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The ecological benefits of being irrationally moral

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2022

Elisabetta Sirgiovanni Open the ORCID record for Elisabetta Sirgiovanni [Opens in a new window]
Elisabetta Sirgiovanni*
Affiliation:
Department of Molecular Medicine, Museum of the History of Medicine, Sapienza University of Rome, 00185 Rome, Italy elisabetta.sirgiovanni@uniroma1.it
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Abstract

Trolley-like dilemmas are other cases of what Bermúdez refers to as (conscious) quasi-cyclical preferences. In these dilemmas, identical outcomes are obtained through morally non-identical actions. I will argue that morality is the context where descriptive invariance and ecological relevance may be crucially distinguished. Logically irrational moral choices in the short term may promote greater social benefits in the longer term.

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Open Peer Commentary
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e241
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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