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The cost of over-intellectualizing the free-energy principle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 May 2020

Daniel D. Hutto*
Affiliation:
School of Liberal Arts, Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong, New South Wales2522, Australia. ddhutto@uow.edu.au https://scholars.uow.edu.au/display/daniel_d_hutto

Abstract

This commentary raises a question about the target article's proposed explanation of what goes on when we think through other minds. It highlights a tension between non-mindreading characterizations of everyday social cognition and the individualist, cognitivist assumptions that target article's explanatory proposal inherits from the predictive processing framework it favours.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

Hutto, D. (2004) The limits of spectatorial folk psychology. Mind and Language 19(5):548–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hutto, D. D. (2008) Folk psychological narratives: The sociocultural basis of understanding reasons. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Hutto, D. D. & Kirchhoff, M. D. (2015) Looking beyond the brain: Social neuroscience meets narrative practice. Cognitive Systems Research 3435:5–17.Google Scholar
McGeer, V. (2007) The regulative dimension of folk psychology. In: Folk psychology re-assessed, eds. Hutto, D. D. & Ratcliffe, M., pp. 137–56. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5558-4_8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar