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Framing, equivalence, and rational inference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2022

David R. Mandel Open the ORCID record for David R. Mandel [Opens in a new window]
David R. Mandel*
Affiliation:
Intelligence, Influence, and Collaboration Section, Defence Research and Development Canada, Toronto, Ontario M3K 2C9, Canada drmandel66@gmail.com https://sites.google.com/site/themandelian/home
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Abstract

Bermúdez's case for rational framing effects, while original, is unconvincing and gives only parenthetical treatment to the problematic assumptions of extensional and semantic equivalence of alternative frames in framing experiments. If the assumptions are false, which they sometimes are, no valid inferences about “framing effects” follow and, then, neither do inferences about human rationality. This commentary recaps the central problem.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e234
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Copyright
Copyright © The Crown in Right of Canada (Defence R&D Canada), 2022

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