We asked jurors awaiting trial assignment to listen to a recorded synopsis of an authentic criminal trial and to make a choice among 4 verdict possibilities. Each participant juror then deliberated with another juror whose verdict choice differed, as a microcosm of a full jury’s deliberation. Analysis of the transcripts of these deliberations revealed both characteristics general to the sample and characteristics for which variation appeared across participants. Findings were interpreted in terms of a model of juror reasoning as entailing theory-evidence coordination. More frequently than challenging the other’s statements, we found, a juror agreed with and added to or elaborated them. Epistemological stance — whether knowledge was regarded as absolute and certain or subject to interpretation — predicted several characteristics of discourse. Absolutists were less likely to make reference to the verdict criteria in their discourse. Those who did so, as well as those who made frequent reference to the evidence, were more likely to persuade their discourse partners.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, public health guidance (e.g., regarding the use ofnon-medical masks) changed over time. Although many revisions were a result ofgains in scientific understanding, we nonetheless hypothesized that makingchanges in guidance salient would negatively affect evaluations of experts andhealth-protective intentions. In Study 1 (N = 300), wedemonstrate that describing COVID-19 guidance in terms of inconsistency (versusconsistency) leads people to perceive scientists and public health authoritiesless favorably (e.g., as less expert). For participants in Canada(n = 190), though not the U.S. (n = 110),making guidance change salient also reduced intentions to download a contacttracing app. In Study 2 (N = 1399), we show that a briefforewarning intervention mitigates detrimental effects of changes in guidance.In the absence of forewarning, emphasizing inconsistency harmed judgments ofpublic health authorities and reduced health-protective intentions, butforewarning eliminated this effect.

We developed the Short Maximization Inventory (SMI) by shortening the Maximization Inventory (Turner, Rim, Betz & Nygren, 2012) from 34 items to 15 items. Using the Item Response Theory framework, we identified and removed the items of the Maximization Inventory that contributed least to the performance of the original scale. The construct validity assessed for SMI is similar to the full MI and is in line with the predictions from the literature: the Satisficing subscale is positively related to the indices of well-being, while the Decision Difficulty and Alternative Search subscales are negatively related to well-being. The new scale retains the good psychometric properties of the original scale. Furthermore, its brevity allows researchers to use the scale in studies in which maximization is not the primary focus. Although the SMI lacks the “High Standards” subscale, as did the original MI, we believe that SMI is a step towards developing a reliable and conceptually sound measure of maximizing that can be used in various research designs.

This paper investigates the boundaries of the recent result that eliciting more than one estimate from the same person and averaging these can lead to accuracy gains in judgment tasks. It first examines its generality, analysing whether the kind of question being asked has an effect on the size of potential gains. Experimental results show that the question type matters. Previous results reporting potential accuracy gains are reproduced for year-estimation questions, and extended to questions about percentage shares. On the other hand, no gains are found for general numerical questions. The second part of the paper tests repeated judgment sampling’s practical applicability by asking judges to provide a third and final answer on the basis of their first two estimates. In an experiment, the majority of judges do not consistently average their first two answers. As a result, they do not realise the potential accuracy gains from averaging.

Would you redirect a trolley to save five people even if it means that the trolley will run over a person on the side track? Most people say they would. Would you push that same person into the path of the trolley in order to save the five? Most people say they would not. These sorts of intuitive moral judgments are made rapidly and seem almost automatic. Now imagine a combined choice context where one can redirect a trolley, push a person in its path or do nothing. The number of lives lost from intervening can be varied. The most straightforward interpretations of current theories of moral judgment predict either no effect or that the combined context will lead to greater focus on lives lost. In contrast, we observe a similarity effect such that utilitarian choice may become less attractive in the combined choice context.

Vlaev and Chater (2006) demonstrated that the cooperativeness of previously seen prisoner’s dilemma games biases choices and predictions in the current game. These effects were: a) assimilation to the mean cooperativeness of the played games caused by action reinforcement, and b) perceptual contrast with the preceding games depending on the range and the rank order of their cooperativeness. We demonstrate that, when playing against choice strategies that are not biased by such factors, perceptual biases disappear and only assimilation bias caused by reinforcement persists. This suggests that reinforcement learning is a powerful source of inconsistency in strategic interaction, which may not be eliminated even if the other players are unbiased and the markets are efficient.

We clarify two points made in our commentary (Pezzo & Beckstead, 2020, this issue) on a recent paper by Longoni, Bonezzi, and Morewedge (2019). In both Experiments 1 and 4 from their paper, it is not possible to determine whether accuracy can compensate for algorithm aversion. Experiments 3A-C, however, do show a strong effect of accuracy such that AI that is superior to a human provider is embraced by patients. Many papers, including Longoni et al. tend to minimize the role of this compensatory process, apparently because it seems obvious to the authors (Longoni, Bonezzi, Morewedge, 2020, this issue). Such minimization, however, can lead to (mis)citations in which research that clearly demonstrates a compensatory role of AI accuracy is cited as non-compensatory.

In 2012, two independent groups simultaneously demonstrated that intuitive mindset enhances belief in God. However, there is now some mixed evidence on both the effectiveness of manipulations used in these studies and the effect of mindset manipulation on belief in God. Thus, this proposal attempted to replicate one of those experiments (Shenhav, Rand & Greene, 2012) for the first time in a high-powered experiment using an under-represented population (Turkey). In line with the intuitive belief hypothesis, a negative correlation between reflectiveness and religious belief emerged, at least in one of the experimental conditions. In contrast to that hypothesis, however, the results revealed no effect of the cognitive style manipulation on religious belief. Although a self-report measure (Faith in Intuition) provided evidence that the manipulation worked as intended, it did not influence actual performance (Cognitive Reflection Test), suggesting a demand effect problem. Overall, the results failed to provide support for the intuitive belief hypothesis in our non-WEIRD sample, despite generally following the predicted patterns, and suggest that using stronger manipulation techniques are warranted in future studies.

What is the role of recognition in consumer choice? The recognition heuristic (RH) proposes that in situations where recognition is correlated with a decision criterion, recognized objects will be chosen more often than unrecognized ones, regardless of any other relevant information available about the recognized object. Past research has investigated this non-compensatory decision heuristic in inference. Here we report two experiments on preference using a naturalistic consumer choice task. Results revealed that, although recognition was a powerful driver of preferences, it was used in a compensatory rather than a non-compensatory way. Specifically, additional information learned about recognized brand objects significantly affected choices. It appears that recognition is processed in a compensatory manner and combined with other attributes in preferential choice.

Laboratory studies of choice and decision making among real monetary rewards typically use smaller real rewards than those common in real life. When laboratory rewards are large, they are almost always hypothetical. In applying laboratory results meaningfully to real-life situations, it is important to know the extent to which choices among hypothetical rewards correspond to choices among real rewards and whether variation of the magnitude of hypothetical rewards affects behavior in meaningful ways. The present study compared real and hypothetical monetary rewards in two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants played a temporal discounting game that incorporates the logic of a repeated prisoner’s-dilemma (PD) game versus tit-for-tat; choice of one alternative (“defection” in PD terminology) resulted in a small-immediate reward; choice of the other alternative (“cooperation” in PD terminology) resulted in a larger reward delayed until the following trial. The larger-delayed reward was greater for half of the groups than for the other half. Rewards also differed in type across groups: multiples of real nickels, hypothetical nickels, or hypothetical hundred-dollar bills. All groups significantly increased choice of the larger delayed reward over the 40 trials of the experiment. Over the last 10 trials, cooperation was significantly higher when the difference between larger and smaller hypothetical rewards was greater. Reward type (real or hypothetical) made no significant difference in cooperation on most measures. In Experiment 2, real and hypothetical rewards were compared in social discounting—the decrease in value to the giver of a reward as social distance increases to the receiver of the reward. Social discount rates were well described by a hyperbolic function. Discounting rates for real and hypothetical rewards did not significantly differ. These results add to the evidence that results of experiments with hypothetical rewards validly apply in everyday life.

People not only seek to avoid losses or secure gains; they also attempt to create opportunities for obtaining positive outcomes. When distributing money between gambles with equal probabilities, people often invest in turning negative gambles into positive ones, even at a cost of reduced expected value. Results of an experiment revealed that (1) the preference to turn a negative outcome into a positive outcome exists when people’s ability to do so depends on their performance levels (rather than merely on their choice), (2) this preference is amplified when the likelihood to turn negative into positive is high rather than low, and (3) this preference is attenuated when people can lie about their performance levels, allowing them to turn negative into positive not by performing better but rather by lying about how well they performed.

