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The influence of private interests on research in behavioural public policy: A system-level problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2023

Liam Kofi Bright
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK L.K.Bright@lse.ac.uk; https://www.liamkofibright.com/ J.Parry1@lse.ac.uk; https://jonathan-parry.weebly.com/
Jonathan Parry
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK L.K.Bright@lse.ac.uk; https://www.liamkofibright.com/ J.Parry1@lse.ac.uk; https://jonathan-parry.weebly.com/
Johanna Thoma
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Universität Bayreuth, GWII, Bayreuth, Germany Johanna.Thoma@uni-bayreuth.de; https://johannathoma.com/

Abstract

Chater & Loewenstein argue that i-frame research has been coopted by private interests opposed to system-level reform, leading to ineffective interventions. They recommend that behavioural scientists refocus on system-level interventions. We suggest that the influence of private interests on research is problematic for wider normative and epistemic reasons. A system-level intervention to shield research from private influence is needed.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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