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Framing provides reasons

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2022

Neil Levy Open the ORCID record for Neil Levy [Opens in a new window]
Neil Levy*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney 2109, Australia Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 1PT, UK neil.levy@philosophy.ox.ac.uk https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=hqLeZWcAAAAJ&hl=en
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Abstract

Framing effects are held to be irrational because preferences should remain stable across different descriptions of the same state of affairs. Bermúdez offers one reason why this may be false. I argue for another: If framing provides implicit testimony, then rational agents will alter their preferences accordingly. I show there is evidence that framing should be understood as testimonial.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e233
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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