Is psychology relevant to art and aesthetics? The question about the effects the arts have on us remains puzzling, like the fuzzy logic of the question “What is art?” from which it actually emanates. I believe it is fair to say that any declaration that psychology is irrelevant to art is as mistaken as the belief that there can be such a thing as a psychological or neural account of art proper. Bullot & Reber (B&R) set out to revisit this dilemma proposing a psycho-historical framework as a means to reconcile this long-standing debate. I welcome the integrative spirit of their proposal. I certainly think it marks a productive starting point if one wants to tackle some of the hard issues involved at the interface between the study of mind and the study of art. Still, I have some worries that I will try to flesh out very briefly in this comment.
My first worry concerns the metaphysical barriers between an “internal” and an “external” domain and the concomitant internalist representational ideal of cognition and art to which B&R's analysis submits. My worry stems from my contention that the cognitive life of art is a strictly relational phenomenon that can only be studied by collapsing the boundaries between what is on the “inside” and what is on the “outside” (Malafouris Reference Malafouris and Manzotti2011). My second worry concerns the underlying epistemological foundation upon which B&R's view of an integrative and contextualised science of art is grounded. This worry reflects my uneasiness with the common use of the term science of art. For what is a science of art? What is it that we aim for in seeking to construct a science (psychological, neuroscientific, or psycho-historical) of art appreciation? Usually by science of art we mean the approach to the study of art, which is, broadly speaking, objective, replicable, and testable. The way to accomplish that is through quantification, measuring, generalisation, experimentation, scaling, and decomposition. Hence the problem: the more committed you are to the scientific principles of your approach, the more distant you become from what makes your subject matter important for what it is, that is, art rather than science.
My worry, in other words, is that inherent to the very idea of a “scientific” approach to art is an emphasis to reductionist analysis that often threatens to lose sight of what makes art unique and distinctive in the first place. I don't mean to say that art is more of a conceptual and less of an empirical problem. What I mean instead, is that art is irreducible to the logic of either conceptual or empirical problems. Put it simply, too much respect to science often means disrespect to art and vice versa. How can there be a science of art then? I suggest that one way to answer that question which can be relevant and meaningful to the problem of art is to transform the science of art into something that can be described, instead, as a science for or through art. In the latter case, the question is no longer one about how the sciences of mind can be used to explain art away; it is instead a question of how the sciences of mind can be used to enrich, complement, and engage art. This view opens the possibility for a synergy of a very different “symmetrical” kind. That is, a synergy aiming at rethinking the concept of art and through that also rethinking the whereabouts and meaning of the concept of mind.
B&R rightly recognise that no artificially designed art-stimuli and de-contextualised participants are sufficient to study art appreciation. But does their psycho-historical framework allow for a true reconciliation of the domains of mind and art? Does their model grapple with the historical, cultural, critical, and intentional complexity inherent in art appreciation? B&R propose that sensitivity to art-historical contexts is the necessary additional requirement for productive experimental research on art appreciation. In particular, B&R identify three modes of appreciation: basic exposure to an artwork, the artistic design stance, and artistic understanding. But what is it that these modes of appreciation tell us specifically about the question “What does art do?”
Although their integrative proposal goes some way to resolve those issues, it remains incomplete. In particular, I see two problems with B&R's account of the “how” and “why” of art appreciation. For one thing, the three main types of psychological responses that they recognise conflate many different dimensions that often represent a mixture of discrete and continuous events operating at different levels and timescales. They also leave out several affective and cultural dimensions of great value. Moreover, they offer little space for phenomenological description and anthropological comparative analysis. Recognisably, these shortcomings might act as a stimulus for future research; so they need not be perceived as a major problem. More important to clarify, however, is the meaning of “context” relevant to the different psychological responses identified in their article. B&R's emphasis on how contextual variables moderate the effects of mental processes responsible for appreciators' responses to artworks successfully demonstrates why using works of art as stimuli is not sufficient to study art. Still, in their view, it appears as if “context” is something that can be eventually translated and potentially reduced to a series of mental processes situated inside the head of the individual. But surely, the meaning, and thus importance, of “context” in “contextual analysis,” implies much more than merely a new set of “inputs” for an internally processed art appreciation program situated in the brain. The “context,” I argue, does much more: it provides the relational environment and regulates the dynamics that makes art appreciation possible. The “context” does more than influencing form “outside” how the agent makes sense of the artwork; it is instead an integral part of the cognitive ecology (Hutchins Reference Hutchins2010; Ingold Reference Ingold2010; Malafouris Reference Malafouris2010; Reference Malafouris2013) of art consciousness. Although B&R claim to place context at centre stage, in reality it remains on the margins of the supposed central question that asks how art works. The marriage of psychology with context that B&R propose needs more than they seem able to offer here. I argue that investigating art appreciation as a form of situated embodied interaction is central to understanding art. Finding ways to penetrate the constitutive intertwining of the mind (brain and body) with art, in context, holds the key for the success of B&R's psycho-historical framework.
