South-South security cooperation is increasingly reshaping Africa’s security governance, as emerging actors introduce new military doctrines, institutions, and technologies. Among these, Turkey’s security engagements have become increasingly prominent, influencing military modernization, external dependencies, and security assemblages.This article employs a relational ontology to examine Turkey’s security engagements with African states, arguing that they do not represent a linear shift from Western alliances to South-South cooperation but instead operate within entangled global security hierarchies. This multiplicty stems from Turkey’s “both-and” positioning—as a non-Western, non-core NATO member that is simultaneously expanding security partnerships with the Global South. Furthermore, this study argues that Turkey’s security interactions with African states demonstrates how Turkey actively articulates and adapts logistical, operational, organizational, and normative security practices between the Global South and the Global North, positioning itself as both a recipient and producer of global military norms, rather than acting as a passive intermediary in global security governance. By analyzing Turkey’s military training programs, defense diplomacy, arms sales, and forward-basing strategies n Africa, this article demonstrates how Turkey both reproduces and transforms global security hierarchies by contributing to the homogenization of military practices and security assemblages.

This article explores security cooperation between the Caribbean and Mexico,looking specifically at strategies being pursued to shift the focus in Latin America and the Caribbean from ‘the war on drugs’ to ‘the war on guns’ to address the problem of gun trafficking. This is a shift away from the United States’ priority to that of the region and a move towards a more assertive model of South–South security cooperation. The Caribbean Community and Common Market’s (CARICOM’s) strategy to support Mexico’s tortious and historic lawsuit against American gun manufacturers and to declare a ‘war on guns’ reflects its inability to independently influence the United States’ priorities within the region. Mexico, a Southern country, makes a difference because of its geopolitical relevance to the US, their shared border, and Washington’s attempt to stop the flow of Mexican immigration. We read the Mexico–Caribbean coalition as a significant development in South–South security cooperation (SSSC). Our analysis contributes to an understanding of the nuances and complexities of security cooperation, capacities for scaling up action through SSSC, and the political and legal manoeuvrings involved in challenging hierarchies of power between the so-called global North and South.

This article analyses Colombian South–South security cooperation. Drawing upon empirical research findings and by focusing on Colombian security engagements with other Latin American countries in the realm of military transformation, we identify the role of epistemological constructs as key drivers of Colombian South–South security cooperation. We demonstrate that Colombian policy and security actors intentionally created comparability between their own country and its security challenges, and the conditions existing in other countries of the region. This portrayal of idiosyncratic (in)security features as shared attributes across otherwise-different country contexts enables the transfer of security models rooted in Colombia’s expertise and experience. We show how such security-driven homologisation efforts enabled Colombian security practitioners to navigate international hierarchies, particularly unequal US–Colombian relations in their favour, allowing them to secure continued US support and position Colombian security expertise as a blueprint for addressing contemporary security challenges across the region and beyond.

This paper examines South–South security cooperation and regional organisations (ROs) in Africa. Much of the literature on peace and conflict in Africa has focused on ROs and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Guided by the mantra ‘African solutions to African problems’, these organisations have facilitated several instances of African-led security cooperation. Yet ROs have limited agency and capacity, are institutionally rigid, and are often donor-dependent. As a result, ad hoc security initiatives such as the G5 Sahel and Accra Initiative – our case studies – are on the rise. While such initiatives are better adapted to local context and feature higher levels of autonomy (relative to APSA), we critique this view by showing how donors pressure and trap African governments facing transnational security threats into ad hoc initiatives. These initiatives transform into ‘zombified’ security institutions that rarely live up to the elevated expectations of African and Western stakeholders. This creates a paradox for debates around African agency in security affairs: ad hoc initiatives lock African states into security frameworks that do not respond to their needs but also facilitate the pursuit of donor funding, reassert the national scale of sovereignty, and incentivise new forms of bilateral security cooperation.

The article explores how European Union (EU) democracies respond to the transnational repression phenomenon. Authoritarian transnational repression has become an increasingly recurrent phenomenon in recent years. However, we still have an inadequate understanding of how Western democracies respond to such forms of authoritarian interference. This article sheds light on the EU’s responses to the authoritarian transnational repression phenomenon by using the analytical framework of securitisation as its theoretical approach. In doing so, it aims to find out the extent to which transnational repression has been securitised in the EU. The study demonstrates that the EU’s response to the transnational repression phenomenon exhibits the case of a failed securitisation. The paper draws its analysis from policy documents, semi-structured interviews with EU stakeholders, and descriptive analysis from the Freedom House Transnational Repression Database.

This paper examines China’s evolving security engagement in Africa, focusing on the recent shifts in policy and strategy as China’s global influence expands. By employing a multi-dimensional research approach, including fieldwork with semi-structured interviews, and a thorough analysis of official Chinese documents, the study highlights key examples from Tanzania, Ethiopia, and the African Union. China’s security engagement is characterised by a dual strategy of hard and soft security measures, including military presence, arms transfers, and diplomatic initiatives. The research identifies a significant transition from primarily economic-focused interactions to a more nuanced strategy that incorporates military cooperation and diplomatic interventions. This shift reflects China’s response to the complex geopolitical dynamics within Africa and its broader ambitions on the global stage. While still largely state-centric, China’s engagement is beginning to adopt more assertive security strategies, driven by the need to protect its investments and citizens in conflict-prone regions, as well as to position itself as a responsible global actor in peace and security. Despite these developments, China’s approach remains cautious and reactive, constrained by its policy principles and the complexities of African geopolitics.

This article explores China’s evolving approach to South–South security cooperation, focusing on its use of the security–development nexus in its relations with Global South countries, particularly in the Mekong region. The central research question is: under what circumstances will China adjust the balance between security and development in its cooperation with the Global South? This article uses two case studies in the Mekong region, where China has applied contrasting approaches to address different security-related issues, to explore how China justifies its security choices through the security–development nexus in its relations with Global South countries. The varying security priorities and complex regional dynamics have led to variations in the nature and scope of its security cooperation with the Global South. Drawing on Chinese official documents, media reports, and interviews with scholars and policy advisors, this article argues that China adapts its security–development approach based on three key factors: its perception of security risks, its ability to dominate an issue, and the urgency of its interests. The significance of this research lies in its contribution to the ongoing debate about China’s role in South–South security cooperation. The study also offers insights into the challenges China faces in managing its dual role as both a development partner and a security actor, with implications for its influence in the Mekong region and beyond.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has been shaped by advocacy from states in the Global South. How should the impacts of this advocacy be understood? This paper argues that whilst Global South and rising-power engagement has shaped R2P, it has not unpicked elements of coloniality that remain embedded in the norm. In placing greater emphasis on state responsibilities to protect over international responsibilities, rising-power advocacy embeds further in R2P a colonial concept of the state which has been mobilised to ward off criticism of the state’s colonial projects in its own peripheries. Moreover, the entrenchment of a colonial concept of the state at the heart of R2P reinforces a diagnosis according to which atrocity crimes occur due to failures within the state in which atrocity takes place. This diagnosis erases the role coloniality plays in the internationalised production of atrocity crimes, whilst also framing outsider states as potential saviours, thereby reproducing colonial saviourisms in R2P. Whilst R2P may be a dewesternised norm, it has thus not been decolonised.

As social identities are not static but made, actors constantly invest in their public image, financially, institutionally, and aesthetically. This article examines and compares two vignettes of NATO’s public (visual) diplomacy and strategic communication. It shows the changing nature of the visual communication that NATO has applied to rationalise its military force and to fix its collective identity. In addition, the article illustrates that the changing visual communication of the alliance shapes and is shaped by its identity constructions and its quest for ontological security. For the vignette of a force comparison report from 1984, authored by the NATO Information Service, I argue that technical images are conditioning the sensible and possible by normalising the deployment of military force and disciplining anxieties about the self, deterrence, and defence. This look is based on spatial divisions, absent people, and relational objects. Compared to the vignette of NATO’s more recent social media campaign, #NATO2030, published in 2021, I argue that the latter reveals the progressive nature of the alliance by gaze to gender, diversity, and collective security. This shift from a deterrence-fixed to a human-faced episteme symbolises NATO’s ability to secure a stable self while adopting its public diplomacy.

