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Thinking through prior bodies: autonomic uncertainty and interoceptive self-inference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 May 2020

Micah Allen
Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, 8000Aarhus, Denmark. Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies, Aarhus University, 8000Aarhus, Denmark Cambridge Psychiatry, University of Cambridge, CambridgeCB2 8AH, UK
Nicolas Legrand
Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, 8000Aarhus, Denmark.
Camile Maria Costa Correa
Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, 8000Aarhus, Denmark.
Francesca Fardo
Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, 8000Aarhus, Denmark. Danish Pain Research Centre, Aarhus University Hospital, 8000Aarhus, Denmark


The Bayesian brain hypothesis, as formalized by the free-energy principle, is ascendant in cognitive science. But, how does the Bayesian brain obtain prior beliefs? Veissière and colleagues argue that sociocultural interaction is one important source. We offer a complementary model in which “interoceptive self-inference” guides the estimation of expected uncertainty both in ourselves and in our social conspecifics.

Open Peer Commentary
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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