This study aims to provide evidence about two widely held assumptions in the experimental study of moral judgment. First, that different terms used to ask for moral judgment (e.g., blame, wrongness, permissibility…) can be treated as synonyms and hence used interchangeably. Second, that the moral and legal status of the judged action are independent of one another and thus moral judgment have no influence of legal or other conventional considerations. Previous research shows mixed results on these claims. We recruited 660 participants who provided moral judgment to three identical sacrificial dilemmas using seven different terms. We experimentally manipulated the explicit legal status of the judged action. Results suggest that terms that highlight the utilitarian nature of the judged action cause harsher moral judgments as a mechanism of reputation preservation. Also, the manipulation of the legal status of the judged action holds for all considered terms but is larger for impermissibility judgments. Taken as a whole, our results imply that, although subtle, different terms used to ask for moral judgment have theoretically and methodologically relevant differences which calls for further scrutiny.

Undersampling biases are common in the optimal stopping literature, especiallyfor economic full choice problems. Among these kinds of number-based studies,the moments of the distribution of values that generates the options (i.e., thegenerating distribution) seem to influence participants’ sampling rate.However, a recent study reported an oversampling bias on a different kind ofoptimal stopping task: where participants chose potential romantic partners fromimages of faces (Furl et al., 2019). The authors hypothesised that thisoversampling bias might be specific to mate choice. We preregistered thishypothesis and so, here, we test whether sampling rates across differentimage-based decision-making domains a) reflect different over- or undersamplingbiases, or b) depend on the moments of the generating distributions (as shownfor economic number-based tasks). In two studies (N = 208 andN = 96), we found evidence against the preregisteredhypothesis. Participants oversampled to the same degree across domains (comparedto a Bayesian ideal observer model), while their sampling rates depended on thegenerating distribution mean and skewness in a similar way as number-basedparadigms. Moreover, optimality model sampling to some extent depended on thethe skewness of the generating distribution in a similar way to participants. Weconclude that oversampling is not instigated by the mate choice domain and thatsampling rate in image-based paradigms, like number-based paradigms, depends onthe generating distribution.

How do donors reason and justify their choices when faced with dilemmas in a charitable context? In two studies, Swedish students were confronted with helping dilemmas based on the identifiable victim effect, the proportion dominance effect and the ingroup effect. Each dilemma consisted of two comparable charity projects and participants were asked to choose one project over the other. They were then asked to provide justifications of their choice by stating the relative importance of different types of reasons. When faced with an identified victim dilemma, participants did not choose the project including an identified victim more often than the project framed statistically, but those who did emphasized emotional reasons (e.g., “Because I had more empathic feelings”), but not any other reasons, more than those choosing the statistical project. When faced with a Proportion dominance dilemma, participants more often chose the project with a high rescue proportion (e.g., you can save 100% out of 30) than the project with a low rescue proportion (e.g., you can save 4% out of 800), and those who did emphasized efficacy reasons (e.g., “Because my money can make a greater difference there”), but no other reasons, more than those favoring the low recue proportion project. Finally, when faced with an Ingroup dilemma, participants more often chose the project that could help ingroup-victims over the project that could help outgroup victims, and those who did emphasized responsibility reasons (e.g., “Because I have a greater obligation”), but no other reasons, more than those favoring outgroup projects. These results are consistent with and extend previous findings about how different helping effects are related to different psychological processes.

Does one’s stance toward evidence evaluation and belief revision have relevance for actual beliefs? We investigate the role of endorsing an actively open-minded thinking style about evidence (AOT-E) on a wide range of beliefs, values, and opinions. Participants indicated the extent to which they think beliefs (Study 1) or opinions (Studies 2 and 3) ought to change according to evidence on an 8-item scale. Across three studies with 1,692 participants from two different sources (Mechanical Turk and Lucid for Academics), we find that our short AOT-E scale correlates negatively with beliefs about topics ranging from extrasensory perception, to respect for tradition, to abortion, to God; and positively with topics ranging from anthropogenic global warming to support for free speech on college campuses. More broadly, the belief that beliefs should change according to evidence was robustly associated with political liberalism, the rejection of traditional moral values, the acceptance of science, and skepticism about religious, paranormal, and conspiratorial claims. However, we also find that AOT-E is more strongly predictive for political liberals (Democrats) than conservatives (Republicans). We conclude that socio-cognitive theories of belief (both specific and general) should take into account people’s beliefs about when and how beliefs should change – that is, meta-beliefs – but that further work is required to understand how meta-beliefs about evidence interact with political ideology.