Why is there no NATO in Asia? Literature on this question is selective and incomplete. This paper develops a new theory with determinate predictions regarding patron and clients’ alliance design preferences, the alliances that result, the commitments therein, and alliance duration. A subtle but nonetheless persistent form of entrapment problem exists with clients that don’t want a war yet fear adversary aggression. Clients’ commitment to collective security is a hand-tying costly signal that assures the patron of client resolve to defend the status quo and reduces the probability and costs of entrapment. Patrons will rationally prefer to join in an alliance clients who have already made a collective security commitment. Clients are more likely, the paper shows, to make such commitments when their adversary credibly threatens to militarily occupy at least one of them. This is more likely in land than in sea theatres. When clients fail to realise collective security, patron efforts to impose it on them will fail, will result in short lived multilateralism, and will force bilateralism on the patron. The paper uses new archival evidence from Britain and Australia to show how this strategic framework explains variation in alliance design in Europe and Asia.

Leaders play a central role in world politics, and threat perception is a crucial element in the study and practice of International Relations (IR). Yet existing accounts of how leaders perceive threats are inadequate, drawing on an incomplete notion of leaders as (ir)rational information processors that pays no attention to the leader’s experience of danger as it unfolds in time and how such experience is structured. By integrating a framework developed by linguist Ray Jackendoff to describe the experience of language with the study of danger in International Relations, and by employing an interpretive textual analysis technique to danger descriptions made by world leaders embedded in different historical and cultural settings constructing different security dangers, I develop and illustrate the ‘danger framework’. In describing the unique features with which leaders experience security dangers, the danger framework theorises the qualia of danger experience and how it is organised into the conscious field of leaders. In doing so, the paper makes progress on three problems for existing accounts of threat perception in IR, illuminates important research puzzles, and provides the literature on experience and Ontological Security Studies (OSS) with micro-foundations.

While much critical scholarship has pointed out that liberal peacebuilding can contribute to consolidating authoritarianism in host countries, little is known about the political effects in the deployer country. This article analyses the relationship between foreign and domestic peace processes and far-right forces in Brazil. We ask if Brazil’s leadership role in the United Nations’ Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (2004–17) and its own domestic pacification efforts in Rio de Janeiro with the Pacifying Police Units (2008–14) contributed to the strengthening of the far right in Brazil. Relying on a combination of literature review, document analysis, and fieldwork interviews, we argue that Brazil’s engagement in liberal peacebuilding processes strengthened the far right in Brazil in two important ways. The first was through a military capture of politics, as a large portion of the military elite that participated in both interventions enabled the military to take a more prominent role in Brazil’s domestic politics. Second, Port-au-Prince and Rio de Janeiro became crucial sites for experimentation with a range of policy ideas that Bolsonaro later capitalised on, namely, a punitive turn in security policies and the mobilisation of conservative Evangelical actors and morals to support and justify the military occupation.

Germany’s 2022 Zeitenwende (watershed) has been widely interpreted as a break with Berlin’s decades-long attempts to offer security ‘with rather than against Russia’. In the 1970s, West Germany’s social democrat-led government had embarked on Ostpolitik (Eastern policy) as a way of normalising relations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and other Soviet satellites by fostering closer economic ties with Moscow. This policy was extended by subsequent governments and even endured, though in new form, after the fall of the Berlin wall. Ostpolitik is now commonly seen to have culminated in a Kremlin-friendly political landscape and an economy dependent on Russian gas. More than two years after Zeitenwende, the jury is still out as to whether Ostpolitik has been dismantled or simply remains on hold. This article shows that although German politics has experienced a seismic shift since the invasion, forces of continuity remain in operation. Ostpolitik was always in part the symptom of a desire to do realpolitik in Europe. This urge is unlikely to disappear.

