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Behavioral market design

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2023

Axel Ockenfels Open the ORCID record for Axel Ockenfels [Opens in a new window]
Axel Ockenfels*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Köln, Germany ockenfels@uni-koeln.de; https://ockenfels.uni-koeln.de/de/ao Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany
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Abstract

When it comes to behavioral change, economic design and behavioral science are complements, not substitutes. Chater & Loewenstein give examples from policy design. In this commentary, I use examples, often from my own research, to show how behavioral insights inform the design of the rules that govern market transactions.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e171
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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