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Explaining or redefining mindreading?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 May 2020

Krzysztof Dołęga
Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, D-44780Bochum, Germany.
Tobias Schlicht
Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, D-44780Bochum, Germany.
Daniel C. Dennett
Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA02155.


Veissière et al. disrupt current debates over the nature of mindreading by bringing multiple positions under the umbrella of free-energy. However, it is not clear whether integrating the opposing sides under a common formal framework will yield new insights into how mindreading is achieved, rather than offering a mere redescription of the target phenomenon.

Open Peer Commentary
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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