACA}_0$. We prove that for any $\Pi ^1_1$ sound theory T extending $\mathsf {ACA}_0^+$, the reflection rank of T equals the $\Pi ^1_1$ proof-theoretic ordinal of T. We also prove that the $\Pi ^1_1$ proof-theoretic ordinal of $\alpha $ iterated $\Pi ^1_1$ reflection is $\varepsilon _\alpha $. Finally, we use our results to provide straightforward well-foundedness proofs of ordinal notation systems based on reflection principles.