This article analyses the integration of Southern Italy into the first wave of financial globalization through the lens of transnational business groups (BGs) and relational infrastructures. Drawing on an original micro-level dataset and employing advanced Social Network Analysis (SNA) techniques, we map the evolving structure of business and financial relationships that connected the Neapolitan periphery to core European financial centres in the nineteenth century.

The article offers a relational reinterpretation of peripheral integration, showing that global capitalism advanced not merely through markets or states, but through densely structured networks of trust, influence and institutional proximity. It proposes a methodological and conceptual framework relevant to comparative histories of financial globalization and to rethinking the role of peripheries in shaping, and not just receiving, the trajectories of modern capitalism.

This article examines the repercussions of the European banking crises of 1931 on Argentina’s banking sector, emphasizing the role of European banks with branches in the country. While existing literature has focused on the spread of financial instability in Europe and the United States, little attention has been given to the effects on developing economies. Argentina, a key destination for European capital, provides a compelling case study. Using balance sheets, financial statements and archival evidence, this study explores how European banks acted as conduits for the transmission of the 1931 crisis. As parent banks in Europe faced strain, their Argentine affiliates experienced significant deposit withdrawals and were forced to revise their balance sheet strategies, heightening vulnerability within Argentina’s banking system. The findings highlight the broader consequences of global financial integration and suggest that the ripple effects of the European meltdown prolonged recessionary pressures in Argentina, altering lending practices long after the initial shock. This research contributes to the historiography of interwar banking, offering a deeper understanding of the dynamics between European and developing economies during the Great Depression, and underscores the need for further exploration of financial instability in peripheral regions.

Do self-imposed short-selling bans stabilise markets or impair them? We study the 1930 restrictions on non-mining shares introduced by the self-regulated Sydney (SSX) and Melbourne (MSX) exchanges one day apart. Using hand-collected daily quotes and trades for four weeks around the bans, we estimate difference-in-differences models by exchange and by listing status, and stratify firms by pre-ban liquidity and returns. Bid–ask spreads widen overall, most for initially illiquid firms and on SSX, while MSX effects are weaker, consistent with brief cross-venue substitution. Trading volumes adjust unevenly, with notable contractions among high-volume non-mining and dual listed firms. Returns show no systematic impact, although relative gains accrued to high-return non-mining firms on SSX. Overall, the bans introduced new frictions in liquidity and participation without providing broad price support. Our results underscore the limited effectiveness of self-regulated short-selling restrictions and offer historical insights for today’s self-regulated markets such as cryptocurrency and over-the-counter trading.