This article challenges the perception of Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) as a revolutionary shift driven by the explosion of publicly accessible data. Instead, we argue that the rise of OSINT reflects an evolution of traditional intelligence practices: the collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of vast amounts of information. While the exponential growth of open–source data is reshaping the intelligence landscape, it is neither revolutionizing nor democratizing intelligence. Rather, it is prompting both state and non–state actors to explore how best to integrate OSINT practices and enhance digital literacy within their communities. Core OSINT challenges – information overload, reliability, and legal and ethical concerns – remain consistent with broader intelligence issues. Addressing these challenges provides a foundation for consolidating OSINT as a community of practice, and linking it to debates on the disputed role of security expertise in the public debate.

Retaining operational effectiveness in a low-carbon world will require military innovation and change. Indeed, there has been growing acknowledgement within some defence ministries that as the world decarbonises a military energy transition is essential. In this paper, we illustrate how calls for a military energy transition have gained renewed traction within the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) since 2018. Empirically, we draw on semi-structured interviews with 46 officials and armed forces personnel, conducted by the authors between June and October 2023. To structure our analysis, we adopt a multilevel perspective (MLP) from the field of Sustainability Transitions. Combining the MLP with insights from the literature on military innovation, we shed light on the ways proponents of ‘low-carbon warfare’ have challenged the ‘high-carbon’ sociotechnical regime that currently dominates the MoD. We also explain why more rapid and disruptive change has been stymied. By centring attention on the extent of ‘alignment’ between internal and external sources of change, our MLP makes a valuable contribution to understanding why the struggle for military change often unfolds in non-linear ways.

Lists have come to define terrorism. In the absence of an agreed-upon definition of what constitutes terrorism, proscription, or the inclusion of non-state armed groups on terrorist lists, has created a new category, a new reality. The material and symbolic consequences of these lists have been explored in human rights law and critical terrorism studies literature. But as the world seems to shift away from the terrorist framing, what happens to the ‘terrorists’ stuck on these lists?

Grounded in empirical research with listed non-state armed groups the article explores how listed actors themselves react to the listings. They should not be seen as mere passive recipients of these labels and lists – they are active agents and able to cope strategically with this stigma. Building on Rebecca Adler-Nissen’s work on stigma in world politics, the article shifts the focus from state to non-state actors and assesses how different listed groups cope using Adler-Nissen’s typology of stigma recognition, stigma rejection, and counter-stigmatisation. This diversity in reaction is unpacked through three case studies (ETA, Hezbollah, and FARC). While some armed groups have tried to explicitly reject the label imposed on them, others have embraced it.

The article traces what happens to the ‘terrorists’, how they are reacting, and whether they can ever escape their condition. Listing regimes have enabled the continuation of the war on terror through their embeddedness in the multilateral system, creating a permanence that can endlessly be reactivated.

This article brings a pragmatic perspective to the analysis of threat perception in two important ways. First, as does the philosophical tradition of pragmatism, the article joins perception (or knowledge) together with response (action). Perception and response, knowledge and action, are inextricably linked as people learn through the creation of knowledge what is useful in the world. It is in this sense that pragmatists understand the perception and response to threats as evolved practices that are conjoined. Second, the paper explores threat perception and response under the condition of radical uncertainty. I explore the kinds of strategies leaders can use to respond to perceived threat in a context of radical uncertainty, the defining characteristic of contemporary world politics, and explore the advantages of pragmatic strategies that proceed to look for ‘what works in the world’ as provisional responses to perceived threats through iterative, ongoing experimental processes.

Threat perception in international relations has received much academic attention and continues to do so. Other contributions to this special section on how leaders feel security dangers or perceive threats with radical uncertainty are closely intertwined with this article’s focus on threats that are vague and not immediately perceptible. Humans possess a capacity for thinking about and imagining the future known as prospection. Faced with threatening futures, can governments prepare their civil servants to systematically manage uncertainties and anticipate dangers? Drawing on empirical data from interviews with foresight practitioners in the United Kingdom and Singapore, this article examines how governments are nudging civil servants to deploy futures techniques as part of threat perception.