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Nudges, regulations, and behavioral public choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2023

Samuel G. B. Johnson Open the ORCID record for Samuel G. B. Johnson [Opens in a new window]  and
Jason Dana
Samuel G. B. Johnson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada. samuel.johnson@uwaterloo.ca; http://www.sgbjohnson.com/ School of Management, University of Bath, Bath, UK Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
Jason Dana
Affiliation:
School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA; jason.dana@yale.edu; https://som.yale.edu/faculty-research/faculty-directory/jason-dana
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Abstract

Chater & Loewenstein have done a service to the field by raising the fundamental issue of how the political process distorts well-intentioned efforts at behavioral public policy. We connect this argument to broader research on government failure, particularly public choice theory in economics. We further suggest ways that behavioral research can help identify and mitigate such failures.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e164
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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