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Rational framing effects and morally valid reasons

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2022

Tomasz Żuradzki Open the ORCID record for Tomasz Żuradzki [Opens in a new window]
Tomasz Żuradzki*
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy & Interdisciplinary Centre for Ethics, Jagiellonian University, ul. Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków, Poland t.zuradzki@uj.edu.plhttps://incet.uj.edu.pl/tomasz-zuradzki
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Abstract

I argue that the scope of rational framing effects may be broader than Bermúdez assumes. Even in many “canonical experiments,” the explanation of the judgment reversals or shifts may refer to reasons, including moral ones. Referring to the Asian disease paradigm (ADP), I describe how non-consequentialist reasons related to fairness and the distinction between doing and allowing may help explain and justify the typical pattern of choices in the cases like ADP.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e247
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

Bermúdez, J. J. (2021). Frame it again: New tools for rational decision-making. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
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Żuradzki, T., Szwed, P., & Maj, M. (2022). A risky choice framing effect, doing/allowing, and fairness in uncertain prospects (manuscript). https://osf.io/mj3ypGoogle Scholar