In this research, we explore how experience with an "attraction set" of options, designed to elicit an asymmetric-dominance (attraction) effect, affects choice making in a second "compromise set" designed to elicit a compromise effect. In Experiment 1, when a compromise set was presented, subjects who had chosen an asymmetrically dominating option from an attraction set were less likely to surrender to the compromise heuristic than their counterparts who had chosen the equivalent option from a binary set. Lower susceptibility to the compromise heuristic suggests that asymmetric dominance might have facilitated the learning of attribute preferences. In Experiment 2, subjects were asked to make six choices in the personal computer category. Subjects who had chosen any number of asymmetrically dominating options from the attraction condition were less susceptible to the compromise heuristic in a subsequent choice task than their counterparts who had chosen the same number of equivalent options from the binary condition. It was unlikely that the effect was caused by better memory of asymmetrically dominating options subjects had previously chosen. Results from the two experiments corroborated the reasoning that asymmetric dominance affects the learning of attribute weights and this effect persists in a subsequent choice task.

Open-ended methods that elicit willingness-to-pay (WTP) in terms of absolute dollars often result in high rates of questionable and highly skewed responses, insensitivity to changes in health state, and raise an ethical issue related to its association with personal income. We conducted a 2x2 randomized trial over the Internet to test 4 WTP formats: 1) WTP in dollars; 2) WTP as a percentage of financial resources; 3) WTP in terms of monthly payments; and 4) WTP as a single lump-sum amount. WTP as a percentage of financial resources generated fewer questionable values, had better distribution properties, greater sensitivity to severity of health states, and was not associated with income. WTP elicited on a monthly basis also showed promise.

Rational trust decisions depend on potential outcomes and expectations of reciprocity. In the trust game, outcomes and expectations correspond to the structural factors of risk and temptation. Two experiments investigated how risk and temptation influenced information search and final decisions in the trust game. The central finding was that trustors underemphasized temptation relative to its effects on the expected value of trust. Instead, trustors made decisions egocentrically, focusing on potential outcomes. In Experiment 1, information search data revealed that trustors often made decisions without learning about the payoffs related to temptation. Experiment 2 investigated whether trustors were able to use temptation to form accurate expectations of reciprocity. Trustors understood, but underestimated, the relationship between temptation and the probability of reciprocity. Moreover, they did not fully consider expectations in their final trust decisions. Changes in potential outcomes had larger effects on trust than comparable changes in expectations. These results suggest that levels of trust are too high when the probability of reciprocity is low and too low when that probability is high.

When survey respondents rate the quality of life (QoL) associated with a health condition, they must not only evaluate the health condition itself, but must also interpret the meaning of the rating scale in order to assign a specific value. The way that respondents approach this task depends on subjective interpretations, resulting in inconsistent results across populations and tasks. In particular, patients and non-patients often give very different ratings to health conditions, a discrepancy that raises questions about the objectivity of either groups’ evaluations. In this study, we found that the perspective of the raters (i.e., their own current health relative to the health conditions they rated) influences the way they distinguish between different health states that vary in severity. Consistent with prospect theory, a mild and a severe lung disease scenario were rated quite differently by lung disease patients whose own health falls between the two scenarios, whereas healthy non-patients, whose own health was better than both scenarios, rated the two scenarios as much more similar. In addition, we found that the context of the rating task influences the way participants distinguish between mild and severe scenarios. Both patients and non-patients gave less distinct ratings to the two scenarios when each were presented in isolation than when they were presented alongside other scenarios that provided contextual information about the possible range of severity for lung disease. These results raise continuing concerns about the reliability and validity of subjective QoL ratings, as these ratings are highly sensitive to differences between respondent groups and the particulars of the rating task.

Using five variants of the Asian Disease Problem, we dissected the risky-choice framing effect by requiring each participant to provide preference ratings for the full decision problem and also to provide attractiveness ratings for each of the component parts, i.e., the sure-thing option and the risky option. Consistent with previous research, more risky choices were made by respondents receiving negatively framed versions of the decision problems than by those receiving positively framed versions. However, different processes were evident for those scoring high and low on numeracy. Whereas the choices of the less numerate showed a large effect of frame above and beyond any influence of their evaluations of the separate options, the choices of the highly numerate were almost completely accounted for by their attractiveness ratings of the separate options. These results are consistent with an increased tendency of the highly numerate to integrate complex numeric information in the construction of their preferences and a tendency for the less numerate to respond more superficially to non-numeric sources of information.