Is psychology relevant to art and aesthetics? The question about the effects the arts have on us remains puzzling, like the fuzzy logic of the question “What is art?” from which it actually emanates. I believe it is fair to say that any declaration that psychology is irrelevant to art is as mistaken as the belief that there can be such a thing as a psychological or neural account of art proper. Bullot & Reber (B&R) set out to revisit this dilemma proposing a psycho-historical framework as a means to reconcile this long-standing debate. I welcome the integrative spirit of their proposal. I certainly think it marks a productive starting point if one wants to tackle some of the hard issues involved at the interface between the study of mind and the study of art. Still, I have some worries that I will try to flesh out very briefly in this comment.
My first worry concerns the metaphysical barriers between an “internal” and an “external” domain and the concomitant internalist representational ideal of cognition and art to which B&R's analysis submits. My worry stems from my contention that the cognitive life of art is a strictly relational phenomenon that can only be studied by collapsing the boundaries between what is on the “inside” and what is on the “outside” (Malafouris Reference Malafouris and Manzotti2011). My second worry concerns the underlying epistemological foundation upon which B&R's view of an integrative and contextualised science of art is grounded. This worry reflects my uneasiness with the common use of the term science of art. For what is a science of art? What is it that we aim for in seeking to construct a science (psychological, neuroscientific, or psycho-historical) of art appreciation? Usually by science of art we mean the approach to the study of art, which is, broadly speaking, objective, replicable, and testable. The way to accomplish that is through quantification, measuring, generalisation, experimentation, scaling, and decomposition. Hence the problem: the more committed you are to the scientific principles of your approach, the more distant you become from what makes your subject matter important for what it is, that is, art rather than science.
My worry, in other words, is that inherent to the very idea of a “scientific” approach to art is an emphasis to reductionist analysis that often threatens to lose sight of what makes art unique and distinctive in the first place. I don't mean to say that art is more of a conceptual and less of an empirical problem. What I mean instead, is that art is irreducible to the logic of either conceptual or empirical problems. Put it simply, too much respect to science often means disrespect to art and vice versa. How can there be a science of art then? I suggest that one way to answer that question which can be relevant and meaningful to the problem of art is to transform the science of art into something that can be described, instead, as a science for or through art. In the latter case, the question is no longer one about how the sciences of mind can be used to explain art away; it is instead a question of how the sciences of mind can be used to enrich, complement, and engage art. This view opens the possibility for a synergy of a very different “symmetrical” kind. That is, a synergy aiming at rethinking the concept of art and through that also rethinking the whereabouts and meaning of the concept of mind.
B&R rightly recognise that no artificially designed art-stimuli and de-contextualised participants are sufficient to study art appreciation. But does their psycho-historical framework allow for a true reconciliation of the domains of mind and art? Does their model grapple with the historical, cultural, critical, and intentional complexity inherent in art appreciation? B&R propose that sensitivity to art-historical contexts is the necessary additional requirement for productive experimental research on art appreciation. In particular, B&R identify three modes of appreciation: basic exposure to an artwork, the artistic design stance, and artistic understanding. But what is it that these modes of appreciation tell us specifically about the question “What does art do?”
Although their integrative proposal goes some way to resolve those issues, it remains incomplete. In particular, I see two problems with B&R's account of the “how” and “why” of art appreciation. For one thing, the three main types of psychological responses that they recognise conflate many different dimensions that often represent a mixture of discrete and continuous events operating at different levels and timescales. They also leave out several affective and cultural dimensions of great value. Moreover, they offer little space for phenomenological description and anthropological comparative analysis. Recognisably, these shortcomings might act as a stimulus for future research; so they need not be perceived as a major problem. More important to clarify, however, is the meaning of “context” relevant to the different psychological responses identified in their article. B&R's emphasis on how contextual variables moderate the effects of mental processes responsible for appreciators' responses to artworks successfully demonstrates why using works of art as stimuli is not sufficient to study art. Still, in their view, it appears as if “context” is something that can be eventually translated and potentially reduced to a series of mental processes situated inside the head of the individual. But surely, the meaning, and thus importance, of “context” in “contextual analysis,” implies much more than merely a new set of “inputs” for an internally processed art appreciation program situated in the brain. The “context,” I argue, does much more: it provides the relational environment and regulates the dynamics that makes art appreciation possible. The “context” does more than influencing form “outside” how the agent makes sense of the artwork; it is instead an integral part of the cognitive ecology (Hutchins Reference Hutchins2010; Ingold Reference Ingold2010; Malafouris Reference Malafouris2010; Reference Malafouris2013) of art consciousness. Although B&R claim to place context at centre stage, in reality it remains on the margins of the supposed central question that asks how art works. The marriage of psychology with context that B&R propose needs more than they seem able to offer here. I argue that investigating art appreciation as a form of situated embodied interaction is central to understanding art. Finding ways to penetrate the constitutive intertwining of the mind (brain and body) with art, in context, holds the key for the success of B&R's psycho-historical framework.