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The social sciences needs more than integrative experimental designs: We need better theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2024

Moshe Hoffman Open the ORCID record for Moshe Hoffman [Opens in a new window] ,
Tadeg Quillien  and
Bethany Burum
Moshe Hoffman*
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA Hoffman.moshe@gmail.com, https://sites.google.com/site/hoffmanmoshe/ bethanyburum@gmail.com, http://bethanyburum.com
Tadeg Quillien
Affiliation:
School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK tadeg.quillien@gmail.com, https://sites.google.com/view/tadeg-quillien/homel
Bethany Burum
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA Hoffman.moshe@gmail.com, https://sites.google.com/site/hoffmanmoshe/ bethanyburum@gmail.com, http://bethanyburum.com
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

Almaatouq et al.'s prescription for more integrative experimental designs is welcome but does not address an equally important problem: Lack of adequate theories. We highlight two features theories ought to satisfy: “Well-specified” and “grounded.” We discuss the importance of these features, some positive exemplars, and the complementarity between the target article's prescriptions and improved theorizing.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 47 , 2024 , e47
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press

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